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Western culture. In large part, is a product of 
scientific inquiry, technological development and the 
ability to harness some of nature's resources. Much of 
society looks to science for technology-related solutions 
to many of its ills. As it develops new technology, 
science necessarily seeks to understand and control the 
forces of nature.
Although science assumes a prominent role in 
contemporary society, that prominence does not 
necessarily translate into cultural consensus on the 
progress achieved by technological developments. Another 
perspective is represented by those who contend that 
continued technological advancement is the source of 
existing problems, not the solution.
As these issues surface, so do questions about how 
to adjudicate them. Who decides which of these issues 
are to be debated by the public? And, who defines the 
terms on which they are argued?
One significant issue to come before the public in 
recent years is recombinant DNA research or genetic 
engineering and its applications. An important spokesman 
on this issue is Jeremy Rifkin. Rifkin is of rhetorical 
interest because of his strategies to sustain the 
dialogue and define the parameters in which it occurs.
This dissertation analyzes a broad range of Rifkin*s 
rhetorical artifacts and those of scientists engaged in
v
recombinant DNA research. They are examined against 
criteria developed to identify and understand heresy.
The five areas of analysis are: the 
nearness/remoteness phenomenon, the social construction 
of heresy, the social consequences of heresy, the 
doctrinal consequences of heresy, and the heresy-hunt 
ritual. The first two criteria focus on the rhetorical 
strategies of the heretic. The last three concentrate on 
the rhetorical strategies of the defenders of the 
institutional orthodoxy.
This dissertation examines the rhetorical strategies 
of a heretical challenge to the scientific establishment 
and the consequences of that challenge. This 
dissertation also analyzes the rhetorical strategies 
employed by the defenders of the scientific orthodoxy. 
Although an understanding of the rhetorical strategies 
employed on both sides of this conflict is important, the 
implications for the role of rhetoric in highly 





Western culture, in large part, is a product of 
scientific inquiry, technological development, and the 
ability to harness some of nature's resources.
Contemporary society appears to require of scientists 
continued emphasis on the discovery of knowledge, the 
development of technology, and the control of nature in an 
effort to achieve continued and more rapid progress. 
Richard Weaver suggests that progress has become deified 
in America because it is "probably the only term which 
gives to the average American or West European of today a 
concept of something bigger than himself, which he is 
socially impelled to accept and even sacrifice for."1
Although science assumes a prominent role in 
contemporary society, that prominence does not necessarily 
translate into cultural consensus on the progress achieved 
by technological developments. While each new technology 
may introduce a new technique, process or product, it is 
often accompanied by a side effect or by-product that is 
perceived as less than beneficial by some segment of the 
population. In fact, it is not uncommon for some new 
technologies to be condemned because people fear that they 
introduce more disadvantages than benefits.
1
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A heterogeneous culture is expected to produce 
divergent views on issues of public importance. So, as 
these issues surface and different opinions evolve, the 
questions become: How are these issues adjudicated? Who 
decides what gets brought before the public for debate?
Who defines the terms on which the issues are argued?
An important societal issue brought to the public 
forum in recent years is the recombinant DNA 
(deoxyribonucleic acid) discoveries of the 1970s. 
Recombinant DNA is the term used in scientific circles for 
what has generally been labeled "genetic engineering" and 
"biotechnology" in discussions involving the public and 
popular press. In 1973, two scientists, Herbert Boyer and 
Stanley Cohen, developed procedures to produce 
"recombinant DNA molecules" from two different parental 
DNA molecules. With the development came the practical 
application of combining DNA molecules, or genes, across 
previously inviolable species boundaries. James D. Watson 
and John Tooze succinctly stated the significance of the 
discovery when they declared that, "Without doubt 
molecular geneticists now had the power to alter life on a 
scale never before thought possible by serious 
scientists."2
Since the early discoveries it has been this "power 
to alter life on a scale never before thought possible" 
that has haunted both proponents and opponents of
3
recombinant DNA. Scientists view recombinant DNA as the 
gateway to unprecedented medical applications, greatly 
increased plant and animal food and fiber production 
efficiency, and other biological achievements never before 
thought possible. Opponents of recombinant DNA argue that 
while there are potential benefits from the technology, 
the potential for unprecedented problems far outweighs the 
positive effects. Opponents contend that recombinant DNA 
experiments raise issues that transcend scientific 
inquiry. They argue that the experiments affect the 
population beyond the laboratory and that the decisions 
about these investigations should extend to the public at 
large.
An important spokesman on the issue of genetic 
engineering is Jeremy Rifkin. Although there are other 
people involved in this issue, none is as rhetorically 
interesting as Rifkin. Although he is not a scientist, 
Rifkin challenges the entire scientific community and with 
it influential scientists, multi-national corporations, 
universities, and government agencies. Rifkin's appeal to 
those interested in rhetorical studies lies in his 
strategies and his ability to achieve a measure of success 
in a confrontation questioning the legitimacy and 
necessity of a highly popular technology. Although Rifkin 
did not initiate the debate, I contend that he does more
4
than any other individual to sustain the dialogue and 
define the parameters in which it occurs.
Much of Rifkin's success is a result of his defining 
the genetic engineering issue in terms of "us vs. them." 
His definition of "us" is a value-oriented culture with a 
perspective of the world that focuses on what he terms 
empathetic relationships between human beings and nature. 
Rifkin's definition of "them" is a scientific 
establishment that places its guest for empirical data 
above the scrutiny of public opinion and virtually ignores 
questions of values and ethics that arise from the 
research. Rifkin argues, "We can choose to engineer the 
life of the planet, creating a second nature in our image, 
or we can choose to participate with the rest of the 
living kingdom. Two futures, two choices.”3 Rifkin 
strategically places these two perspectives at opposite 
ends of a continuum that provides little, if any, middle 
ground on which compromise might be attempted or consensus 
achieved.
On one end of Rifkin's continuum is what he calls 
"...an ecological approach, a stewardship approach."4 
Rifkin advocates the development of a philosophy of 
science that "...works with the environment, that is 
empathetic to the natural resource base rather than a 
philosophy of science based on exploitation and short-term 
gains only."5 Rifkin argues for an economic philosophy
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based on "...justice for the homo sapiens species and 
equity and justice for all the other creatures that we 
have on this planet."6 Rifkin claims renouncing the 
scientific world view and the technological achievement it 
fosters is requisite to achieving the empathetic world 
view that he envisions. Rifkin argues that society must 
renounce "...the use of power as a means of obtaining 
security" if it is to survive.7 Moreover, he appeals for 
a commitment "...that can erase the need for a nuclear 
bomb and genetic engineering from the collective 
consciousness of the human race."6
On the other end of Rifkin's continuum is the 
scientific establishment. Rifkin contends that the 
controlling influence in society is science: "If there is
a universal faith today, a faith that supersedes political 
ideologies, economic philosophies and religious doctrines, 
it is most assuredly the faith we place in the scientific 
world view."8 Rifkin argues that nuclear fission and 
recombinant DMA are products of this world view and 
represent a "unique way of thinking, a special approach to 
understanding the world..."10
Rifkin contends that what he terms the scientific 
world view reflects society's obsession with 
predictability and order, a need to control. Rifkin's 
chronology of the scientific world view identifies Francis 
Bacon, Rene' Descartes, Isaac Newton, John Locke, Adam
6
Smith, and Charles Darwin as its founders. Rifkin credits 
Bacon with changing the Western approach to knowledge from 
asking the "why" of phenomena to the asking of Mhow.H 
With this change, Rifkin argues that Bacon defined ",..an 
objective world out there whose secrets can be discovered 
and exploited to advance human ends."11 Rifkin suggests 
that Descartes embraced Bacon's notion of the world and 
developed the tools to pursue that approach to 
investigations. Descartes, Rifkin says, defined the world 
in mathematical terms and, in the process, "...drained it 
of colours, feelings and every other non-quantifiable 
consideration. What was left was pure matter, devoid of 
any meaning."12 Rifkin observes that though the world 
may be without meaning, it is not without activity.
Rifkin claims Newton's laws formed the foundation of 
Europeans' construction of the world as a giant machine. 
Rifkin adds, "It became fashionable among scholars to use 
mechanical terminology to explain and rationalize every 
aspect of life.."13 Rifkin claims that Locke, then, 
defined individuals as small bits of matter with no other 
purpose than perpetuating themselves. This notion, 
according to Rifkin, leads to an intensely materialistic 
view of the world. From that perspective, Rifkin suggests 
it was a small leap for Adam Smith to develop the 
rationale that "...only by each individual attempting to 
maximize his own material advantage that the common good
7
of society is advanced."14 Finally, Rifkin claims that 
Darwin's theory of evolution and natural selection 
provided human beings superior minds and, therefore,
"... superior means of exercising power and control over 
our surroundings."15
Rifkin's depiction of the evolution of the scientific 
world is an assumption on which he builds most of his 
arguments against the scientific establishment. As he 
sets about to define the issues in the recombinant DNA 
debate, Rifkin proposes that these ideas "...continue to 
animate the public life of our nation today" in the form 
of a scientific world view.16
Rifkin has approached the subject of genetic 
engineering and several environmental issues through 
multiple media. His challenges to genetic engineering 
have come through lawsuits, demonstrations, interviews, 
lectures, books and other public forums.17 Rifkin has 
authored or coauthored at least six books, including 
Entropy: Into the Greenhouse World. Algenv. Declaration of 
a_Heretic, Time, Wat-S, Who Should Plav God. The Emerging 
0£d££, The North Will Rise Again, and Biosphere Politics. 
Though all of these publications reflect Rifkin's 
environmental activist approach, Alaeny addresses the 
issue of genetic engineering most directly. Other topics 
are discussed in Algenv. but this treatise is Rifkin's
8
most ambitious attempt to develop arguments against 
scientific defenders of genetic manipulation.
The National Journal declared Rifkin to be one of the 
nation's most influential spokesmen against genetic 
engineering—someone who can greatly influence federal 
policy.18
Rifkin asserts that he is not anti-agriculture, but 
much of his involvement in the biotechnology debate 
clearly runs counter to what agricultural leaders consider 
to be in their best interests. Rifkin has slowed, 
delayed, and even stopped some testing of genetically 
engineered organisms intended for agricultural use. In 
April 1986, The New York Times reported that the United 
States Department of Agriculture (USDA) suspended the 
license and halted the sale of the first live genetically 
altered virus released into the environment. The two-week 
suspension came in response to a petition from Rifkin's 
Foundation for Economic Trends.19
In April 1987, The New York Times published an 
article by Rifkin that raised ethical and economic 
concerns about a Patent and Trademark Office decision to 
patent as a "human invention" any animal engineered with 
characteristics not attainable through classical breeding 
techniques. Rifkin enlisted the help of farm 
organizations, animal activist groups, and several members
of Congress to cut off Patent and Trademark Office animal
20patenting activities.
Although Rifkin employs a multimedia strategy in his 
challenge of genetic engineering, he does not define the 
audience to which he directs his persuasive efforts.
While science and scientists appear to be the subject of 
many of his rhetorical efforts, the materials examined in 
this study do not suggest that these individuals 
constitute his sole audience. Much of Rifkin's work seems 
to rely on the judicial system and regulatory agencies as 
means to stopping or delaying genetic engineering 
research. So, it appears that the decision makers in 
these institutions make up at least part of Rifkin's 
constituency. Otherwise, Rifkin's speeches, lectures, 
books, articles, etc., are tailored for mass media and 
mass consumption. Certainly, when one considers Rifkin's 
arguments one might reasonably assume that Rifkin hopes to 
appeal to the broadest audience possible.
Statement of Purpose
Rifkin's high profile rhetorical approach to 
confronting social issues makes him an important 
individual to investigate, and although many of his works 
will be included in this study as examples of rhetorical 
responses to social situations, the scope of this study 
extends beyond this one man. Rifkin's ability to delay 
and stop biotechnology experimental projects indicates
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that he has developed rhetorical strategies that have had 
a significant measure of influence. Rifkin's involvement 
in the legislative process for the purpose of establishing 
guidelines for biotechnology experimentation and the 
resulting governmental regulations is also reflective of 
his considerable rhetorical expertise.
Notably, Rifkin achieves his successes arguing 
against the powerful and pervasive scientific community, 
and his successes have been won battling an 
extraordinarily popular technology that holds the promise 
of "miracle" medical cures, dramatic agricultural 
advances, and spectacular societal changes.
From its inception, biotechnology research generated 
such inertia that it virtually defied challenges. Yet, 
challenges were precisely what Jeremy Rifkin initiated, 
and with a measure of success. The purpose of this study, 
then, is to examine rhetorical methods and their 
implications when they become the instruments used to 
challenge powerful, highly persuasive issues, ideas, or 
institutions. In the hands of Jeremy Rifkin, rhetoric 
becomes a tool that at once draws impassioned rebuttals 
from the scientific community and moves people outside 
science to question the freedom with which scientific 
inquiries are conducted. Rifkin approaches the issue of 
genetic engineering with a self-proclaimed heretical 
perspective.
It is this notion of heresy and the rhetorical stance 
it implies that will be the focus of this dissertation.
The word heresy has its roots in the Greek term hairesis 
meaning "action of taking, choice, sect" akin to the Greek 
horme meaning assault or attack.21 One definition of 
sect, according Webster's Third New International 
Dictionary, is "a dissenting religious body; especially: 
one that is heretical in the eyes of other members within 
the same communion."22 The idea of heresy springs from 
conflicts within the Roman Catholic Church and refers to 
"a sin of one who, having been baptized and retaining the 
name of Christian, pertinaciously denies or doubts any of 
the truths that one is under obligation of divine and 
Catholic faith to believe."23 For the purposes of this 
study, heresy is defined more broadly to include the 
beliefs of individuals that deviate from the orthodoxy of 
social institutions other than the Church and threaten the 
stability of the controlling values and assumptions of 
those institutions. From this perspective, heresy is 
viewed as a rhetorical endeavor in which its proponents 
engage in dialectical efforts to persuade others to 
forsake existing orthodoxy for their "new orthodoxy." 
Although heresy, by definition, is a deviance from the 
status quo and carries several pejorative connotations, it 
remains an effective means of persuasion under certain 
circumstances. This paradox raises some important
12
questions about the role of the rhetor who chooses heresy 
as a rhetorical strategy. First, if the heretic is to
be effective, one of his challenges is to develop a cadre 
of followers, a sect or dissenting body that is, as the 
Merriam-Webster dictionary termed it, "heretical in the 
eyes of other members within the same communion." Having 
forfeited whatever ethos he may have earned by simply 
being a member of the group, how does the rhetor acquire 
the credibility necessary to be effective? How does the 
heretic justify his position of being both inside the 
group and outside? How does the rhetor create and 
maintain the ethos of the heretical notion he advocates? 
How does the rhetor incorporate orthodoxy into his 
rhetorical strategies to further heretical notions? 
Finally, is there a form to heresy as a rhetorical 
strategy?
This dissertation suggests that Jeremy Rifkin employs 
a rhetoric of heresy in his opposition to genetic 
engineering and examines Rifkin's rhetorical strategies in 
an attempt to answer these and other questions.
Jeremv Rifkin; A Voice for Extreme Viewpoints
Pinpointing the origin of what Rifkin's detractors 
call his extremist views is difficult, but they began 
surfacing during his undergraduate days in the Wharton 
School of Finance at the University of Pennsylvania. His 
involvement in campus politics became more visible when he
13
was elected president of his class, during which time he 
earned a reputation as an accomplished speaker. In 1966, 
some of Rifkin's fraternity friends attacked other 
students who were picketing the university's 
administration building. This incident provoked Rifkin to 
organize a "freedom of speech" rally, paving the way for 
future activities in the peace movement. Following his 
graduation from the University of Pennsylvania, Rifkin 
continued his education at the Fletcher School of Law and 
Diplomacy of Tufts University in Medford, Massachusetts, 
where he earned a master's degree in international 
affairs.2*
Beginning with his college days, Rifkin sought 
controversial, even confrontational, issues in which to 
involve himself. Rifkin set the pattern for his career 
when, according to his curriculum vitae, he was "a sponsor 
of the first national rally against the Vietnam War." In 
1969, he helped create a citizens' commission to help 
publicize Vietnam veterans who had personal reports of how 
the United States was violating international 
agreements.25
Rifkin came to national prominence in 1976 when he 
organized the People's Bicentennial Commission as a 
counter-celebration to the national Bicentennial 
Celebration. Its activities included mocking the
14
pageantry of the national activities and publicizing the 
"sins" of corporate America.
Following the Bicentennial festivities, Rifkin 
founded and became co-director of The People's Business 
Commission in Washington, D.C. The commission was 
described as "an educational organization dedicated to 
challenging the abuses of corporate power and to 
mobilizing public support for democratic alternatives to 
the present economic system." In 1977, Rifkin established 
the Foundation for Economic Trends, the successor to the 
People's Business Commission. These organizations 
provided Rifkin the opportunity to debate the interrelated 
issues of organized labor, the decline of the industrial 
Northeast, and the manipulation of capital. Part of the 
product of these efforts was the collaboration and 
coauthorship of several books.27
About the time his first books were being published, 
Rifkin's attention turned to the implications of 
scientific research into recombinant DNA and the prospects 
of genetic manipulation. His entry into the fray began in 
1977, when he and some followers made an uninvited 
appearance at a meeting of scientists organized by the 
National Academy of Sciences. As one of the meeting 
organizers rose to speak, Rifkin's colleagues stood and 
sang "We shall not be cloned” to the tune of "We Shall
Z€LOvercome." Since that time, Rifkin has taken a more
15
conventional, but no less confrontational, approach. He 
has challenged regulatory agencies, corporations, 
universities, and others engaged in biotechnology research 
with court orders and law suits.
Rifkin is in considerable demand on the speaking and 
lecture circuit, having participated in more than 100 
conferences and meetings in eight countries during one 16 
month period. During the past decade he has spoken on 300 
college campuses, usually in what he calls "A One-Day 
Interdisciplinary Residency with Jeremy Rifkin," for which
29he received $4,500.
There is no evidence to suggest Rifkin's background 
includes the formal study of science, but according to 
Liebe Cavalieri, a molecular biologist at Sloan-Kettering 
Hospital in New York, "Jeremy is extremely intelligent and 
grasps scientific issues immediately, if you take the 
trouble to explain them."30
Though not a scientist, Rifkin has no reservations 
about commenting on science, both verbally and in writing. 
His three most popular books, The Emerging Order; God in 
the. Aqg g.f Scarcity, Entropy: Into the Greenhouse World, 
and Algenv challenge the basis of scientific inquiry.
The Emerging Order is a scathing attack on political 
liberalism, crediting it with "Vietnam, Watergate and 
related scandals, failed social experiments, inflation and 
unemployment..." and labeling it as a system of
16
exploitation. Rifkin argues that the whole liberal 
approach is based on the "possibility of unlimited 
economic growth.1,31 This growth, of course, is made 
possible by growing industrialization that generated 
scientific inquiry. Rifkin says that nature was once seen 
as divine and mysterious, but the coming of the scientific 
age reduced it to quantitative physical phenomena. Rifkin 
says, "Desacralized and reduced to mathematics, the world 
became nothing more than material for manipulation."32 
Emerging Order carries another of the themes present in 
most of Rifkin's works—an attack on "progress.” He says 
the "age of materialism has been characterized by the 
notion of progress.... the process by which the 'less 
ordered' natural world is harnessed by people to create a
33more ordered material environment."
Entropy: Into the Greenhouse World is Rifkin's view 
of a deteriorating environment in which he argues that the 
burning of fossil fuels is at once creating a shortage of 
energy and producing detrimental, perhaps fatal, 
environmental conditions.34 Rifkin discusses in detail 
what he describes as the "entropy effect" or the Second 
Law of Thermodynamics. The First Law of Thermodynamics, 
Rifkin explains, is that all energy and matter in the 
universe are constant and can be neither created nor 
destroyed. The second law and the entropy effect states 
that matter and energy can be changed in only one
17
direction, "that is, from useable to unusable, or from 
available to unavailable."35 with a detailed chronology 
of the development of the "machine age" or the scientific 
world view, Rifkin revives his argument against "unlimited 
growth" and "progress."
In Alqenv. Rifkin depicts Darwin's theory of 
evolution as a contribution to the scientific world view 
that has resulted in the development of biotechnology. 
Rifkin says, "The recombinant DNA process is the most 
dramatic technological tool to date in the growing
36biotechnological arsenal." With that statement Rifkin 
launches into a full scale attack on biotechnology, 
predicting detrimental effects on the environment, 
society, the economy, and humanity in general. Rifkin 
suggests that humanity is faced with two choices for its 
future. It can choose to "engineer the life of the 
planet, creating a second nature in our image, or we can 
choose to participate with the rest of the living 
kingdom."37 Rifkin argues that the next generation is 
being reared on information that will make it more 
accepting of the "engineered" approach to modifying living 
beings than is the current generation.
Many of the ideas and arguments in Alqeny appear to 
be distilled and refined from an earlier book on 
biotechnology written by Rifkin and Ted Howard. In Who 
Should Play God?. Rifkin and Howard describe the genesis
18
of recombinant: DNA and assume an unapologetic stance 
against the technology. They declare that, "...this book 
is not intended to be value-free...on this question we 
side with the opponents of genetic engineering, and this 
book is intended to reflect that point of view.1,38
Beginning with chapter two and continuing through the 
remaining chapters, Rifkin and Howard pursue the issue of 
eugenics. Citing example upon example of mankind's 
fascination with creating the perfect human being, Rifkin 
and Howard paint a chilling portrait of the dark side of 
biotechnology and how they predict it may ultimately 
affect the human race. They state their case 
metaphorically: "It is these bits of genetic data [DNA] 
that molecular biologists are now learning to read. Once 
having learned the letters of the alphabet, they will 
ultimately be able to write."39
Time Wars is another of Rifkin's arguments against 
advancing technology. He contends that the increasing 
emphasis on efficiency places a greater premium on saving 
time and time-saving technologies. This push for greater 
efficiency outstrips what he calls "nature's own 
production and recycling rhythms" to such an extent that 
the planet's "ecosystems are no longer capable of renewing 
resources as fast as they are being depleted, or recycling 
waste as fast as we discard it."40
19
Rifkin discusses in detail what he sees as the 
detrimental effect of computers and their ability to 
compress time. Rifkin says, "The new 'computime' 
represents the final abstraction of time and its complete 
separation from human experience and the rhythms of 
nature."41 Rifkin asserts, "The computer represents the 
ultimate technological expression of our culture's 
obsession with efficiency."42
Rifkin argues that the manipulation of time is a 
means of acquiring and maintaining power. Citing examples 
such as the shrinking official allotment of time 
corporations allow for mourning the loss of a family 
member and the economic reasons for the seven-day work 
week, Rifkin argues that time has become a powerful 
political instrument.43 He says, "In the computer age, 
information is power and that power is becoming 
increasingly centralized in the hands of a small coterie 
of public bureaucracies and giant corporations."44
Rifkin appeals to people in Time Wars, as in most of 
his writings, to live more harmoniously with nature in 
what he calls "a partnership based on a deep and abiding 
respect for the rhythms of the planet." But, he says, to 
accomplish this, "we would have to be willing to give up 
the long-standing alliance of perspective and power and 
seek a new temporal orientation based on an empathetic
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union with the biological and physical clocks of 
nature."45
Declaration of a Heretic is Rifkin's frontal assault 
on the scientific world view. In his introduction to this 
book, Rifkin explains that "If there is a universal faith 
today, a faith that supersedes political ideologies, 
economic philosophies and religious doctrines, it is most 
assuredly the faith we place in the scientific world 
view."46 Rifkin suggests, though, that this faith is 
unfounded. He believes it is "possible that the 
scientific world view of the Enlightenment has run its 
course, and that by continuing to adhere unqualifiedly to 
its assumptions, we make the world a less secure and more 
dangerous place to live in."47
Rifkin takes direct aim at what he suggests are the 
two most dramatic technological developments of the modern 
era—the splitting of the atom and genetic engineering. In 
his discussions on the development of nuclear power,
Rifkin argues that even after we know the benefits and 
dangers of splitting the atom and we know that the dangers 
may outweigh the benefits, we must continue the 
technology. He contends we no longer have the ability to 
say no to technology. Rifkin says, "To reject the 
experiment is to threaten our world view, to question our 
approach to knowledge and to undermine our traditional 
relationship to technology.1,48
In his criticism of genetic engineering, Rifkin 
suggests that the primary objectives of technology are 
efficiency and speed. He claims that genetic engineering 
is "so contrary to the underlying principles of the 
ecological vision as to constitute a totally different 
conception of the future."48 Rifkin contends that the 
notion of species as a separate entity with a unique 
nature loses its significance with the recombining of 
genetic traits across species barriers. He suggests that 
there is nothing to stop scientists from making whatever 
crosses they choose. Rifkin implies that researchers in 
molecular biology believe "that there is nothing 
particularly sacred about the concept of a species." He 
extends that notion to include human genes.30
In the final chapter, Rifkin says, "It is time to 
entertain the ultimate heresy: to consider the idea of 
renouncing the use of power as a means of obtaining 
security.1,51
In essence, we can see that all of Rifkin's writings
are heretical. In his introduction to Declaration of a
Heretic. Rifkin asks several questions that surface, in
one form or another, in each of his books:
Is it heresy to suggest that the particular approach 
to knowledge we have given our allegiance to, for 
these past several hundred years, is alienating us 
even further from the natural world we so desperately 
seek to understand? Is it heresy to suggest that the 
fruits of the scientific world view have been a mixed 
blessing, often causing more harm than good? Is it 
heresy to suggest that the two great scientific
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discoveries of this century provide us with 
inordinate power over the forces of nature and ought not to be used? Is it heresy to suggest that 
alternative approaches to science and technology are 
indeed possible to contemplate and act upon?
There is a sense of irony in these rhetorical
questions because Rifkin suggests that the status quo
considers such questions heretical, yet he believes the
views implied by the questions should, if fact, represent
the status quo. As Rifkin raises these issues again and
again in his books, the reader sees more clearly that his
approach to these issues certainly cannot be considered
mainstream. He admits at one point that his point of view
is often considered irrational by those in the scientific
community.
The parentage of Rifkin*s challenges appears to 
reside in the Frankfurt School, reflecting the ideas of 
Jurgen Habermas and others. Rifkin*s criticism of the 
scientific community frequently centers on what he 
describes as the scientists' will to dominate and control 
nature. Habermas contends that mastering nature is seen 
by the scientific-technological community as a 
"precondition of freedom." However, he predicts this 
"boundless will to control" may result in the destruction 
of nature by threatening the very ground of survival.54
Habermas concerns himself not only with modern man's 
preoccupation with controlling nature, but also the 
effects of a population that exceeds the limitations of
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the world's finite resources, and in the process deprives 
itself of what he calls the "basic sensual-aesthetic" 
needs.53 He argues that continued industrialization, 
contamination, and destruction of the environment bring 
people to the realization that there are limits to 
aesthetic deprivation. So, according to Habermas, it is 
not just the environmental equilibrium that rapidly 
advancing technology puts in jeopardy, but the coping 
capacity of the world's citizenry. Habermas suggests that 
this inability to cope manifests itself in fears and 
anxieties, "In the fear generated by atomic power plants, 
nuclear waste, or gene manipulation, there is certainly a 
good bit of justified anxiety."56
Habermas has cited developing crises that have become 
some of Rifkin's points of contention. For example, 
Habermas believes that ecological balance is threatened by 
continued growth in population and production worldwide.
He observes that "The economic needs of a growing 
population and the productive exploitation of nature are 
faced with material restrictions: on the one hand, finite 
resources...; on the other hand, irreplaceable ecological 
systems...."57 Rifkin echoes Habermas' concern about 
imbalance in international power evolving from the 
development of nuclear weapons. Habermas suggests that 
although nuclear technology is neutral, "The accumulated
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potential for annihilating is a result of the advance 
stage of productive forces."58
Dieter Wellershoff warns, as does Rifkin, of a dark 
future in which fossil fuels are depleted, increasing air 
pollution and water contamination, destruction of the 
ozone layer, and the disintegration of the ecosystem in 
the "deadly final lap of the technological-industrial 
civilization that now begins to span the entire 
globe... "59
Among Rifkin*s demands of the scientific community, 
and a goal toward which much of his rhetoric is directed, 
is public participation in the decision-making process for 
implementing and expanding technological discoveries. 
Habermas, before Rifkin, cited the need for a more 
dialectical approach when he declared that it is a 
"...question of setting into motion a politically 
effective discussion that rationally brings the social 
potential constituted by technical knowledge and ability
into a defined and controlled relation to our practical
60knowledge and will.” Habermas argues that the mass 
populations have become depoliticized and the public realm 
has declined as a political institution. The result, he 
says, is "...a system of domination that tends to exclude 
practical questions from public discussion."61 The 
question that Habermas believes should be opened to public 
debate is not whether society uses all of the potential
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available to it through science and technology, but 
”...whether we choose what we want for the purpose of the 
pacification and gratification of existence.1,62 Habermas 
contends that the solution is in unrestricted 
communication.
Clearly, the ideas of an environment with finite 
resources, the adverse effects of increasing efforts to 
control nature, the self-perpetuating world-view of 
technological advancement, and the necessity of public 
discussion of the conduct of science found their genesis 
in philosophical circles long before Rifkin brought them 
before the American public. Although Rifkin's position on 
these issues is not original, his ability to adapt these 
arguments for the general populace and persuasively argue 
his position as a heretic in the shadow of what many would 
consider an intimidating scientific presence, makes the 
man and his rhetoric the focus of this dissertation.
Review of Literature
The relationship between rhetoric and science, even 
in its best moments, can be described as no better than an 
uneasy coexistence. Science has endured the criticism of 
rhetoric proponents who contend first that there must be 
more to scientific inquiry than simply empirical data; 
human values must be considered. Rhetoric extends its 
argument to the notion that even the most basic of 
scientific data are based on assumptions that cannot be
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empirically verified. Meanwhile, proponents of science 
counter that rhetoric is argument based on beliefs, 
intuition, and other equally empirically unverifiable 
notions. Proponents of science argue that at least the 
ability to quantify their findings provides tangible proof 
for their positions.
Contemporary scholars of rhetoric, seeking a more 
comfortable grasp on this extremely thorny issue, have set 
out to prove that science itself is rhetorical. Herbert 
Simons, for instance, suggests that the doing of science 
is a consensual undertaking, i.e., a scientist proposing a 
new procedure seeks consensus on his approach to the task 
by following prescribed procedures and submitting his 
findings to a technical journal in his field of endeavor 
for peer review and approval or consensus.63 other 
rhetorical scholars support the notion that the seeking of 
consensus among scientists is a rhetorical act.64 This 
perspective of the rhetoric of science examines the 
rhetorical acts scientists employ to persuade other 
scientists.65
Particularly relevant to this study are the works of 
Thomas B. Farrell and 6. Thomas Goodnight; Alan Gross; 
Michael Calvin McGee and Martha Anne Martin; and Walter 
Fisher who address the issue of the failure of technical 
reasoning to resolve social issues.
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Farrell and Goodnight argue that because of the "root 
metaphors" of industrial expansion "...the invention of 
advanced technology has had the unintended effect of 
technologizing rhetorical invention."66 They propose that 
this "technologizing” often excludes external audiences 
from participation. In fact, Farrell and Goodnight offer 
a rather direct indictment of technical communication: "So 
long as the assumptions, procedures, expectations, and 
formats of technical communication and surrogate discourse 
operate within undisturbed patterns, they are virtually 
self-conf irming.1,67 They contend that it is not until a 
crisis such as the Three-Mile Island mishap occurs that 
the communication patterns are broken and their 
inadequacies revealed.
From his investigation of the recombinant DNA debate, 
Alan Gross concludes that the more the opposing sides 
argued the issues the more divided they became. He 
observes that "Throughout, official bodies of redress, by 
their divided action, or inaction, facilitated stalemate 
rather than synthesis.1166 Gross contends that his study 
affirms the conclusions of the Farrell and Goodnight work 
and that "Both analyses conclude that conflicting societal 
assumptions were responsible for the failed attempt to 
deal with threatened disaster."60
Michael Calvin McGee and Martha Anne Martin attack 
technical reasoning from a slightly different approach.
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They suggest technical reasoning and discourse is a power 
play by misguided elitists who choose to make experts of 
themselves. In their view, a new way of thinking about 
expertise is required, one which is properly skeptical of 
claims to practical knowledge.1,70 They believe a move in 
that direction has already begun as "thinkers" are coming 
to believe "that expert advice is but an opinion argued 
more and less persuasively."71
Gross concludes that the question raised by the 
discussions of Farrell, Goodnight, McGee, Martin, and 
himself is not whether society should protect science and 
technology; rather can society abandon the idea that 
science and technology hold the solutions to social 
problems and can society find a consensual answer to the 
questions that science and technology raise?72
Walter Fisher, recognizing technical reasoning's 
failure to resolve social issues, concludes that all human 
communication contains "...mythos— ideas that cannot be 
verified or proved in any absolute way..."73 Arguing 
that "Humans as rhetorical beings are as much valuing as 
they are reasoning animals," Fisher suggests that value 
judgements are unavoidable, that they are not irrational, 
and that people are not likely to arrive at a consensus 
about them.74 Fisher contends that part of the failure 
of technical reasoning is that it ignores what makes a
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value valuable—that: a value "makes a pragmatic difference 
in one's life and in one's community."73
In his essay proposing narration as a paradigm of 
communication, Fisher suggests that technical reasoning is 
effective within its specialized communities, however, 
when a scientific issue migrates from its scientific 
cloister into the public arena, the rules of advocacy 
change.76 Fisher contends that the rational world 
paradigm simply does not account for issues raised by the 
"good reasons" expressed in public moral arguments. He 
suggests that "when arguers appealing to justice and 
equality contend with adversaries who base their case on 
success, survival, and liberty, they talk past each 
other."77
Another area of investigation examines how scientists 
persuade nonscientific audiences. The public television 
series Cosmos. hosted by Carl Sagan, is an example of one 
scientist's effort to popularize science. Thomas Lessl, 
in his analysis of the Cosmos series, suggests that the 
statement of theories as fact and the diminished adherence 
to scientific protocol are two of Sagan's tools for 
elevating the ethos of science. Additionally, Lessl 
suggests that Sagan depicts science as the culmination of 
an evolutionary cycle that legitimizes its assertions as 
the salvation for mankind.78
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E.O. Wilson, a Harvard entomologist, is another 
example of a scientist popularizing science, but in a 
different context from that of Sagan. John Lyne and Henry 
Howe analyzed Wilson's rhetorical methods as he parlayed 
his expertise in entomology into a popularized approach to 
social biology. The question at the heart of the article 
is "What makes an expert an expert?" The authors' 
observations and conclusions suggest that "instead of 
being hemmed in by disciplinary standards, the expert can 
blur the lines of demarcation between scientific paradigms 
and, thereby, elude accountability to any of them."78
Lyne and Howe point out that Wilson's movement among 
audiences of varying expertise provided him with an 
environment of ever-changing criteria. These criteria set 
by audiences beyond his discipline allowed him more 
freedom for generalizations in his interpretation of 
scientific data. The authors argue that Wilson's 
standards "float within the context of argument."
Lyne and Howe conclude with another problematic
question, "How do we hold to account the expert who
constructs expertise rhetorically, moving from one
discourse frame to another, and eluding the controls of
80any or all of them?" In other words, when the 
scientist moves from the structured confines of his 
discipline where his peers determine the validity of his 
science and takes his perspective to the non-scientist
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public, where is the control on the validity of his 
arguments?
still another frequently used approach to 
popularizing science comes as the nonscientist takes 
science to the naive public. During his presidency,
Ronald Reagan chose his "Star Wars" address to persuade 
his audience of the necessity of science and call for an 
increase in defense spending. Janice Rushing argues 
that Reagan rhetorically situated scientists in a "no-win" 
situation by crediting them with the development of the 
ultimate weapon—the nuclear bomb-and with it the 
capability to destroy humanity, but then charging them 
with the responsibility for using their science to protect 
humanity from annihilation.82 Rushing argues that 
Reagan's "star Wars" speech "encapsulates technical 
reasoning within a myth which creates the illusion of both 
preserving science and transcending its
83transgressions."
Rushing says Reagan's rhetorical triumph in the "Star 
Wars" speech is the linking of technology and the mythic 
frontier so that "technology unleashed will 'open up the 
high frontier of space,' 'tap its unlimited 
resources,'....so that 'free enterprise investment' might 
continue to be enjoyed by the 'Free World allies."'8*
Rushing posits that one of the primary failings of 
the "Star Wars" address is that the Frontier metaphor is
32
inadequate to deal with the complexities of space and the 
new technology—the hero no longer rides a horse, but a 
machine that travels infinitely faster than its 
predecessor.85
This review of literature suggests a lack of critical 
investigations of rhetoricians who employ a wide range of 
rhetorical strategies, methods, and tools to confront a 
prominent scientific establishment and who attempt to 
expose scientific inquiry to increased public scrutiny. 
This dissertation will help fill that void. I suggest 
that an articulate, well-informed, nonscientist, such as 
Jeremy Rifkin, is able to analyze the vulnerabilities of 
genetic engineering and tailor rhetorical strategies to 
attack those weaknesses. In the process, Rifkin brings to 
public view the inadequacies of technological reasoning to 
address social concerns about scientific endeavors.
Methodology
Defining rhetoric by its function, Kenneth Burke says
rhetoric is "the use of words by human agents to form
attitudes or to induce actions in other human 
86agents..." Elaborating on that definition, Burke adds 
that rhetoric is "the use of language as a symbolic means 
of inducing cooperation in beings that by nature respond 
to symbols."87 Although Rifkin employs nonverbal, overt 
activities occasionally to influence his audiences, his 
primary tool, and the focus of this dissertation, is
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language. Both in books and in discourse, Rifkin uses 
words to move or persuade his audiences to his point of 
view.
This dissertation will follow a critical approach
outlined by Karlyn Kohrs Campbell. She suggests that
rhetorical criticism is the result of a three-stage
process: locating "the unique characteristics of a
discourse...," analysis of "the internal workings of the
discourse and its relation to its milieu...,” and
selection or creation of a "system of criticism to make
88evaluative judgments of its quality and effects."
Campbell explains that the first stage of the 
process, descriptive analysis, is "entirely intrinsic; 
that is, the critic makes the descriptive statements 
solely on the basis of the content of the discourse
ogitself." Similarly, this author will closely examine 
the materials selected for this study, paying particular 
attention to the tone, purpose, structure, and strategy of 
language usage.
The second step of Campbell's critical process is 
historical-contextual analysis. This stage of the 
investigation requires the critic to examine extrinsic 
elements of discourse. Campbell suggests that the critic 
study "the audience, the historical-cultural context, 
other persuasive forces, and the rhetorician himself."90 
In concert with this approach, this dissertation details
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the audiences to whom Jeremy Rifkin directs his rhetoric, 
the historical-cultural context of genetic engineering, 
and a sketch of Rifkin*s rhetorical credentials and his 
evolving into a political activist. I will analyze how 
Rifkin adapts his discourse to confront a highly popular 
scientific technology in an effort to minimize its 
implementation. This investigation will examine how 
Rifkin, political activist and rhetorician, responds to 
the advancing technology of genetic engineering.
The third and final stage of Campbell's critical 
process is interpretive analysis. Here the critic selects 
or creates a system of criticism and "bases his decisions 
on his intrinsic descriptive analysis and extrinsic 
analysis of the historical-cultural context." Campbell 
explains that the third stage "focuses on the critic, 
reflecting his interests and biases."81 The system of 
criticism for this dissertation will draw heavily from an 
analysis of heresy in the early Roman Catholic Church.
The author will analyze examples of the confrontations 
imbedded in the recombinant DNA controversy, the 
historical-cultural context of the conflict, and an 
analysis of heresy by Lester R. Kurtz.
Kurtz outlines five distinguishing characteristics of 
heresy: nearness and remoteness, social construction, 
social consequences, doctrinal consequences, and the 
heresy-hunt ritual.82
Kurtz asserts that heresy represents a union of both 
nearness and remoteness. The heretic is a member of a 
group or institution, but one who holds beliefs that 
deviate from the norm of the group, a ’'deviant insider." 
Kurtz suggests that heresy is strangely powerful because 
it so closely resembles orthodoxy, "It is developed within 
the framework of orthodoxy and is claimed by its
03proponents to be truly orthodox." Lessl adds that 
heretics have a greater potential for disruption because 
of their legitimate claim to group membership and the fact 
that they "possess a measure of social legitimacy by 
virtue of their technical membership in the group."94
The second of Kurtz* characteristics of heresy is 
social construction. He concludes that heresy is a power 
struggle—a problem of authority. It is not what one 
believes that makes him a heretic but adherence to error 
in defiance of authority. Often, the result of this 
struggle is the polarization of viewpoints. At one end of 
the continuum are the authorities who defend the 
institution against what they believe to be a genuine 
threat and at the other end are the heretics who challenge 
the elements of orthodoxy they believe to be 
destructive.95
Kurtz* third characteristic of heresy views the 
phenomenon from a different perspective. He suggests that 
heresy is most often viewed as "divisive and disruptive,
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an affront to authority and the social order." Kurtz
argues that another effect of heresy is intergroup
solidarity. Labelling heretics as a common enemy, the
institutional hierarchy can marshall support for its 
86position. Lessl suggests that although scientists may 
not be willing to admit it, an attack on science may 
actually be beneficial because "it brings together 
scientists who are ordinarily isolated within their 
specializations and produces among them a renewed social 
consciousness."97
According to Kurtz, the doctrinal consequences of 
heresy include issues of definition. It is the 
polarization of positions and in "the heat of escalating
ADconflicts that orthodoxy is formulated...." Lessl 
posits that "in the process of trying to keep deviance at 
bay, the advocates of orthodoxy are pressed to draw 
doctrinal lines which, by showing what is not correct,
89serve to clarify what is correct."
Finally, the fifth characteristic of heresy is the 
ritual of identifying and denouncing heretics. Kurtz 
explains that this ritual serves to both suppress heresy 
and relieve anxiety. Rituals focus anxiety onto what is 
controllable, whether or not it is the source of the 
anxiety. Heretics often become convenient targets on 
which an institution may focus its anxieties.100
Lessl suggests that heresy as a dialectical term 
always stands in opposition to "orthodoxy" and designates 
every affront to an institution's authority.101 
Evaluating Jeremy Rifkin's rhetorical activities by those 
standards, one must classify much of Rifkin's work as 
heretical. The "orthodoxy" against which Rifkin rails is 
scientific opinion. Rifkin asserts, "Today's faith system 
is the scientific world view. Today's Church is the 
scientific establishment.11102 Surely, Rifkin stands in 
opposition to scientific orthodoxy and is the 
personification of an affront to the scientific 
community's authority.
Mindful of Kurtz' definition of heresy and the 
necessity of the heretic to be a legitimate member of the 
institution against whose orthodoxy he rebels, I suggest 
that Jeremy Rifkin is a heretic and his rhetoric is 
heresy. Clearly, Rifkin is not a scientist, but he is a 
member of contemporary society which subscribes to what 
Rifkin calls a "scientific world view." Rifkin asserts 
that people in today's society "are so enmeshed in the set 
of assumptions that make up the modern scientific world 
view...", that another way of thinking is almost 
impossible to fathom.103
Philip Wander contends that the validation of ideas 
by scientific empiricism is so powerful and so generally 
accepted that "it is hardly surprising that on every great
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issue in modern society, science, scientists, and the 
vocabulary of science shape the debate.104 Yet, Rifkin 
sees a different world order; in fact, his perspective of 
how society should function is divergent enough and his 
adherence to those beliefs firm enough to be termed 
heretical.
The author suggests that a close examination of 
Rifkin's rhetorical artifacts will confirm the notion that 
Rifkin's approach to confronting the issue of 
biotechnology is heresy. This dissertation will 
investigate the following important research questions:
Is Rifkin's opposition to biotechnology based in a 
rhetoric of heresy? And, do the constraints imposed by a 
rhetoric of heresy seriously limit the success (or at 
least the perception of success) of the strategy?
Although rhetors who choose heresy as their approach to 
confronting issues may achieve occasional, even 
significant successes, I suggest that the likelihood of a 
rhetoric of heresy overcoming orthodoxy is highly remote 
because heresy ultimately becomes a victim of its own 
success. Heresy is most effective in attacking the 
weaknesses of the orthodoxy. Not only do these attacks 
suggest to the defenders of orthodoxy areas that need 
improvement, they draw attention to a common enemy against 
which the orthodoxy can become unified. The more success 
heresy achieves, the more unified the orthodoxy becomes
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for the purpose of expunging the heresy. This is the 
paradox faced by Rifkin and, perhaps, by all those who 
choose to confront status quo policies through the 
rhetorical means of heresy.
Lessl, in his discussion of the role of heresy in the 
scientific creationism debate, describes how orthodoxy 
modifies its position to respond to heresy.103 He argues 
that although the parasitic nature of heresy prompts 
orthodoxy to marshall its resources to eradicate the 
deviance, orthodoxy "finds its position strengthened
through argumentative rejections of the deviant
106position." Lessl concludes that "heresy and orthodoxy 
are two sides of the same social process,"107 and focuses 
much of his discussion on the benefits that accrue to 
orthodoxy through responses to heretical challenges.
If, indeed, heresy ultimately helps reform and, 
perhaps, strengthen the orthodoxy against which it 
struggles, what are the implications for the rhetor who 
chooses heresy as his approach to dissent? Do the 
limitations of his choice relegate his efforts to, at 
best, a truncated success? Must he seek consolation in 
the reformation of the orthodoxy he opposes or in the 
influence he can effect on the way to that reformation? In 
a democratic society that virtually demands a dialectical 
approach to societal issues, what are the rhetorical 
alternatives? If a rhetorical approach such as heresy
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betrays its rhetor and is perceived as ineffective or 
inappropriate for challenging society's foremost issues, 
what is the alternative for those who seek change? If 
heresy contributes to it own demise, is society left with 
only technical reasoning as a powerful and legitimizing 
force? Is there a rhetorical alternative? Do all 
rhetorical approaches carry with them the same 
limitations?
The significance of this study, then, lies in its 
identification of a contemporary practitioner of a 
rhetoric of heresy, an analysis of the rhetorical 
strategy, identification of rhetorical successes against 
the orthodoxy of science and an analysis of how these 
rhetorical successes ultimately and paradoxically succumb 
to an invigorated orthodoxy.
Organization of Data 
The dissertation will include six chapters that 
conform to the following outline:
Chapter two: This chapter will explore the
methodology chosen for this study. It will extend the 
earlier discussion of Kurtz1 definition and criteria for 
evaluating heresy. Lessl's notions of heresy will be 
examined for insights into understanding the phenomenon.
Chapter three: This chapter will analyze several of
Rifkin's rhetorical artifacts to explicate the nearness 
and remoteness that characterizes Rifkin's rhetoric as
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heretical. Of particular importance will be an analysis 
of Rifkin's ability to position himself as rhetorically 
supportive of science but philosophically in opposition to 
advancing technology, while skillfully turning scientific 
orthodoxy upon itself.
Chapter four: This chapter will analyze several of
Rifkin's rhetorical artifacts to explicate the social 
construction that characterizes Rifkin's rhetoric as 
heretical. Here, the analysis will focus on the 
conflicting perspectives of the biotechnology issue with 
emphasis on the struggle for authority to govern 
biotechnology.
Chapter five: This chapter will analyze several
rhetorical artifacts to explicate the social consequences, 
doctrinal consequences, and the heresy hunt ritual that 
reflect Kurtz* remaining three characteristics of heresy. 
This chapter will shift the emphasis from Rifkin's 
rhetorical strategies and methods to those of the 
defenders of the orthodoxy. This chapter will focus on the 
rhetoric of the cacophony of groups within the scientific 
community that may never have raised their voices and 
almost certainly would never have coalesced except to take 
a stand for their respective positions on the issue of 
biotechnology. The chapter will examine, too, Rifkin's 
role in compelling the scientific community and government 
agencies into making statements about genetically
engineered products and the enactment of legislation 
governing biotechnology that eventually lead to orthodox 
doctrine. Finally, this chapter will analyze the rhetoric 
of those who sought to maintain the orthodoxy of science 
and biotechnology by denigrating Rifkin and attempting to 
undermine his legitimacy and credibility.
Chapter six: This chapter will offer the author's
conclusions about the role of a rhetoric of heresy in 




Seeking a thorough understanding of the critical 
rhetorical elements of heresy and the fundamentals of the 
phenomenon of heresy, I rely primarily on the works of 
three authors for analysis: Karlyn Kohrs Campbell, Lester 
R. Kurtz, and Thomas M. Lessl.
Karlyn Kohrs Campbell's three-stage process of 
rhetorical criticism is the guiding beacon for the 
remaining chapters of this dissertation. Though guided by 
Campbell's critical perspective, the criteria for analysis 
are provided by Lester Kurtz' five elements of heresy.
Campbell describes the first stage of rhetorical 
criticism as discovering "the unique characteristics of a 
discourse..." The critic, at this point, becomes 
completely familiar with the rhetorician's discourse 
seeking to understand the speaker's role and purpose, and 
makes himself fully aware of the intrinsic dynamics of the 
discourse. Campbell suggests that the critic concentrate
on the discourse itself and virtually ignore audience,
108context, and other external elements.
The second stage of Campbell's process is extrinsic 
in nature and focuses on what she terms the "historical- 
cultural" context. In this stage the critic seeks to 
identify the forces that influence the rhetorician's
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strategies. The critic considers audience, social 
context, opposing forces, the rhetorician's knowledge and 
skill, and other obstacles with which the rhetorician must 
contend to achieve his goal of persuading his 
audience.109
The critic applying Campbell's third stage of 
criticism synthesizes both internal descriptive analysis 
and extrinsic analysis of the historical-cultural context 
to create interpretive analysis. Here, the critic selects 
or creates the criteria for interpreting and evaluating 
the work of the rhetorician. Analyzing the discourse 
against the criteria selected, the critic judges and 
evaluates the worth of the work and "makes a contribution 
to the ongoing dialogue about the role of persuasive 
discourse in a humane society."110
All three stages of Campbell's approach are woven 
into the fabric of this analysis. Having traversed stage 
one, I will engage stages two and three for the remainder 
of this study. In stage two Campbell suggests that the 
critic study "the audience, the historical-cultural 
context, other persuasive forces, and the rhetorician 
himself."111 The audiences to which Rifkin addresses his 
discourse, the context in which it is delivered, and 
Rifkin himself will become the bases on which the stage 
two analysis is accomplished.
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In stage three, according to Campbell, the critic 
selects or creates a system of criticism and "bases his 
decisions on his intrinsic descriptive analysis and
extrinsic analysis of the historical-cultural
112context." The system of criticism selected for this 
study draws heavily from Lester Kurtz' analysis of heresy 
in the early Roman Catholic Church. Kurtz identifies five 
distinguishing characteristics of heresy: nearness and 
remoteness, social construction, social consequences, 
doctrinal consequences, and the heresy-hunt ritual.113
Nearness/Remoteness
In an explanation of what appears to be his 
contradictory notion of nearness and remoteness, Kurtz 
chooses the "stranger" metaphor to make his point. He 
draws his comparison from an essay by Georg Simmel who 
advances the notion that a stranger is both near and far 
at the same time. Describing the stranger relationship, 
Simmel suggests that "the distance within this relation 
indicates that one who is close by is remote, but his 
strangeness indicates that one who is remote is near."114 
Although he or she is physically close to a person or 
group, a barrier remains between them, keeping the 
stranger at a distance and apart from the group.
From Kurtz' perspective, the heretic and the stranger 
have much in common. Like the stranger who enters a room 
and mingles with a group, but is not really "in the
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group," the heretic is "in the room" and technically part 
of the institution, but remains detached from the 
orthodoxy.113
Lessl suggests that the nearness/remoteness
phenomenon creates a crisis in an institution. The crisis
springs from conflict and controversy into which heretics
draw the defenders of orthodoxy. Lessl posits that the
conflict and controversy are different not only in kind,
but also in effectiveness. He explains that heretics
"have a disruptive potency greater than, not merely
different from, that of external enemies of a social 
116institution." He argues that a heretic maintains a 
certain amount of ethos simply because he is a technical 
member of the group. This ethos often lends credibility 
to many of his arguments.
As mentioned earlier, for the purposes of this study, 
heresy is defined broadly to include the beliefs of 
individuals that deviate from the orthodoxy of social 
institutions other than the Church and threaten the 
stability of the controlling values and assumptions of 
those institutions. Although Rifkin declares himself a 
heretic, sufficient evidence exists that one could arrive 
at the same conclusion from a more objective evaluation.
By Kurtz' definition, Rifkin is inside the 
institution of contemporary society, but outside its 
orthodox beliefs concerning technical advancement in
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general and genetic engineering in particular. Rifkin is
a member of a contemporary society that subscribes to what
he calls a "scientific world view." Rifkin asserts that
people in today's society "are so enmeshed in the set of
assumptions that make up the modern scientific world
view...", that another way of thinking is almost
impossible to fathom.117 Rifkin's challenges to that set
of assumptions earn for him the heretic label.
Rifkin's "nearness" is based in his being a member of
contemporary society. He is the recipient of whatever
technological benefits accrue to one who lives in a
society with a "scientific world view." Rifkin proclaimed
in a speech in Washington, D.C.,
I'm like a lot of people-I'm not a purist. I do 
believe you have to manipulate nature to 
survive. I don't want to take us back into the 
stone age. I do believe we have to proceed on 
into the future and we have to manipulate and 
tinker and organize nature..."
Yet, in the presence of Rifkin's nearness, there is
evidence of his remoteness. Kurtz suggests that "Every
heresy implies a political stance and every heretic is the
110leader of an insurrection..." Rifkin's insurrection 
manifests itself in challenges of the foundations of the 
"scientific world view" that question the validity of 
scientific inquiry and technological advancement.
Perhaps nothing illustrates what Kurtz would term 
Rifkin's "deviant insider" status more concretely than his 
repeated attacks on efficiency. Rifkin asserts that man's
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quest for economic efficiency and speed disrupts the 
environmental balance so that "planetary ecosystems are no 
longer capable of renewing resources as fast as they are 
being depleted... ,,12°
Rifkin affirms his stance as a heretic by leading an 
insurrection against genetic engineering and what he would 
term its goal of "hyperefficiency." Arguing that the 
primary objective of genetic engineering is efficiency and 
speed, he suggests that this technology "signals the most 
radical change in our relationship with the natural world 
since the dawn of the Age of Pyrotechnology.1,121 Rifkin 
claims that efficiency has become an end in itself and 
that "An ever accelerating conversion of biological 
resources into economic utilities becomes the alpha and 
omega of the coming age."122
Further evidence of Rifkin's insurrection against 
advancing technology comes in his challenges to what he 
calls the continuing compression of time. He suggests 
that this time compression is incompatible with nature and 
ultimately destructive. According to Rifkin, computers 
take time compression to new dimensions through their 
ability to measure time in nanoseconds (billionths of a 
second). Rifkin argues that the computer marks a radical 
turning point in time because never before has "time been 
organized at a speed beyond the realm of
123consciousness." Rifkin predicts dire consequences of
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this time compression because "The new 'computime' 
represents the final abstraction of time and its complete 
separation from human experience and the rhythms of 
nature.1,124
Rifkin exemplifies what Kurtz describes as the 
"intense union of nearness and remoteness."123 Rifkin is 
close enough to be a member, but distant enough to be 
considered in error. He is a member of a scientifically 
oriented society striving for increased efficiency through 
technological advancement who challenges the existing 
methods of achieving progress and conducting scientific 
inquiry. Rifkin leads an insurrection against what he 
believes are forces destined for inevitably disastrous 
consequences.
Social Construction
Kurtz' second characteristic of heresy is that "it is 
socially constructed in the midst of social conflict,"128 
Lessl calls this social conflict "struggles over authority 
within the institution."127 Typically, the two sides of 
the conflict retreat to their position of either defending 
the heretical position or refuting it. From there, the 
struggle becomes one of authority.
Kurtz explains that not every deviant position can be 
considered heresy—only those that demonstrate a 
"stubbornness of will" and are "held in explicit 
opposition to ecclesiastical authority.”128 Lessl points
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out that "Only when error challenges authority is it
129treated as heresy." After the lines of contention are 
drawn, self-interest groups tend to form and choose the 
position for which they have an affinity. He suggests, 
however, that one should not assume that either the 
"authorities or the heretics are necessarily malicious or 
self-serving, although they may be."130 Often, 
authorities will make tremendous personal sacrifices to 
defend against what they believe to be a genuine threat to 
the values and structures of their orthodoxy. Heretics 
will often make similar sacrifices to challenge what they 
perceive as destructive forces within the institution. It 
is not unusual for both the authorities and the heretics 
to sincerely believe that their actions are in the best 
interest of the institution.
Lessl contends the struggles over authority that 
characterize heresy may be regarded as political 
struggles. Denouncing heretics becomes an expedient 
course of action for the defenders of the institution. As 
an example, Lessl points to the scientific creationism 
controversy. Scientific creationists first became vocal 
in the 1960s, but it was only in the 197Ds that scientists 
began denouncing their ideas. It was in the 1970s that 
these same groups "began challenging the authority of the 
orthodox scientific community to determine how science 
will be defined in public education."131
Clearly, Rifkin's discourse assumes political 
overtones, engaging the scientific community in a struggle 
for authority. One of Rifkin's arguments against genetic 
engineering is that the scientific community has no way to 
assess the impact of a genetically engineered organism 
after it is released into the environment. He says that on 
the one hand the technology needs to be regulated; but, on 
the other hand, the science capable of evaluating the 
technology does not exist. So, in the struggle for 
authority, Rifkin claims that, "...we should heed the call 
of other countries and impose a five-year moratorium 
worldwide so that we can bring the best environmental 
sciences together with our molecular biologists to see if 
we can hammer out a reasonable risk-assessment
132science." Rifkin's suggestion to negotiate a risk- 
assessment compromise with the molecular scientists is his 
attempt to establish a forum for those whom he identifies 
as lacking a voice in decisions related to genetic 
engineering. Because the scientific community virtually 
dominates those decision-making processes, any compromise 
would involve the scientific community's relinquishing 
some decision-making authority.
In another skirmish related to genetic engineering, 
Rifkin challenges the authority of the United States 
Patent Office to issue patents on genetically engineered 
animals. He says he worked for 14 months to get a bill
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before the United States House of Representatives to 
overturn a decision by the Patent Office allowing the 
patenting of "any genetically-engineered animal on the
133planet." In his characteristically vocal opposition 
to the Patent Office decision, Rifkin asserts that, "In 
one regulatory stroke, a handful of bureaucrats in the 
Patent Office reduced the entire animal kingdom to the 
lowly status of a commercial commodity indistinguishable
134from microwave ovens or automobiles or tennis balls." 
Challenging the authority of the Patent Office further, 
Rifkin says, "It makes no sense for two or three men at 
the Patent Office to dictate the entire future control of
133the gene pool of this planet."
Whether or not Rifkin accurately characterizes the 
decision-making process in the Patent Office, his argument 
is consistent with his attempts to seek a compromise on 
risk-assessment. Again, Rifkin argues that decisions 
about technologies such as genetic engineering need to be 
made not only within the confines of the scientific 
community and governmental regulatory agencies, but should 
be broadened to include members of the public who may be 
affected by their implementation.
Social Consequences 
The third characteristic of Kurtz' notion of heresy 
suggests that not only is the phenomenon socially 
constructed, but it also has social consequences. Kurtz
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argues that although the defenders of orthodoxy most often 
view heresy as "divisive and disruptive, an affront to 
authority and the social order," it cuts like a "two-edged 
sword" and works to their benefit in at least one way. 
According to Kurtz, for whatever disruption heresy causes, 
it provides the defenders of orthodoxy a rallying point 
around which they gather their supporters to do "battle 
with a common enemy. "136
Lessl extends Kurtz1 argument, suggesting that in a 
scientific community heresy draws together "scientists who 
are ordinarily isolated within their specializations and 
produces among them a renewed social consciousness."137 
As members of the scientific community join forces against 
the heretic and his ideas, scientists who may never have 
given the issue in question a second thought "suddenly 
find themselves drawn around the righteous banner of 
public responsibility."138
The solidarity that coalesced against Jeremy Rifkin 
assumes two positions, primarily. First, scientists argue 
that it is only through continued, perhaps accelerated, 
scientific inquiry and research that the needs of society 
and a growing population can be met. They suggest that 
only science can respond to demands for more economically 
efficient food and fiber production, improved medical 
treatments and procedures, new energy alternatives, 
creative environmental conservation approaches, and other
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technologically oriented societal needs. For example,
William E. Marshall, president of the Microbial Genetics
Division of Pioneer Hi-Bred International, Inc., speaking
at a biotechnology forum, predicted that,
We could become independent of petroleum-related 
inputs, our energy needs could be significantly 
reduced, new crops could be developed more 
quickly for new areas, food animals could be 
developed more readily for specific market 
targets, and our soil and water resources could 
be regenerated. 3
Second, these scientists argue against the public’s 
participation in decisions related to biotechnology 
because of a lack of understanding of the science 
involved. Speaking at that same biotechnology forum,
Karen Rogers, education director for the Monsanto company, 
suggested that the fears of people untrained in science 
threaten the freedom and right to conduct research in the 
United States. Rogers argued that, "Biotechnology simply 
is moving ahead too quickly for the public to assimilate 
its advances into their existing educational, religious 
and social frameworks."140
The efforts of Rifkin and others who oppose 
recombinant DNA research produce other social 
consequences, too. Among the most visible results are 
increased regulation of the technology and its products 
and the reluctance on the part of some segments of society 
to use the products. For example, one of Rifkin's primary 
targets is BST (bovine somatotropin), a genetically
engineered hormone designed to increase milk production.
In the foreword of a report on BST from the Congress of 
the United States Office of Technology Assessment,
Director John H. Gibbons said, "Some states have placed a 
moratorium on the use of this technology, even if approved 
by FDA, and some large retail food chains have refused to 
sell milk and dairy products from BST test herds even 
though FDA has approved their sale.” As an indication of 
the bureaucratic interest in this product, Gibbons said 
the study conducted by the Office of Technology Assessment 
was requested by the Senate Committee on Agriculture, 
Nutrition, and Forestry, the House Committee on Government 
Operations, and the House Committee on Agriculture.141
The results of Rifkin's heretical discourse appear to 
reflect what Kurtz referred to as the "two-edged" sword 
effect. On the one hand, Rifkin raises enough questions 
about the technology to cause several regulatory agencies 
to become involved and creates skepticism in the minds of 
some users so that they become reluctant to employ the 
products of the technology. On the other hand, his 
actions cause otherwise uninvolved scientists to enter the 
public debate and state their rationale for conducting 
research. These social consequences have rhetorical 
implications that include increased dialogue about 
biotechnology and increased public awareness of the issues 
involved in the debate. It is likely that the 1987 United
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States Department of Agriculture (USDA) biotechnology 
forum was, in part, a rhetorical response to the 
challenges posed by the opponents of genetic engineering.
Doctrinal Consequences
The fourth of Kurtz* five characteristics of heresy 
suggests that it produces doctrinal consequences. He 
contends that as the heretics and the authorities of 
orthodoxy confront each other and engage in doctrinal 
disputes, the defenders of authority solidify positions 
that may have never been defined otherwise. Kurtz 
suggests that as people choose sides in a conflict, they 
find it "increasingly difficult to mix positions and 
beliefs that have conflicting political implications."142 
By rejecting a particular heretical position, the 
orthodoxy may find itself unintentionally endorsing a 
position that was not previously doctrinal and may never 
have become doctrinal otherwise. Kurtz points out that to 
really understand the doctrine of any orthodoxy, one needs 
to examine the historical context in which it 
developed.143
Lessl relates this process to scientific inquiry. He 
argues that "Assumptions that are clearly operational in 
scientific research but which escape deliberate scrutiny 
are drawn to the surface in heretical controversies and in 
the process are more clearly defined for orthodoxy."144 
Lessl contends that the threat posed by heretics brings to
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the surface the "metatheoretical groundwork" that 
underlies theories, i.e., the larger framework of the 
scientific world view in which they work.
Although Rifkin's opposition to recombinant ONA 
research is couched in terms of economic, social, and 
environmental effects, ethical dilemmas, and fear, his 
underlying theses challenge the assumption that scientific 
inquiry holds the answers to society's problems. His 
opposition also challenges the freedom with which 
scientific inquiry is conducted. In his introduction to 
Declaration of a Heretic. Rifkin claims that the world 
"hangs precariously in the balance" because "the 
scientific world view and the technologies it has 
generated have taken our world to the very edge of earthly 
existence..."1*5 In acknowledging the technological 
achievements of science, Rifkin invokes an appeal to fear 
and uncertainty, focusing attention on the destructive 
aspects of certain technologies. The implication is that, 
given the choice, the public would have decided to live 
without the benefits of nuclear technology to be free of 
the threat posed by nuclear weapons.
Speaking to a national convention of agricultural 
communication specialists in 1988, Rifkin said, "We're 
entering a new chapter in our relationship to technology, 
especially in agriculture. Now, we're going to, as a 
society, debate the pros and cons of each new
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140technology..." In opening the debate on biotechnology 
to the public, Rifkin's thesis suggests that people will 
recognize the dangers that accompany genetic engineering 
and will reject the technology because those potential 
threats outweigh whatever benefits accompany them.
Although Rifkin's challenges focus on genetic 
engineering and nuclear fission, many of his arguments 
transcend these specific technologies and target the more 
fundamental scientific-technological paradigm. For 
example, Rifkin refers to a cadre of people that he calls 
"warriors of the mind." He claims their goal is "To 
disarm the world view that has given rise.to the nuclear 
bomb and genetic engineering..."1*7 Rifkin believes 
scientific inquiry has reached the end of the line because 
"With each passing day, this long-relied-on form of 
reasoning appears more stilted, more tautological, more 
tiresome." Rifkin says, "Further reliance on this form of 
knowledge would be self-defeating for the human race."1*8 
Rifkin's questioning of the validity of scientific inquiry 
in general, and the effects of genetic engineering and 
nuclear fission in particular, draws unsolicited and 
unwelcome attention to the scientific community. This 
scrutiny has resulted in increased governmental 
participation in research.
Ultimately, this governmental regulation assumes some 
of the control of the scientific community's research
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activities. Though reluctant to relinquish research 
prerogatives, in genetic engineering the scientific 
community finds itself confronted with the involvement of 
governmental and public bodies such as the Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA), the Food and Drug Administration 
(FDA), and the U.S. Patent office.
Whether by choice or by coercion, submitting to 
governmental regulation in developing technologies such as 
genetic engineering may evolve into doctrine for the 
scientific community. Having submitted their science to 
these bodies, these scientists and institutions then use 
the findings of these agencies as endorsements of their 
work. For example, a representative of Monsanto, one of 
the major manufacturers of BST, sent a letter to 
agricultural interests introducing the Office of 
Technology Assessment's report on BST. Suggesting the 
study endorses the BST technology, Peter Calcott of 
Monsanto wrote, "This strong endorsement comes on the 
heels of strong support in the Journal of the American 
Medical Association, in Science, at a National Institutes 
of Health review and the European Community technical
140approval."
It is likely that the doctrinal consequences of 
Rifkin's challenges will continue to evolve beyond the 
life of the debate. Clearly, Rifkin's beliefs and 
challenges are divergent enough to draw criticism from the
orthodox scientific community. With that criticism comes 
the likelihood of greater definition of the scientific 
community's stand on recombinant DNA and increased 
"boundary-work" for the ideology that surrounds the 
technology.
For example, many scientists and administrators
conducting genetic engineering research have become
sensitive to the need to make communities located near
test sites aware of projects that involve releasing
genetically engineered organisms into the environment.
Describing preparations for a test of a genetically
engineered organism at the Monsanto Company headquarters,
Karen Rogers, a company education adviser, explained,
We did not take the test community for granted.
As early as 1985, we began a briefing program 
for local officials. Favorable stories appeared 
in the local press, and briefings were conducted 
for county farmers. All in all, the community 
viewed the test positively.
Informing the public of genetic engineering
experiments is a radical departure from earlier positions
and appears to be a permanent element of recombinant DNA
research.
Heresy Hunt.. Ritual 
Finally, Kurtz defines the fifth characteristic of 
heresy as "the process of defining and denouncing heresy 
and heretics" as ritual.131 Kurtz and Lessl agree that 
the heresy hunt ritual is an effort by orthodoxy to 
relieve its anxiety and the tensions resulting from the
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conflict. The heretic Is a convenient object onto which 
these anxieties can be focused.
Lessl suggests that as scientists employ the heresy 
hunt ritual to stop the spread of heresy they begin to 
substitute rhetorical solutions where more direct remedies 
are not available. Lessl contends that these efforts are 
attempts to "solace the anxieties of their constituents 
and maintain political quiescence."132 According to 
Lessl, scientists involved in the creationist controversy 
found the actual problems of public and political 
ambivalence difficult, if not impossible, to solve 
directly. Their solution was to attack those close at 
hand, the "deviant insiders," with the most powerful 
weapons in their arsenal—scientific evidence and 
argument.133
Rifkin appears to be the primary target on which
proponents of recombinant DNA research focus their
anxieties. Several scientists, chemical companies, and
other allied industries have openly criticized Rifkin for
his stand on biotechnology. For example, in the preface
to one of his books, Rifkin admits that,
I have been accused of being opposed to 
scientific inquiry, academic freedom and, worst 
of all, the march of progress. I have been 
castigated as an obstructionist, a spoiler, a 
man dedicated to slowing, retarding or halting 
the further advances of the human race.
Occasionally a scientist, corporate leader or 
policy maker will cast doubt on my temporal 
sanity, insisting that my real desire is to turn
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back the clock of time; how far back is often
determined by the ire of the assailant.
In a profile of Rifkin, Time magazine quoted Norton 
Zinder, a geneticist at Rockefeller University in New York 
City, who referred to Rifkin as a "fool" and a 
"demagogue." The article also quoted from Harvard 
Professor Stephen Jay Gould's review of Rifkin's Alaeny. 
Gould wrote that Alaeny was "a cleverly constructed tract 
of anti-intellectual propaganda masquerading as 
scholarship...1 don't think I have ever read a shoddier 
work. "135
Those familiar with Rifkin's work readily recognize 
that almost without exception, Rifkin assumes the role of 
challenger, the one who takes the offensive questioning 
the validity of continued scientific inquiry and the 
technological advances it produces. Yet, as the recipient 
of criticism from the scientific community, Rifkin 
portrays himself as the victim, the heir to denigrating 
comments and epithets. In his "dramatistic analysis of 
order," Kenneth Burke suggests that "victimage" is 
preceded by "redemption," which is preceded by 
"guilt."156 Burke argues that "guilt" begets 
"redemption" which begets "victimage." From Burke's 
perspective of victimage, Rifkin seems to suggest that the 
scientific community is using him as a scapegoat for its 
inability to live up to its promise of solving society's 
problems through technological advances. As Lessl
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suggests, the scientific community is substituting 
rhetorical solutions to problems that are difficult or 
impossible to resolve directly.
Conclusion
Rhetorically, Rifkin is a "thorn in the side" of the 
scientific community. Using statistics and scientific 
evidence of past accomplishments, scientists argue that 
only the technology produced by scientific inquiry can 
respond to society's future nutritional, medical, 
economic, and environmental needs. Rifkin agrees that 
technological advancement has produced benefits for 
society, but argues that it has also brought the world to 
the brink of destruction and that more technology will 
only increase the dangers. Rifkin suggests that values 
need to be placed higher on the agenda of human existence 
and that can be accomplished only in the absence of what 
he terms the threatening technologies of atomic fission 
and genetic engineering.
Rifkin's challenges have focused public and 
governmental attention on scientists and research that may 
have never received such scrutiny otherwise. The 
increased visibility of these programs has drawn otherwise 
laboratory-bound scientists into the public debate about 
genetic engineering. As these confrontations continue, so 
does the discourse that produces what Kurtz refers to as
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"boundary-work" or the defining and redefining of 
scientific orthodoxy as it relates to genetic engineering.
In the rhetorical refining of orthodoxy, scientists 
seek to purge the system of those elements that they 
perceive to be detrimental to the paradigm. In the case 
of genetic engineering, the scientific community focuses 
much of its rhetorical effort on Rifkin, questioning his 
knowledge of science, his motives, his tactics, and his 
strategies. In a concerted effort to discredit Rifkin and 
his challenges, the scientific community seeks to redirect 
to Rifkin a share of the responsibility for science not 
achieving more "success" through genetic engineering. In 
the "victimage" process, scientists retreat to scientific 
dogma, virtually ignoring the value-based arguments of 
their challenger.
Chapters three and four will examine Rifkin's 
rhetorical approach from the perspective of Kurtz' first 
two characteristics of heresy. Chapter five focuses on 
the rhetorical strategies of the scientific orthodoxy and 
reflects Kurtz' last three characteristics of heresy. An 
analysis of the crisis created in an institution resulting 




Chapter three presents the argument that Rifkin's 
depiction of the scientific world view is consistent with 
Kurtz' first characteristic of heresy—that heresy is the 
result of a deviant member of the institution who actively 
rebels against the orthodox beliefs of the institution. 
This chapter argues, too, that Rifkin's rhetorical 
approach reflects Lessl's notion that the phenomenon 
described by Kurtz results in crisis within the 
institution. Rifkin develops a rhetorical strategy that 
challenges the validity of the orthodoxy of what he 
describes as the scientific world view. These challenges 
create a crisis within the scientific community as 
scientists recognize the threat to the freedom with which 
it operates. The crisis Rifkin creates within the 
scientific community is the result of his challenges of 
what he considers the world's two most important and 
dangerous technological discoveries—nuclear fission and 
recombinant DNA manipulation.
Nearness/Remoteness Analysis 
In characterizing the nature of heresy, Kurtz first 
describes his notion of nearness/remoteness. In his 
descriptive analysis of the phenomenon, he suggests that 
the heretic is an individual who possesses the credentials 
for membership in the orthodoxy of an institution, but
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chooses not to subscribe to the tenets of that orthodoxy. 
The heretic is, at once, near or inside the orthodoxy, but 
remote or apart from its beliefs. Rifkin is a member of a 
society, perhaps begrudgingly, that subscribes to the 
scientific world view, yet he strenuously opposes the 
orthodoxy of the scientific community. At every 
opportunity, Rifkin challenges the processes that produce 
and maintain the scientific world view, questioning its 
assumptions, methods, goals, and results. His rhetorical 
assaults assail the very existence of the scientific 
establishment, advocating radical modification.
Lessl contends that a more crucial point is the 
result of the nearness/remoteness phenomenon that 
manifests itself in the heretic's advocacy of an 
insurrection against the orthodoxy. Being a technical 
member of the orthodoxy, the heretic maintains a certain 
ethos that makes his arguments credible. As a member of 
the orthodoxy, he is credited with knowing the system and 
having the ability to identify strengths and
157weaknesses. It is likely that some of those hearing 
the challenges of the heretic reason "where there is 
smoke, there must be fire," i.e., there must be some basis 
for the heretic's charges, otherwise why bring them up?
Lessl's extension of Kurtz' notion of 
nearness/remoteness transcends description and suggests 
that the phenomenon results in crisis within the heretic's
institution. Lessl's analysis of the creationism debate 
argues that the appearance of this heretical doctrine 
posed a significant threat to the defenders of 
evolutionary theory because it undermined the political 
support afforded institutionalized science. Lessl 
contends that "Creationism represents a crisis for 
scientists to the extent that it gives immediacy to 
perceived attitudes of the general public that contravene 
the normative bases of scientific culture.1,158
In many ways the effects of Rifkin's challenges are 
similar to those Lessl describes in the creationism 
debate. Rifkin's advocacy challenges the validity of 
scientific institutions with the intent of threatening not 
only genetic engineering, but science as a whole. While 
Rifkin's impeding the advances of biotechnology draws the 
ire of those scientists involved in this research, his 
activities in nuclear technology and genetic engineering 
are only symptomatic of his stated goal of achieving a 
world view that replaces scientific research and 
technology with an "empathetic" approach to the world. 
Condemning the scientific world view as exploitative,
Rifkin argues, "The idea is to develop a philosophy of 
science that works with the environment, that is 
empathetic to the natural resource base rather than a 
philosophy of science based on exploitation and short-term
159gains only." This goal and its accompanying
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challenges are the genesis of the crisis to which the 
scientific community finds itself responding in the 
genetic engineering debate.
The first rhetorical elements of Rifkin's attempts to 
create a crisis are found in a scenario in which he 
requires his audiences to choose. He presents his 
perspective in declarative statements as though they were 
undisputed facts. For example, he claims the world is in 
the midst of a long-term transition: "He are moving out of 
fossil fuels, the energy base for industrial technology, 
and we're now moving into renewable resources, the energy 
base for biological based technology." Creating a sense 
of urgency, Rifkin implies that this trend is irreversible 
and predicts its effects will be unprecedented in modern 
history. Rifkin says, "This transformation will be as 
significant, in my opinion, as the transformation from 
Medieval agriculture to the industrial, urban way of life 
of the last 200 years."160 Rifkin predicts that, "The 
world's germ plasm will become as important to the 
economic fortunes of each country as fossil fuels and 
metals were during the brief expanse of the Industrial 
Age.. ."161
Rifkin's suggestion that society's movement from a 
fossil fuel energy base to a renewable resource energy 
base will be as significant as moving from Medieval 
agriculture to 20th century urban life dramatizes the
changes that he predicts lay ahead. Rifkin's analogy 
encompasses several hundred years of the most dramatic 
changes in the history of man. The transformation from a 
Medieval agricultural society in which citizens fled to 
the country side for relief from urban centers to 20th 
century society concentrated in cities with complex 
economies, politics, transportation, and communications 
moves mankind from one extreme to another. Rifkin's 
rhetorical strategy is two-fold. First, he suggests that 
the future is uncertain. Rifkin's analogy suggests that, 
on a biologically based technology continuum, 20th century 
society finds itself in the same relative position as 
Medieval agriculture found itself on the fossil fuel 
technology continuum. Rifkin's analogy implies that 20th 
century citizens are no more able to predict the changes 
that lay in store for them in the biotechnology era than 
citizens of Medieval Europe could have predicted the 
industrialization of today's society. Second, Rifkin 
creates a sense of urgency. His analogy spanned several 
hundred years, but he implies that because of the speed of 
advancing technology, particularly genetic engineering, we 
may experience a similar transformation within our 
lifetime.
Having established an occurrence of worldwide 
proportions, Rifkin suggests that alternatives exist for 
society's approach to the future. Rifkin then narrows
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those choices, suggesting that only two alternatives exist 
for the future use of renewable resources and that those 
choices are mutually exclusive. Rifkin argues, "I think 
there's two broad philosophical approaches to organizing 
renewable resources. The first is an ecological 
approach..." "There's also another approach...genetic 
engineering."162
Having narrowed to two his audience's choices, Rifkin 
contrasts the two alternatives in what Richard Weaver 
describes as god-terms and devil-terms. God-terms and 
devil-terms fall under Weaver's definition of "ultimate" 
terms on which the rhetor relies and to which the populace
163attributes greatest sanction. Weaver proposes that a 
god-term is an "expression about which all other 
expressions are ranked as subordinate and serving 
dominations and powers" and has the capacity to demand
164sacrifice. Devil-terms, on the other hand, 
characterize what is perceived as the greatest evil of a
165culture. Presenting his two alternatives in god-terms 
and devil terms, Rifkin suggests that only one reasonable 
choice really exists: "We can choose to engineer the life
of the planet, creating a second nature in our image, or 
we can choose to participate with the rest of the living 
kingdom."166
Rifkin's characterization of the biotechnology choice 
is encrusted with devil-terms. First, he says genetic
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engineering is "powerful." Rifkin claims that, "Genetic 
engineering is the most powerful technology we have ever 
conceived to control the forces of nature."167 He 
further suggests that to choose genetic engineering is to 
abandon human values: "Genetic engineering simply means
placing engineering principles into the gene pool...we*re 
learning how to apply engineering assumptions into the
blueprint for microbes, plants, animals, and the human
166race." Rifkin's engineering assumptions carry with 
them the characterization of devil-terms, too, and include 
"quality control, predictability of outcome, 
utilitarianism, and efficiency...the assumptions that we 
used...in organizing inanimate materials during the fossil
169fuel era." Rifkin contends that biotechnology is an 
appropriate choice if society's highest priority is 
"physical security" and "perpetuation at all costs."170 
Rifkin's claim that the Industrial Age has become a 
metaphor for "the process of transforming, exchanging, and 
discarding nonrenewable energy" includes more of his 
devil-terms.171 Rifkin's devil-term vocabulary includes 
other frequently used terms such as "desacralize," 
"domination," "appropriating life," "exercising power over 
nature," "extract," "expropriate," "distill," "process," 
"consume", "regiment," "short-term gains," "controlling," 
and "devour." Rifkin typically casts these words in 
negative contexts to depict the world view of those who
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choose to support or engage in genetic engineering 
research.
On the other hand, Rifkin's characterization of the 
alternative to genetic engineering is presented as an 
effort to achieve oneness with nature, the environment, 
and, perhaps, God. In that holistic context, Rifkin 
employs what have become god-terms for him to describe and 
define the world view for which he argues. For example, 
Rifkin labels the alternative to genetic engineering "an 
ecological approach, a stewardship approach" that is 
"empathetic to the natural resource base” in which "we use 
new tools to develop sustainability with our resources" 
and provide "justice for the homo sapiens species and 
equity and justice for all the other creatures..."172 
Describing man's relationship to the environment from the 
"empathetic" world view perspective, Rifkin uses other 
god-terms such as "cajole," "select," "congenial," 
"resacralize," "partnership," "companionship," 
"connecting," "mutual give and take," and "maintaining an 
endowment for future generations."
Rifkin's use of these god-terms attempts to move 
audiences to his world view by instilling a sense of 
guilt. Rifkin hopes individuals will either choose to 
"resacralize" their relationship with nature and be more 
"empathetic" to the environment or feel guilty for not 
doing so. Rifkin implies that to reject the values of his
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world view is to separate oneself from God and nature. He 
suggests that those who do not "resacralize" and become 
"empathetic" violate the sacred relationship between 
humans and their environment; they seek material wealth at 
the expense of nature.
Rifkin characterizes the scientific world view as 
essentially devoid of values and as the creator of a world 
in which decisions are based only on the exploitation of 
nature, expediency, and production efficiency. Thus, he 
creates a rhetorical environment that requires the 
audience to reject that approach to the world and to seek 
an alternative. Conveniently, he provides a choice that 
is as difficult to reject as his depiction of the 
scientific world view is to accept, significantly, he 
provides only one alternative and it assumes an almost 
religious approach that is molded from life enriching 
values such as wisdom,
patience, sacrifice, and discipline. Choosing terms such 
as "ecological approach" and "stewardship approach," 
Rifkin suggests not only that the "empathetic" world view 
is concerned with the wise, thoughtful use of renewable 
resources, but implies that the scientific world view is 
unconcerned with these issues. From this foundation 
Rifkin builds his arguments against many of society's 
technological achievements. He credits the scientific
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community with what he terms the two greatest evils in the 
history of mankind—nuclear energy and genetic engineering.
Rifkin's depiction of the domination of science 
suggests that it is the end product of philosophers and 
scientists who place their priorities not on human values, 
but on quantifying nature, understanding how it operates, 
appropriating its resources for the material benefit of 
mankind, and seeking more expedient methods of converting 
these natural resources into consumer goods. From this 
perspective, Rifkin fashions for the scientific community 
a syllogism, or what he terms an "age-old equation: 
knowledge = power « control = security." Rifkin argues 
that efficiency drives this equation, "Efficiency as both 
a method and a value reorients the whole of the human 
experience to one end: total mastery of the physical 
world."173
Rifkin's challenge of the orthodox scientific world 
view is the foundation on which he builds his case against 
the validity of genetic engineering. The arguments 
supporting Rifkin's insurrection against genetic 
engineering are based, in large part, on his comparison of 
biotechnology to nuclear technology. Rifkin claims, "The 
first sustained nuclear reaction and the discovery of the 
double helix are products of the scientific world 
view. "m
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Rifkin's strategy of comparing genetic engineering to 
nuclear technology has two rhetorical advantages. First, 
it can be argued, with little disagreement, that nuclear 
technology is the result of scientific research and the 
scientific world view. Second, it can be persuasively 
maintained that with the benefits of nuclear technology 
come serious concerns about the ever-present dangers 
resulting from nuclear weapons. Rifkin employs both of 
these assumptions as he draws parallels between nuclear 
technology and genetic engineering.
First, Rifkin argues that technologies, regardless of 
their initial significance, are eventually developed to 
their fullest potential whether they are ultimately 
beneficial or detrimental or both. In an interesting 
choice of words in the following quotation, Rifkin chooses 
not to acknowledge that technology is either "beneficial" 
or "detrimental." Rather he chooses to contrast a neutral 
term to a devil-term. Rifkin asserts that, "the 
possibilities inherent to a new technological category 
have been fully exploited over time, whether their 
purposes were benign or satanic."175 Rifkin argues that 
even the most beneficial technologies can have dangerous 
consequences. For example, he cites nuclear weapons as 
the ultimate extension of one of the most fundamental and 
beneficial human discoveries—fire. Claiming that fire is 
the tool we used to "recast the face of the earth in our
own image,11 Rifkin contends that humans have used fire to 
dominate and control all of creation.176 Nuclear 
technology, according to Rifkin, is fire in its ultimate 
form. Rifkin's use of the fire metaphor in this context 
helps reduce the complexities of nuclear technology to one 
of the most basic tools of our existence. Although fire 
is used for countless beneficial purposes, its potential 
for pain and destruction are among our earliest lessons.
To suggest that nuclear technology takes fire to its limit 
is to suggest pain and destruction beyond comprehension, 
perhaps to equal the forces of Hell. Rifkin would suggest 
that power of this magnitude must be an enemy of nature 
and a threat to mankind.
Continuing to build his case against nuclear 
technology, Rifkin argues that it was introduced as a 
technological revolution with major benefits and minimum 
risks, but has failed to live up to those 
expectations.177 Rifkin cites the "near meltdown of the 
nuclear core at Three Mile Island in Pennsylvania, and the 
full meltdown at Chernobyl in the Soviet Union" as two 
examples of the danger inherent in nuclear technology when
178it is used for peaceful purposes. Rifkin suggests 
that the "myth" of cheap energy has been dispelled by 
enormous costs of nuclear power plant construction. He 
argues that power plants generate social and health 
problems for which there are no technical solutions.
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Rifkin cites as examples health problems encountered by
miners of uranium and associated problems in communities
near the mines. Finally, Rifkin points to the long-term
problems of disposing of nuclear waste.170
Rifkin challenges nuclear technology from still
another perspective—must any technology be used just
because it is available? Rifkin's rhetorical strategy on
this issue is to engage in a discussion of the dangers of
nuclear weapons including the potential for annihilation-
followed by rhetorical questions for which he conditions
his audience for the desired response. He asks, "How many
of us would vote to split the atom had we to make that
decision over again? How many of us would vote not to
180split the atom?" Acknowledging that many people find
it difficult to say no to nuclear power based on the
benefits and dangers of the technology, even after a
vividly descriptive account of its destructive power,
Rifkin employs the devil-term "power" again. Rifkin
proclaims that nuclear technology "... is a new form of raw
power, more compelling than any other ever made available
to the human race." "Is the extraordinary power intrinsic
to the process of nuclear fission and fusion appropriate
181to exploit or not?" Suggesting that the continued use 
of nuclear power threatens human existence, Rifkin asks 
rhetorically, "What price are we willing to pay for the 
survival of life here on earth?"
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Rifkin's use of rhetorical questions reflects his 
approach of limiting the choices available to his 
audience. The last question suggests to the person 
answering it that the only way to survive on earth is to 
discontinue the use of nuclear technology. The question 
regarding the appropriateness of using nuclear technology 
seems to imply that to use such a powerful resource to 
generate electricity is an "over-kill" and that until more 
productive uses of nuclear energy can be found, the 
technology should be abandoned.
Having argued that nuclear technology, like all other 
technologies, began as a simple, beneficial tool that was 
developed to its ultimate potential and evolved into the 
world's most destructive force; having argued that the 
dangers of nuclear technology outweigh its benefits; 
having argued that mankind is not necessarily compelled to 
employ a technology just because it exists; and having 
argued that it is time for society to stop the 
proliferation of advancing technology, Rifkin introduces 
genetic engineering as a technology not unlike nuclear 
technology.
The age of fire, according to Rifkin, depended on the 
"alchemic process." He argues that the alchemist viewed 
nature as a process growing toward perfection and that the 
task of the alchemist was to help achieve that end. 
Alchemy, then, was the process that allowed people to
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"melt, fuse, purify, putrefy, distill and coagulate his 
base material, creating new combinations and forms, each 
one closer to the ideal golden state.”183 Rifkin claims 
it was this process-turned-philosophy that evolved into 
the modern scientific world view.
Drawing the parallel between biotechnology and fire 
technology, Rifkin introduces and contrasts the term 
"algeny” to alchemy. Rifkin defines algeny as "the means 
to change the essence of a living thing by transforming it 
from one state to another...the upgrading of existing 
organisms and the design of wholly new ones with the 
intent of 'perfecting' their performance." Rifkin's 
definition of algeny, like that of alchemy, is 
characterized as a process of human intervention in nature 
to achieve perfection, but with living organisms.184
Comparing recombinant DNA technology to the first 
uses of fire, Rifkin argues that it is now possible "to 
snip, insert, stitch, edit, program and produce new 
combinations of living things just as our ancestors were 
able to heat, burn, melt and solder together various inert 
materials creating new shapes, combinations and
165forms." Rifkin's comparison lays the groundwork for 
one of his most prominent arguments against genetic 
engineering—that the technology "seduces" scientists and 
society at large into perceiving living organisms in the
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same way they perceive inanimate objects and that this
modified view of living organisms is innocuous.
One of the elements of Rifkin's rhetorical strategy
in challenging "the creation of new forms" is his taking
the offensive against the scientific community's argument
that genetic engineering is a logical, natural extension
of traditional breeding and hybridizing techniques.
Scientists, according to Rifkin, say to him, "Well,
Jeremy, gee, lighten up...this is just a more
sophisticated approach to the kind of domesticating
technologies we've been using since Neolithic 
166agriculture." Rifkin rejects the notion that genetic
engineering is an extension of conventional breeding
techniques countering with, "Now, we have a technology
called gene-splicing that allows us in both theory and
practice to eliminate the idea of a species as an
identifiable being with...an essential nature."167
Rifkin implies that scientists tread sacred ground
when they contemplate "recombining genetic traits across
168mating walls." Rifkin appeals to a fear of 
reductionism with its attendant amoral consequences when 
he argues that "species as a separate, recognizable 
entity" should be left intact and that crossing these 
"natural species boundaries” turns "all of life into 
manipulable chemical materials."160
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Rhetorically, Rifkin invokes the fear of the unknown 
when he suggests that scientists who engage in genetic 
engineering will view gene manipulation as another form of 
chemical experiment. The inference of this prediction is 
that this chemical experimentation will evolve into an 
ultimately destructive force similar to nuclear 
technology. Rifkin invokes fear at still another level. 
Janice Rushing and Thomas Frentz argue that culture 
possesses repressed fears about its relationship to 
technology that are expressed through what they term "The 
Frankenstein myth" in which the maker is threatened by the 
made, and "the original roles of master and slave are in
190doubt." Rushing and Frentz suggest that two
perspectives of technology pervade science fiction cinema
and reflect cultural views and fears. The "utopian" view
envisions the "triumph of reason, the Enlightenment dream
of human progress." The "dystopian" perspective creates
"foreboding images" of technology, "regards the machine as
a malevolent threat," and "extrapolates from and
exaggerates present conditions in imagining the
future..."191 Rifkin assumes the "dystopian" perspective
as he rhetorically creates "foreboding images" and
extrapolates about the future. Rifkin asserts,
It is now only a matter of a handful of years 
before biologists will be able to irreversibly 
change the evolutionary wisdom of billions of 
years with the creation of new plants, new 
animals^ and new forms of human and post-human
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Rifkin contrasts the utopian/dystopian perspectives 
in yet another expression of genetic engineering: 
"Researchers say this technique will ultimately provide a 
cure for dwarfism. Just as easily, it could be used to
1B3develop a basketball team of ten-footers.” Rifkin 
takes his rhetoric one step further as he invokes the 
genocidal horrors that were a product of Hitler's Third 
Reich. Rifkin asserts that even before Hitler's rise to 
power in Germany, "American geneticists and social 
ideologues had begun working closely together to fashion 
similar technologies and programs designed to both 
eliminate the so-called inferior stock from the human 
species. . ."104
Rifkin's comparison of genetic engineering to nuclear 
technology is evidence that fear is an important part of 
his strategy to halt or impede the progress of 
biotechnology. Rifkin incorporates fear primarily at two 
levels—one involves the uncertainty of the consequences of 
releasing genetically engineered organisms into the 
environment; another confronts the issue of determining 
the point at which gene manipulation in humans begins and 
ends.
As there are costs associated with the benefits of 
nuclear technology, Rifkin invokes the fear of the unknown 
predicting that still greater costs will accompany 
whatever benefits accrue from genetic engineering. Rifkin
83
makes that claim metaphorically: "All great technological 
revolutions secure the present by mortgaging the future.
In this respect, genetic engineering represents the 
ultimate lien on the future."195 Continuing with the 
metaphor, Rifkin argues that every time a new genetically 
modified organism is introduced into the environment, "the 
ecological interest rate moves up a point." Invoking fear 
through Rushing and Frentz* dystopian expression of 
exaggerating "present conditions in imagining the
196future," Rifkin claims that "every genetically 
engineered product presents a threat to the ecosystem it
197is released in." Rifkin amplifies the threat of these 
releases with his description of three characteristics 
common to genetically engineered organisms. First, they 
are alive and inherently unpredictable. Second, these 
organisms have mobility because they can reproduce, 
mutate, and migrate off site. Third, genetically 
engineered organisms released into the environment cannot 
be recalled.198
To dramatize the effects of what Rifkin terms the 
inevitable problems that genetically engineered organisms 
will create, he returns to his strategy of comparing 
genetic engineering eventualities with what he 
characterizes as similar problems already existing in 
nature. For example, Rifkin cites the introduction of 
exotic species and the inability to control pests such as
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kudzu vine, Dutch elm disease, chestnut blight, and gypsy
199moth. Rifkin admits that the level of risk posed by 
the release of these genetically engineered organisms is 
relatively small, but argues that because "industry is 
expected to introduce thousands of new genetically 
engineered products into the environment each year," 
statistically, sooner or later one of these products will 
create problems.200 Characteristically, Rifkin paints a 
worst-case scenario in his description of the effects of 
genetically engineered organisms set loose in the 
environment. He predicts, "If only a tiny fraction turn 
out to be pests, because of the scale of introduction, the 
biological pollution could well exceed chemical
pollution..." and "You're stuck for centuries, perhaps,
201millennia." Rifkin's other prominent infusion of fear 
into his challenge of genetic engineering becomes apparent 
as he raises the issue of human gene manipulation. While 
he makes no claims of similarities between genetic 
engineering and the German holocaust in World War II, 
Rifkin raises the specter of the Nazi regime in his 
discussions of recombinant DNA. He argues that while the 
old eugenics were steeped in political ideology and 
motivated by hate and fear, the new eugenics are 
commercial and are presented in terms of "increased 
economic efficiency, better performance standards and 
improvement in the quality of life."202 What he implies,
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but does not say, is that the motivation behind genetic 
engineering is different from that behind the Nazi 
campaign, but the results are the same.
Rifkin posits that, like nuclear technology, "Once we 
decide to begin the process of human genetic engineering, 
there is really no logical place to stop."203 Rifkin 
suggests that the first steps in the process have already 
been taken with the introduction of human growth hormone 
genes into the "permanent hereditary make-up of pigs, 
sheep and other domestic animals."204 Rifkin argues that 
having taken this first step, scientists have demonstrated 
that they do not consider the human growth hormone gene 
unique and are more likely to view the other human genes 
in a similar manner. This is Rifkin's rhetorical effort 
to reinforce his contention that living organisms, human 
beings included, are relegated to the level of inanimate 
objects by recombinant DNA researchers.
Moving from the rather simple concept of transferring 
human genes to domestic animals, Rifkin expresses concern 
about the ultimate potential and perhaps the most 
troublesome aspect of biotechnology. Rifkin concedes that 
the first occurrence of human gene manipulation will 
likely be directed toward curing diseases such as 
diabetes, sickle cell anemia, and cancer. If genetic 
manipulation can cure these diseases, Rifkin asks why 
should we not consider other "disorders" such as "myopia,
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205color blindness, left-handedness?" Rifkin predicts 
that as scientists learn more about the makeup and 
functions of genes, the possibility of behavior 
modification will become a reality: "Many scientists are
already contending that schizophrenia and other 'abnormal' 
psychological states result from genetic disorders or 
defects."206 Rifkin points out that part of the 
complexity of the issue is who defines "defect,"
"disease," and "abnormal."
Rifkin raises serious questions that are easily 
within the realm of possibility if genetic engineering is 
taken to its ultimate potential. Rifkin, again, narrows 
society's choices to two. Either we abandon genetic 
engineering completely or allow it to run its course. 
Citing the development of nuclear technology, he contends 
there is no middle ground.
Rifkin's repeated direct attacks on scientific 
assumptions and his somewhat more passive challenges to 
that world view through direct attacks on nuclear 
technology and recombinant DNA have put the scientific 
community in the position of having to defend itself and 
justify its activities, goals, and methods. Because 
scientific inquiry enjoys the exalted position of being 
almost beyond reproach, the questions raised by Rifkin and 
others represent a decidedly heretical perspective and
87
create within the scientific community an unwelcome crisis 
of justification.
Cpntslttplon
This chapter cited elements of Rifkin's rhetorical 
strategy that suggest it is consistent with Kurtz* notion 
of nearness/remoteness and Lessl's idea that the 
nearness/remoteness phenomenon results in crisis in the 
institution's orthodoxy. This chapter analyzed Rifkin's 
rhetorical approach challenging the validity of the 
scientific world view and what he suggests are its two 
most important technological achievements—nuclear 
technology and genetic engineering.
Chapter four will argue that Rifkin's rhetorical 
strategy is consistent with Kurtz' second characteristic 
of heresy—that it is socially constructed. The analysis 
in chapter four will suggest that the crisis described in 
chapter three results from social factors such as 
political confrontations and struggles for power between 




It was argued in Chapter Three that Jeremy Rifkin's 
rhetorical strategy to replace what he terms the 
scientific world view with his "empathetic" world view 
creates a crisis within the scientific community 
consistent with Kurtz* first characteristic of heresy and 
Lessl's formulation of crisis. This chapter will analyze 
the issues on which Rifkin focuses that create the crisis. 
I will argue that his attempt to wrest some or all of the 
decision-making control of the scientific process from the 
scientific community is consistent with Kurtz' second 
characteristic of heresy, i.e., heresy is socially 
constructed. By examining Rifkin's rhetoric in this way, 
we can learn how rhetors who challenge the orthodoxy of an 
institution draw the defenders of that orthodoxy into a 
confrontation. This analysis of Rifkin's strategies 
provides insight into the heretics rhetorical appeals that 
put the orthodoxy on the defensive and delineates the 
point(s) of contention.
Social Construction Analysis 
Kurtz argues that heresy is socially constructed amid 
social conflict. The conflict arises when the defenders 
of the orthodoxy and the heretics find themselves on 
opposing sides of a tenet of the institution. Lessl 
contends that these confrontations are struggles over
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authority in the institution. Kurtz and Lessl agree that 
earning the label of heretic requires more of an 
institution's member than merely holding errant beliefs; 
he must challenge the orthodoxy with those beliefs. Lessl 
points out that "Only when error challenges authority is 
it treated as heresy."207 The act of challenging the 
orthodoxy draws a line of contention for both sides, and 
self-interest groups tend to form and choose the position 
for which they have an affinity.
Lessl contends the struggles over authority that
characterize heresy may be regarded as political
208confrontations. While the heretic attempts to 
undermine the authority of the orthodoxy and assume 
control of some or all of the decision-making processes, 
the orthodoxy attempts to solidify its position by 
reinforcing its authority, rallying its supporters and 
denouncing the heretics. Lessl argues that heresy focuses 
much of an institution's attention on its authoritarian 
basis. He cites as an example the centralization of Papal 
authority as an ecclesiastical respqnse to the modernist 
heresy. Lessl contends, too, that more conservative 
religious groups tend to become more dogmatic about 
stricter interpretation of the scriptures.209 Kurtz 
points out that sacred doctrines and institutions "require 
perpetual defense from destructive forces..." and that
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those responsible for the defense must discharge their 
obligation whatever the cost.210
Rifkin's rhetorical strategy assumes unmistakably 
political overtones. And it undeniably attempts not only 
to establish control of the decision-making process, but 
to overthrow the orthodoxy within which the decision­
making process resides and to replace it with one of his 
own design. Rifkin complains, "The power to control the 
future biological design of living tissue has been signed
over to the scientists, the corporations, and the state
211without ceremony." The transfer of power may have 
occurred without ceremony, as Rifkin suggests, but not 
without notice.
Clearly, the scientific community's power to control 
genetic engineering has Rifkin's attention, and those 
scientists involved with the technology are the subjects 
of Rifkin's considerable rhetorical expertise. Although 
Rifkin does not delineate a division in his rhetorical 
strategy in the power struggle with the scientific 
community, his efforts seem to manifest themselves in 
short-term and long-term approaches. The short-term 
efforts employ books, speeches, media events, legislative 
lobbying, and demonstrations to achieve visibility for the 
controversy. The long-term strategy seeks to persuade 
society to invoke passive resistance against technical
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advancement toward a goal of exorcising the existing 
scientific world view.
Short-Term Strategy: Active Resistance
Genetic engineering's momentum is one point of 
conflict for Rifkin and the scientific community. While 
Rifkin would like to increase the public's involvement in 
discussions about genetic engineering, his first point of 
contention is to stop or delay the research. So, in the 
struggle for authority, Rifkin advocates a halt in 
recombinant DNA activities: "I think we should heed the 
call of other countries and impose a five-year moratorium 
worldwide so that we can bring the best environmental 
sciences together with our molecular biologists to see if
we can hammer out a reasonable risk-assessment
212science." Rifkin's Foundation on Economic Trends made 
a similar plea. A news release issued from the Washington 
office called for "an international moratorium on the 
deliberate release of genetically engineered organisms 
into the environment pending a thorough review of 
potential environmental and public health risks."213 
Rifkin cites Germany, Denmark, and Japan as countries with 
genetic engineering capabilities that have chosen to 
impose moratoriums on the release of the organisms into 
the environment.
Although Rifkin may be appealing to the scientific 
community with these calls for a moratorium, he seems to
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be addressing governmental agencies with either budgetary 
or regulatory control over those involved in the research. 
Realizing that a self-imposed moratorium by the scientific 
community is both unlikely and unrealistic, Rifkin 
challenges the world's governments to assume the 
responsibility of the safety of their citizenry. He also 
challenges them to halt the release of genetically 
engineered organisms until there is assurance that these 
experiments can be conducted safely. He cites three 
genetic engineering-capable governments that have already 
taken that step.
One implication of Rifkin's call for a moratorium is 
that if he were successful, it would signal a major 
victory for the opponents of genetic engineering. Because 
the scientific community virtually dominates the decision­
making processes of recombinant DNA, any compromise would 
involve the scientific community's relinquishing some 
decision-making authority.
Another of Rifkin's strategies to impose a moratorium 
on genetic engineering research is based on risk- 
assessment. He argues that genetically engineered 
organisms should not be released into the environment 
until assurances for safe experimental procedures exist.
He protests: "There is no science of risk-assessment which 
(sic) we can judge these introductions."214 Rifkin's 
argument implies that he would agree to genetic
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engineering research if only risk-assessment procedures 
were in place; however, he knows that consensus on risk- 
assessment procedures is not likely. Indeed, Douglas and 
Wildavsky's analysis of risk-assessment has shown that 
between those people who are risk-takers and those who are 
risk averse, "There is neither agreement over appropriate 
methods to assess risks nor acceptance of the outcomes of
215public processes." Douglas and Wildavsky's research
indicates that four approaches to risk-assessment are
used; all are biased; and no consensus exists on which is
216most appropriate.
They suggest that all four methods develop 
relationships between advantages and disadvantages, but 
the criteria are different for each. The "revealed 
preference" approach assumes people weigh benefits against 
risks internally and risk assessors determine what people 
are willing to accept by observing risk-takers1 actions. 
The "expressed preference" method uses surveys and similar 
instruments to determine the risks people are willing to 
accept. "Natural standards" shifts the burden of risk- 
assessment from people to nature. Rather than focusing on 
what risks people are willing to accept, risk assessors 
try to determine how much risk nature can support.
Finally, the "cost-benefit" approach to risk-assessment 
weighs risks against benefits using common economic 
criteria centered around values that can be
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217calculated. Although Rifkin advocates establishing 
risk-assessment procedures for biotechnology through a 
cost-benefit approach, his use of "cost-benefit" is based 
on personal values rather than economic criteria.
Indeed, Rifkin's criteria for risk-assessment seem to 
evolve from two of Douglas and Wildavsky's approaches.
One of Rifkin's stated goals is to involve the public in 
discussions and debates about scientific research and 
technology. This approach is consistent with Douglas and 
Wildavsky's expressed preferences notion of risk- 
assessment. Not only does expressed preferences reflect 
Rifkin's strategy because it seeks people's involvement 
through an expression of their opinion, but also like 
Rifkin, it assumes that what people want is different from 
what they are getting. Elements of Douglas and 
Wildavsky's natural standards approach is also part of 
Rifkin's risk-assessment strategy. Arguing that the 
burden of proof in this approach shifts from the citizenry 
to nature, Douglas and Wildavsky contend that nature will 
reflect "...whatever version of reality the looker wishes 
to see in it. If you want to forbid new things, just say 
that adding to background radiation or chemical wastes 
will disrupt the delicate balance of nature."218 
Rifkin's rhetorical strategy to developing a risk- 
assessment procedure rejects the risk-takers' argument for 
greater efficiency in the use of natural resources.
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Rifkin*s position is consistent with that of the risk 
averse. Douglas and Wildavsky observe that, "They [the 
risk averse] insist that human life is priceless and 
cannot be measured by vulgar money. They object that the 
whole exercise is immoral when life and nature seem to be
219bought and sold." While scientists argue from the 
risk-takers position of an objective economic cost-benefit 
approach, Rifkin assumes a risk averse stance based on 
subjective, human values. Rifkin focuses on risks; the 
scientists focus on benefits. Consensus among Rifkin and 
scientists on a risk-assessment procedure appears 
unlikely. Rifkin's argument to halt genetic engineering 
experimentation until the development of a risk-assessment 
procedure, then, is an effort to take research out of the 
hands of the scientific community indefinitely.
On the one hand, Rifkin seeks a moratorium to stop 
genetically engineered organisms from being released into 
the environment. On the other hand, he wrestles with the 
scientific community over specific recombinant DNA 
products such as BST (bovine somatotropin). Rifkin often 
refers to the product as B6H (bovine growth hormone). BST 
became one of the most highly publicized and controversial 
recombinant DNA products to date, in part, because it was 
the first commercially successful product of its kind and, 
in part, because of the opposition mounted by Rifkin.
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Rifkin attacks the BST issue from two angles, economic 
consequences and health concerns.
BST manufacturers developed the product to increase 
milk production in cows. Rifkin appeals to the economic 
security of dairy farmers and the tax-paying public when 
he suggests that increased milk production will ultimately 
increase costs to both groups. Rifkin argues that if 
increased milk production is the reason for its 
introduction, it should be taken off the market because, 
nThe last thing we need is more milk. Every industrial 
nation in the world is awash in milk surpluses...1,220 
Rifkin claims increased milk production will result in 
lower prices paid to the farmer and may force "up to
thirty percent of the American dairy farms...out of
221business." His appeal to the public at large suggests 
that although milk prices may decrease, the government is 
committed to buying surplus milk products such as butter 
and cheese and that increased milk production will 
increase taxes spent on these purchases. Rifkin asks 
rhetorically, "Will the taxpayers want to pay to buy up 
all of the surpluses?"222
Rifkin's health argument takes two approaches: first, 
he appeals to people's compassion suggesting that the 
hormone is detrimental to the health of the animals; and 
second, he appeals to people's fear of the unknown,
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contending that the hormone is transmitted to the milk and 
may have negative effects on human health.
Rifkin appeals to people's compassion for animals 
when he charges that BST presents health hazards for the 
cows. He argues, "If you're going to put massive 
injections of a hormone into an animal beyond what it was 
biologically designed for, it's naive and disingenuous to 
believe that won't stress that animal."223 Rifkin 
contends that research shows "...the cows are facing 
sterility, mastitis, a whole range of production stresses
224and it stands to reason."
Rifkin combines a fear of the unknown with a fear of 
"chemical additives in our food" to form the basis of his 
rhetorical strategy to raise concerns about the 
transmission of BST through milk to humans. A television 
commercial produced by Rifkin's organization claimed that, 
"It [BST] could be a health hazard to cows, and the milk 
you drink will contain that hormone. What are they doing
225to our milk?" The audience is to infer that the 
hormone is harmful and that the conspiratorial "they" are 
tampering with milk purity and nutritional quality.
Rifkin's rhetorical strategy to discredit BST as a 
viable product includes demonstrating that increased milk 
production is unnecessary and economically disruptive to 
both farmers and the public. Moreover, this strategy 
raises concerns about the well-being of the animals being
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injected with BST and questions the hormone's effects on 
human health.
Rifkin's preference of the term BGH over BST is by 
design. "Growth hormone" carries more ominous 
connotations than its scientific equivalent, particularly 
when it ends up in a primary food source. Both are 
accurate, but each suggests a slightly different nuance in 
perception.
Rifkin's goal is to have BST removed from the market. 
A successful campaign to ban BST or to severely limit its 
use would mark a significant victory for those opposing 
genetic engineering. For Rifkin it would signify a 
measure of success, an incremental step toward greater 
participation in the decision-making processes related to 
genetic engineering and, more important, justification for 
continuing the power struggle with the scientific 
orthodoxy.
Another product-specific challenge occurred when 
Rifkin blocked field experiments of the first genetically
engineered organism to be released into the
226environment. The organism was named Ice-Minus by its 
developer Steven Lindow, a plant pathologist at the 
University of California, Berkeley. Lindow discovered in 
the frost-forming bacteria, P-syringae, the necessary 
genetic modification to delete the ice-creating 
instructions so that when the new organisms were sprayed
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on a field they would displace the naturally occurring 
bacteria and protect plants down to 24 degrees 
Fahrenheit.227 Noticing that Lindow and the National 
Institutes of Health (NIH), which sponsored the research, 
failed to consider fully the environmental impact of the 
spraying, Rifkin sued to block the experiment. As a 
result, experimentation was delayed for three years.228 
Rifkin predicts that spraying Ice-Minus on crops will have 
several unintended, detrimental effects. Among the 
problems Rifkin anticipates are long-term effects "on 
worldwide precipitation patterns" and putting local flora 
and fauna at a disadvantage against frost damage.229
It was not, necessarily, Rifkin's rhetorical strategy 
that provided the opportunity to block the Ice-Minus 
experiment, but an oversight on the part of the 
researchers. The fact that the project was delayed three 
years provided Rifkin with justification for his challenge 
and lent some credibility to his argument that Ice-Minus 
was not completely harmless.
Rifkin called on the courts to assist in his struggle 
with the scientific community during the Ice-Minus 
controversy, and although he uses the court system and 
existing laws to achieve his goals, he is also active in 
influencing legislation that benefits his cause. The 
National Journal said in 1986 that Rifkin was one of 150 
people in the United States with the most influence in
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shaping federal policy.230 For example, Rifkin claims 
that he worked for 14 months to get a bill before the 
United States House of Representatives to overturn a 
decision by the United States Patent office allowing the 
patenting of "any genetically engineered animal on the
231planet." Though he was working to change a government 
agency policy, Rifkin implies that the scientific 
community was behind the move to patent animals and that 
failure to take action would have played into the hands of 
biotechnology-oriented corporations. He predicted that 
"It'll mean a few chemical and pharmaceutical and biotech 
companies in the next twenty years literally taking over
232animal husbandry as they have poultry."
Again, Rifkin's strategy challenges the scientific 
community's authority to take genetic engineering in 
whatever direction it chooses without public discussion, 
without debate. Rifkin continues to question the freedom 
with which scientists pursue their research as he seeks to 
provoke discussions about genetic engineering and open 
them to public participation. Rifkin predicts, "We're 
going to, as a society, debate the pros and cons of each 
new technology so we can have a more sophisticated 
analysis of cost benefit—so that when we proceed into 
these new areas we do so with a sense that we've taken
233care." Rifkin, convinced that the good he does 
outweighs his mistakes, suggests, "We're opening up the
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process of debate around some of the most important things 
in our lives. We*re opening up science and technology to 
scrutiny beyond the scientific establishment.1,234
Another of Rifkin's strategies is to confront the 
scientific community with challenges that he claims 
represent the concerns of thousands of people and 
organizations, not just himself. Andrew King observes 
that "Anyone who has built a constituency is to be feared. 
Those who have done so have discovered a basis upon which 
to unify people outside the prevailing power
235structure." Rifkin contends that his challenges to 
biotechnology represent views of a constituency that is to 
be recognized and respected, if not feared. Rifkin often 
refers to coalitions in which he is involved that are 
actively building opposition to genetic engineering in one 
way or another. Rifkin spoke of Germany, Denmark, and 
Japan as countries that chose to invoke a moratorium on 
genetically engineered releases into the environment. 
Rifkin's reference to "our international coalition" during 
a speech about BST cites the International Coalition 
Against Bovine Growth Hormone.238 In that same speech, 
Rifkin referred to another coalition, presumably against 
genetic engineering, that consisted of "the National 
Farmers Union, the American Agricultural Movement, Save 
the Family Farm Coalition...the Humane Society, the
237ASPCA..." Again, in that speech, Rifkin claimed to be
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establishing a "global coalition...of farm 
organizations...environmental groups, food and consumer
238groups, religious leaders..." Rifkin warns that a 
group of angry, poor, developing countries in the Southern 
Hemisphere is coalescing to protect gene pools native to 
their countries against acquisitions by the high- 
technology countries of the Northern Hemisphere. Rifkin 
argues that these developing nations claim "genetic 
resources as part of their heritage...and they should be
238compensated for their use."
Repeated references to groups of countries uniting 
against genetic engineering and coalitions of 
organizations and groups forming to challenge the 
technology reflect Rifkin's rhetorical strategy of 
undermining the scientific community's favored position by 
demonstrating growing disenchantment with the paradigm. 
Consistent with Kurtz' argument that "The interests of 
conflicting parties become attached either to a defense of 
the alleged heresy or to the refutation of it," Rifkin 
enumerates the growing number of coalitions to illustrate 
how interests opposed to genetic engineering have "become
240attached ...to a defense of the alleged heresy..."
The result would appear to be the isolation of the 
scientific community and the legitimization of the 
heretic's claims.
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One final strategy Rifkin employs to engage actively 
the scientific community is face-to-face confrontation. 
Rifkin is an accomplished speaker whose presentations vary 
from 30 minutes to eight hours, depending on the
241contract. Although most of his paid appearances are 
likely before friendly audiences, he does not limit 
himself to that speaking environment. For example, The 
National Institutes of Health convened the Technology 
Assessment Conference on Bovine Somatotropin from December 
5-7, 1990. One journal reported the results of the 
meeting:
The conference's concluding news conference was 
enlivened by the presence of BST opponent Jeremy 
Rifkin, president of the Foundation on Economic 
Trends, who shouted questions from the press 
section until he was asked to remain silent by 
NIH officials."
Rifkin also addressed representatives of the 
agricultural units of land-grant universities as part of a 
debate on genetic engineering in Washington, D.C., in 
1988. Though the speaking situation was not 
confrontational, Rifkin arrived at that meeting prepared 
to address an audience that represented scientific 
interests and could be characterized as less than 
friendly. Having attended that speech, I thought that 
Rifkin addressed the topic forcefully and articulately, 
with no evidence of being intimidated by an audience that, 
for the most part, offered him little more than contempt. 
Rhetorically, Rifkin probably accomplishes very little in
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genuinely confrontational situations such as the NIH 
meeting. Although the rhetor employing that kind of 
disruptive discourse is likely to be discounted as a 
radical with minimal credibility, that kind of exchange 
serves to make the defenders of the orthodoxy aware that 
opposition is still very much present and active.
By contrast, when Rifkin addresses a specific 
audience face-to-face—hostile groups included—he leaves a 
lasting impression. Time said of Rifkin, "Twenty years of 
teaching, preaching and raising consciences...have refined 
this show [Rifkin's lectures] to the point that it has a 
slick, thoroughly professional sheen."243 Suggesting 
that Rifkin's lecture style is better suited for college 
students than scientists, The New York Times Magazine 
judged Rifkin's style appealing: "But his natural ease and 
charm, his ability to glide from an analysis of ancient 
and medieval cosmologies to shameless shtick tends to
244intimidate adversaries." Even when members of the 
audience disagree with Rifkin's philosophies and 
perspective and disparage his tactics, they begrudgingly 
admit that he is articulate, persuasive, and a force with 
which the scientific community must reckon.
Long-term Strategy: Passive Resistance
Rifkin, in his books, speeches, and interviews, 
consistently challenges the legitimacy of the scientific 
world view, arguing that it must be replaced with his
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"empathetic" world view. Although this approach to the 
world is an unequivocal challenge to science, the "how to” 
of Rifkin's insurrection is never clearly articulated. 
Instead, he offers adjectives that describe the 
relationship with nature that will be experienced by those 
who adopt this world view. Passive resistance is the 
terminology I choose to describe the road to Rifkin's 
rather nebulous world of the future.
Recalling Rifkin's equation for the scientific world 
view: knowledge *= power = control = security, his passive 
resistance approach to the world argues that power does 
not guarantee security as the equation suggests. He 
points to the nuclear arms race as evidence of his claim. 
Rifkin proclaims, "It is time to entertain the ultimate 
heresy: to consider the idea of renouncing the use of
245power as a means of obtaining security." Arguing that 
security comes from peace of mind rather than from a 
nuclear arsenal, Rifkin philosophizes that "It is 
impossible to control a mind that refuses to cooperate, 
that will not acknowledge the underlying assumptions 
governing the pursuit of power."2*8 Rifkin's rhetorical 
strategy is intended to ultimately transform the power 
struggle from one of physical conflict to one of moral 
combat. The transformation establishes Rifkin and his 
supporters as the moral elite. In his discussion of non­
violent power strategies, King suggests that these
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struggles produce new identities for the combatants. The 
strong, in this case the scientists, are cast as 
oppressors. King contends that the goal of the non­
violent practitioner is to instill guilt in the oppressors
so that they "... at once surrender their prerogatives and 
redress the grievances of the weaker party. "247 Rifkin 
argues that power can work only in circumstances where 
people are willing to cooperate, to become either the 
"victimizers or victims."248 Rifkin claims that, "By the 
mere act of letting go of the drive for power, one 
automatically cancels the exercise of that drive by 
others, whether they be individuals or nations." Rifkin
asserts that letting go of power means losing a measure of
control and "will require that we renounce our drive for 
sovereignty over everything that lives..."249 Rifkin 
predicts that relinquishing the quest for power will 
neutralize science and permit mankind to establish a 
closer relationship with nature and the environment.
Rifkin's strategy also seeks to make a virtue of 
sacrifice. Admitting that the new world view will require 
sacrificing some personal security, Rifkin declares that 
the reward is the security of nature for future 
generations. Rifkin contends that, "Instead of forcing 
the cosmos to conform with our behavior, we would have to 
refashion our behavior to conform with the cosmos."250
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Rifkin's "empathetic" world view is offered as an 
alternative to the existing scientific world view and 
reflects what Douglas and Wildavsky term "sectarian 
cosmology." Sectarianism is defined as "exclusive or 
narrow-minded attachment to a sect, denomination, party or
251school." Douglas and Wildavsky posit that the 
characteristics of sectarianism include: a) an expectation 
that life of the future will be radically changed for the 
worse, b) a belief that the disaster has been caused by 
corrupt worldliness that includes ambition of big 
organizations and continuing development of new 
technology, c) dichotomized values, i.e., good and bad, d) 
espousal of the widest causes for all mankind, and e) 
references to God or nature as justification for its
252actions. Douglas and Wildavsky suggest that 
environmental groups often exhibit the characteristics of 
sectarianism. Rifkin's "empathetic" world view embodies 
these same characteristics. He advocates a world of peace 
and mutual respect for all living creatures—a place where 
everything and everybody lives in perfect harmony with 
nature. Rhetorically, Rifkin creates a sectarian world 
that is free of nuclear weapons, genetically engineered 
organisms, polluting industries, and other technological 
creations of science. It is this withdrawal from 
technological inquiry and advancement that forms the basis
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for Rifkin's threat to the scientific world view and 
creates the crisis within the scientific community.
Perhaps it is the nature of sectarianism to produce 
discourse that is couched in terms that lack specificity. 
Certainly, Rifkin's vision of the "empathetic" world is 
rich with descriptive language, but virtually devoid of 
details about how the paradigm works. I believe the 
ambiguity is intentional. By not dealing in specifics 
Rifkin concentrates his discourse on the positive 
relationships with nature that mankind will enjoy without 
discussing the more troublesome aspects of that world.
For example, Rifkin's empathetic world frees itself of 
nuclear weapons, produces its food through organic 
farming, heats ecologically compatible shelters with 
passive solar devices, and engages in a holistic approach 
to human health. Rifkin's empathetic approach ignores the 
interdependence of the nations of the world, problems of 
hunger in the regions of the world that are incapable of 
producing food, the rapidly expanding world population, 
and the control of dread diseases and epidemics.
Since the Renaissance sectarianism has provided a 
cosmology for challenging authority. Douglas and 
Wildavsky trace the origins of sectarianism in America 
from the earliest colonial settlements to the present, but 
suggest that the two decades from 1960 to 1980 were 
particularly fertile for sectarian movements because of
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technological innovations and increased government
253support. Although Rifkin's "empathetic" world view 
reflects the characteristics of the sectarian movement, 
the values he espouses seem to have grown from the 
agrarian tradition. Perhaps because the genesis of 
biotechnology experimentation was in agricultural 
disciplines, Rifkin finds it easier to argue from an 
agrarian perspective and employ agrarian values.
These agrarian values have been a part of persuasive 
discourse since Thomas Jefferson, and collectively have 
become designated as the "agrarian myth." Richard 
Hofstadter first coined the term "agrarian myth" to 
designate what he called a sentimental attachment to rural 
living based on notions about rural people and their
254lives. Hofstadter's use of the term "myth" does not 
suggest that the notion is necessarily false, rather it 
denotes an idea "that so effectively embodies men's values 
that it profoundly influences their way of perceiving 
reality..."2M
Hofstadter's explains that the agrarian myth consists 
of several themes. Among them is the notion that the 
yeoman farmer was "the ideal man and the ideal citizen." 
The myth contends that the "special virtues" of farmers 
and the "special values" of rural life made agriculture 
uniquely important to society. Another theme describes 
the farmer as the "incarnation of the simple, honest.
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independent, healthy, happy, human being." The agrarian 
myth also suggests that the farmer's life was wholesome 
and filled with integrity because of his "close communion" 
with beneficent nature. Finally, the farmer's well being 
was not merely physical, it was moral.
Rifkin does not suggest that everyone should become a 
farmer, but the values for which he argues are embodied in 
the agrarian myth. Rifkin's ideal citizen is honest, 
happy, and healthy because he communes with nature.
Rifkin argues that the "empathetic" world view engenders 
stewards who "participate with and nurture other things. 
Their sense of security does not come from being in 
control, but rather from taking care of other beings."236 
Rifkin argues that today's "high tech" agriculture needs a 
new perspective, one with a "new vision...that can allow 
us not only to deal with and adjust to the current 
greenhouse crisis, but could allow to plan a new 
agricultural policy for the world in coming centuries that 
will be based on resacralizing our relationship with 
life.'*257
Rhetorically, Rifkin sells the idea of his spiritual 
world as an embodiment of the teachings of Jesus Christ, 
Mohandas Gandhi, Mother Theresa, and Martin Luther
258King. Characterizing his "empathetic" world view in 
god terms, literally, Rifkin identifies his paradigm with 
the world's most revered humanitarians. Taking his vision
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one step further, Rifkin employs a rhetoric of 
transcendence as he discusses the potential of the 
"empathetic" world view. Kenneth Burke suggests that 
transcendence is the capacity for words or symbols to 
enhance the object in nature that they represent—to add a 
"new dimension" to things of nature.259 As Rifkin 
describes the "empathetic" world view, his words extricate 
themselves of earthly bonds and assume utopian 
connotations. Rifkin posits that the new world may be the 
route back to the Garden of Eden. Rifkin's rhetoric soars 
as he envisions his approach to the Garden gates and 
proclaims,
And as our generation walks through those gates, 
and gazes once again upon the beauty of the 
garden as Adam and Eve once did, we will be 
cleansed and rejuvenated. The long, weary 
journey to secure the immortality of the human 
race will have ended where it began. Our 
generation will have finally discovered the 
sweet secret of immortality.
Rifkin's depiction of the "empathetic" world view as 
a return to Paradise cuts like a two-edged sword because 
it is more than a description of a utopian world. In fact, 
because that world beyond the gates of the Garden of Eden 
is in a state of imperfection striving toward a return to 
the Garden, the implication for the existing scientific 
world view is that it is neither the roost direct return 
route to the Garden nor is it the best approach to solving 
the world's problems.
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Rifkin's world view is attractive because it creates 
rhetorically a utopian world, a return to the Garden of 
Eden where humans become one with nature and all of their 
needs are provided. Rifkin implies that the "empathetic" 
world, because of its "oneness with nature" will be free 
of conflict, free of the dangers inherent in a 
technological society, and free of the stress that 
accompanies a materialistic culture.
Rifkin's arguments appeal at still another level. As 
Douglas and Wildavsky point out, conservation and 
ecological activism became a socially acceptable activity 
in the decades of 1960 and 1970.281 Rifkin incorporates 
in his rhetoric the tenets and values of the environmental 
movement. Preserving natural resources for future 
generations is a central theme in Rifkin's arguments. 
Rifkin quotes the philosophy of the Iroquois Indians when 
he argues this point. He suggests that, "When the 
Iroquois Indians made a decision, they asked 'How does the 
decision we make today affect seven generations 
removed?' "262
Conclusion
This chapter presented arguments supporting the 
notion that Rifkin's challenges to science represent a 
power struggle that is consistent with Kurtz' second 
characteristic of heresy, i.e., that heresy is socially 
constructed in the midst of conflict. By definition,
power resides within the orthodoxy of an institution. The 
implication for the heretic is that he assumes 
responsibility for initiating the conflict and the 
inevitable power struggles that ensue. Whether 
confrontation is simply inherent in heresy or whether, in 
Rifkin's case, it is characteristic of his personality and 
approach to life, ample evidence exists to suggest that 
Rifkin eagerly leads the insurrection against the 
scientific orthodoxy on several fronts and actively seeks 
to wrest whatever power over genetic engineering he can 
from the orthodoxy.
The social construction of heresy, according to 
Kurtz, produces social consequences. Chapter five will 
examine some of the consequences within the scientific 
community that result from Rifkin's rhetorical challenges.
CHAPTER 5 
THE RESPONSE 
In Chapters three and four, I demonstrated how 
Rifkin's rhetorical strategy is consistent with Kurtz' 
first two characteristics of heresy. First, the "deviant 
insider" produces crisis in the institution, and second, 
crisis is socially constructed. Chapter five will argue 
that Rifkin's heretical stance and rhetorical strategy 
draw scientists from their laboratories to debate
biotechnology. This involvement in public debate by the
scientists constitutes what Kurtz' calls the social 
consequences of heresy.
Scientists have lost some of the freedom with which 
they conduct their research. It is my contention that
this loss of freedom is a permanent change within the
scientific establishment. This change is a result of 
Rifkin's heretical challenge and reflects Kurtz1 notion of 
the doctrinal consequences of heresy.
Finally, this chapter details the scientific 
community's efforts to seize the rhetorical advantage in 
this controversy by undermining Rifkin's credibility 
through name-calling. Kurtz labels this activity the 
heresy-hunt ritual. The last three of Kurtz' 
characteristics of heresy differ from the previous two 
because they reflect the rhetorical strategies of the 
orthodoxy rather than those of the heretic.
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Social Consequences Analysis 
The social consequences observed in the biotechnology 
controversy occur within the scientific community as 
scientists increase their exposure to the public by 
responding to Rifkin's challenges and countering with 
their own discourse. They leave the laboratory to develop 
arguments, publicly debate the issues, and recruit support 
for their cause.
Heresy produces social consequences beyond the 
boundaries of the institution in which it resides. In the 
case of recombinant DNA, public regulatory agencies adopt 
rules and guidelines that restrict the freedom of 
scientific inquiry into the technology. Retailers refuse 
to stock some items because of public concern about 
agricultural commodities developed from genetically 
engineered products.
Social consequences are one edge of what Kurtz 
described as the two-edged sword of heresy. The defenders 
of the orthodoxy perceive heresy as disruptive, even 
destructive, to their institution. What is not readily 
apparent to them, according to Kurtz, is that the social 
consequences of a heretical challenge benefit their cause 
by pulling their people together against a common enemy.
Kurtz argues that the social consequences of heresy 
demonstrate that, in one way, "the propagation of error" 
ultimately benefits the institution. As Kurtz points out
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"...[heresy] is not only disruptive but can be used for 
the creation of intragroup solidarity and for purposes of
263social control..." By labeling heresy as an enemy of 
the institution, the defenders of the orthodoxy can rally 
their supporters in a way that may not have been possible 
without the heresy.
Lessl reinforces Kurtz* argument that the threat 
posed by heresy results in social changes within the 
institution: "By identifying heresy and defining it as a 
viral infestation of speciosity threatening to induce a 
new fever of public credulity, scientists create for 
themselves a renewed sense of solidarity and social
264importance." Lessl contends that one strategy for 
building institutional solidarity is retreating to 
scientific dogma as a response to the heretic. Lessl 
observes that although instituting dogma is common 
practice, "this impulse is troublesome for scientists as 
members of an institutional group defined by its rejection
265of authoritarian answers to phenomenal questions."
Kurtz and Lessl concentrate their commentary 
regarding social consequences on the institution in which 
the heresy arises. I believe this analysis of social 
consequences should extend beyond the boundaries of the 
institution in which the heresy occurs. While the 
defenders of the orthodoxy are building their support 
within the institution, the heretic may be building
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support outside the institution that can affect the 
orthodoxy. This appears to be the case with Rifkin. His 
heretical stance against the biotechnology orthodoxy 
attracts the interest of several groups including 
governmental agencies. Whatever solidarity occurs within 
and among these outside groups can be categorized as 
social consequences that influence the heretic and his 
institution.
Social Consequences Within the Institution
Opponents of biotechnology, the most prominent of 
whom is Jeremy Rifkin, have compelled substantial numbers 
of scientists and representatives of private and public 
research institutions to defend their participation in 
recombinant DNA research. Moreover, as some of these 
defenders of biotechnology surface, they actively 
encourage their colleagues to promote biotechnology 
research.
Perhaps there is no better example of the orthodoxy 
of agricultural biotechnology rallying its supporters 
against the growing influence of heresy than the United 
States Department of Agriculture's (USDA) Biotechnology 
Challenge Forum. On February 5-6, 1987, the USDA convened 
the "Biotechnology: The Challenge" Forum. The Forum 
brought together scientists, corporate executives,
government officials, and others to express their views on
266biotechnology and the challenges it faces. The
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preface to the Proceedings outlined the goals of the 
meeting as increasing public knowledge about agricultural 
biotechnology research and examining the role of the 
federal government in regulating the results of this 
research. Although the Forum may have achieved these 
goals, the Proceedings indicate that there were attempts 
to bring together those in attendance to form a united 
front against critics of biotechnology.
Because of the views expressed in that forum, there 
can be little doubt that the symposium was the result of 
the growing intensity of public debate on biotechnology 
and the increasing involvement of government as a result 
of the public debate. The agenda drew forth several 
defenders of genetic engineering that may never have 
engaged in a public discussion of the subject except that 
their work was publicly challenged.
The rhetorical strategies employed by the scientific 
orthodoxy in this meeting included minimizing the novelty 
of the technology, questioning the scientific competence 
of those who challenge genetic engineering, invoking 
scientific dogma, and emphasizing the potential benefits
267of the research.
By minimizing the novelty of genetic engineering, 
defenders of biotechnology implement a rhetorical strategy 
that Andrew King terms manipulating the context of an 
event. King contends that "one can change the
persuasiveness of an argument or appeal by expanding or
diminishing the context in which a group of listeners
268think about it." So, the biotechnology orthodoxy 
argues that recombinant DNA is not new; it is simply an 
extension of traditional breeding techniques that have 
always sought improved plants and animals through cross­
breeding. For example, Henry I. Hiller, H.D., special 
assistant to the commissioner of the Food and Drug 
Administration, accused biotechnology critics of confusing 
the public by suggesting the technology is new. He argued 
that genetic engineering involves new techniques that are 
refinements of older biotechnology, "not technological 
disjunctions, as was the advent of nuclear fission, or as
269would be the case for time travel." The effectiveness 
of this argument would appear to be minimized by the 
paradox it creates. On the one hand scientists argue that 
biotechnology is not new, while on the other hand they 
contend that it has the potential of unprecedented 
discoveries in food, medicine and the environment. 
Rhetorically, the scientists employ the notion of 
minimizing the novelty of genetic engineering to refute 
one of Rifkin's primary arguments—that genetic engineering 
permits combinations of genetic traits across species 
boundaries that were never possible with traditional 
breeding techniques. Rifkin contends that biotechnology's 
unique potential lies in its capability to introduce
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genetic traits from any animal to any other animal, 
including humans, and from plants to animals and animals 
to plants. In fact, Rifkin cites as an example of the 
possibilities the introduction of the "light" gene from 
the fire fly into tobacco plants to make them glow at 
night.
One strategy scientists used to discredit the 
heretic's credibility is to question the biotechnology 
challengers' knowledge of science. One Forum speaker, a 
microbiologist, exhibited frustration about public 
involvement in the biotechnology debate and governmental 
involvement in regulating the industry. Suggesting that 
biotechnology research has had no safety problems in ten 
years, he complained that "nonscientific issues may play a 
dominant role in the future of biotechnology development 
and implementation in the United States."270 Implying 
that these "nonscientific issues" may be irrational, he 
invoked the fear that these divergent opinions may cause 
the United States' biotechnology efforts to become second- 
rate. He predicted that "First, the regulatory climate 
could, if not rational, present U.S. industry with an 
insurmountable problem for the eventual introduction of 
products being developed now, leading to a future 
withdrawal of activities in these areas."271 At once 
narrowing the listeners' choices to purely "scientific" 
concerns, defining those choices and invoking the sanctity
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of science, the speaker implied that only rational and 
irrational approaches to the biotechnology debate exist. 
Moreover, for him, any approach that is not science-based 
is not rational and therefore not worthy of serious 
consideration by scientists.
A Monsanto Company representative argued against the 
public's participation in decisions related to 
biotechnology because of its lack of understanding of the 
science involved. Karen Rogers, education director for 
Monsanto, suggested that the fears of people untrained in 
science threaten the freedom and right to conduct research 
in the United States. For Rogers, "Biotechnology simply 
is moving ahead too quickly for the public to assimilate 
its advances into their existing educational, religious
272and social frameworks." On one hand Rogers' comments 
seem to suggest that a general lack of education is the 
reason the public should not participate in genetic 
engineering decisions; but another comment reveals that 
she believes a different kind of education would help 
biotechnology achieve the public consensus it seeks.
Rogers argued that the conduct of scientific inquiry is a 
right. By suggesting that genetic engineering is a right, 
she attempts to elevate the rationale for biotechnology 
research to a higher and therefore more legitimizing moral 
plane. Rogers predicted that "Unless science and math
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literacy is improved, we could lose our right to conduct
273research-whether basic or applied.”
Rogers' comments exemplify Kurtz' notion that heresy 
provides for the defenders of the orthodoxy an opportunity 
to rally their faithful. Rogers admonished the group:
"The time when scientists could conduct research in the 
quiet and solitude of their laboratories without entering
274the public debate is over." Rogers then offered a 
plan for responding to the challengers of genetic 
engineering. She suggested that the industry needs a 
spokesperson for lectures and media appearances, more 
visible scientists, more involvement by universities, an 
education program for journalists, and an emphasis on 
biotechnology in the science programs of schools.275
In a retreat to scientific dogma, another speaker 
responded to one of Rifkin's recurring public challenges. 
Rifkin's suggestion that genetically engineered products 
may become as uncontrollable as Kudzu vine, the gypsy 
moth, and chestnut blight was the subject of this 
speaker's comments. Alan Goldhammer, director of 
technical affairs for the Industrial Biotechnology 
Association, attempted to limit the scope of the 
biotechnology argument by reducing the debate to 
quantifiable, scientific data. He argued that ''It is 
imperative that any risk assessment be science based. It 
is easy to conjure up scenarios of ecological damage by
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genetically engineered organisms, but these will easily 
fall apart when the scientific data are scrutinized.,,Z76 
Goldhammer's metaphorical reference to the scenarios 
"falling apart" is a reductionist approach that suggests 
all the answers are in the scientific data. By 
discounting all considerations beyond the data,
Goldhammer, in effect, reduces the human implications of 
ecological damage to the level of quantifiable data. 
Kenneth Burke contends that human relationships are of a 
higher order than scientific correlations (data). Burke 
observes that, "Any attempt to deal with human 
relationships after the analogy of naturalistic 
correlations becomes necessarily the reduction of some 
higher or more complex realm of being to the terms of a
277lower or less complex realm of being."
Richard J. Patterson, a plant pathologist and 
biochemist, told the Forum that scientists should 
concentrate on the products of biotechnology when talking 
to the public. Patterson said his goal is to manage the 
fear that results from the cases of uncertainty brought to 
the attention of the public by "the antagonists of the 
development of biotechnology..." Patterson said his 
approach to the debate is to "convey knowledge" because 
"the public develops a clearer understanding if you talk 
about the products of biotechnology. 1,278 Patterson's 
strategy implies that discussions of genetically
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engineered products (rather than the methods, effects, or 
consequences) is synonymous with "knowledge." Patterson 
seems to rhetorically construct the public as a rational 
body as he suggests that if the public is simply 
"knowledgeable" about the products of biotechnology it 
will support continued research. This argument, too, is a 
form of scientific dogma based on the rationale that when 
results (data) are analyzed they will provide the desired 
results. Other considerations are not part of the 
equation.
The 1987 biotechnology forum in Washington, D.C., 
preceded four similar meetings the following year. In the 
spring of 1988, the USDA, the nation's land grant 
universities, state agricultural experiment stations, and 
cooperative extension services conducted four regional 
information conferences. Headlined as "Agricultural 
Biotechnology and the Public," these conferences were held 
in Raleigh, North Carolina; Reno, Nevada; New Brunswick, 
New Jersey; and Minneapolis, Minnesota. A published 
report by the USDA summarized the content of those 
conferences. In many ways these conferences were 
extensions of the Biotechnology Challenge Forum sponsored 
by the USDA in Washington, D.C., in February of 1987. 
Apparently, primarily agricultural scientists convened at 
these meetings to discuss the future of biotechnology,
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explore its potential, and plan strategies to overcome 
obstacles.
Because the participants at these conferences were 
scientists engaged in genetic engineering research, their 
rhetorical strategy focused on reinforcing existing 
beliefs about biotechnology and developing arguments for 
the defense of the industry. Some of the scientists 
argued for the necessity of genetic engineering. In a 
section titled "The Promise," the report noted that "ag 
biotechnology can circumvent natural, slow reproduction 
and selection for desirable traits in both plants and 
animals, and greatly speed up the improvement and
• 279versatility of plant and animal species." The notion 
of the necessity of accelerated scientific inquiry was 
repeated by some scientists because "Agriculture's urgent 
challenge is to discover further 'quantum leaps,' such as 
the one we got from nitrogen fertilizer." The scientists 
press for urgency "because our entire food base is so
narrow. Human life depends on a small handful of
280crops." King observes that expanding the context of 
an argument can "make a small event seem far more critical 
than it ordinarily appears."281 By linking more rapid 
technological development with the necessity of 
maintaining an adequate food supply, scientists transfer 
to their research a moral imperative. The role of
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recombinant DNA scientists becomes one of humanitarianism, 
saving the world from hunger.
Patrick Jordan, administrator of the Cooperative 
State Research Service of the USDA, during these 
conferences, perhaps inadvertently agreed with one of 
Rifkin's positions when he declared that HWe are seeing 
the dawn of a new era; a technical revolution that could 
rival the impact of the industrial revolution." Jordan 
issued a rallying call to the scientists, reaffirming that 
science and biotechnology hold the answers to society's 
problems. He predicted that "If we will communicate well 
with the public and listen well, and adjust accordingly, 
we can meet the rendezvous with destiny that the 
scientific community has in solving major problems of 
mankind." 202
The themes argued at the Washington, D.C., forum and 
the four regional conferences recur as scientists, at 
different times in other places, increase their visibility 
and willingness to enter the public debate on genetic 
engineering. Even James Watson, one of the two scientists 
who made the 1953 discovery of the double helix, tries to 
allay the fears of those outside science by minimizing the 
effects of genetic technology. Watson commented on the 
concerns of genetic research in a newspaper interview: "A
lot of people say they're worried about changing our 
genetic instructions, but those [instructions] are just a
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product of evolution designed to adapt us for certain
404conditions that may not exist today." Watson, too, 
attempts to minimize the scope of the debate with what 
King labels a reductionist approach in which "the finite 
solution concentrates on eliminating the effects of the 
problem." Watson's use of highly mechanistic language 
suggests control that minimizes detrimental effects.
Karen Rogers' notion that the public is ill-informed 
to make decisions about genetic engineering is echoed by 
other scientists. Arguing that non-scientists lack the 
knowledge to participate in decisions about genetic 
engineering is a power-play by scientists. King observes 
that, "In a democratic, technologically oriented society, 
an elite may rest its privileges on merit or special
285knowledge." By maintaining that only scientists
possess the expertise necessary to make decisions about
biotechnology, scientists establish themselves as a
privileged elite. Scientists argue that they alone can
make the appropriate decision for the good of everybody.
For example, California Institute of Technology biologist
LeRoy Hood contends that "If you don't have the faintest
idea of biology, you can't think about it. And when you
hear a fearmonger spouting nonsense, you can't say, 'this
286is ridiculous.'" James Lauderdale, Upjohn Corporation 
Bovine Somatotropin project leader, leaves his laboratory 
to suggest that "This country has got an excellent market
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287for fear." Jerry Caulder, president of the Industrial 
Biotechnology Association, is direct when he proclaims 
that the BGH safety debate is "a result of living in a 
society that's relatively scientifically illiterate."288
Some scientists choose to respond to Rifkin's charges 
that genetically engineered organisms, plants and animals, 
are unsafe for humans and the environment. King contends 
that because "An elite is, by definition, a minority, it 
must constantly guard against counter-organization."289 
Sensing restlessness among the public and the government 
regulators, scientists marshalled their forces to defend 
genetic engineering. According to the Science News, 
scientists from several disciplines met in May of 1989 at 
the Boyce Thompson Institute for Plant Research in Ithaca, 
New York, "to try to preempt and evaluate the worries of 
consumers and federal officials..."290
On January 19, 1989, the National Institutes of 
Health (NIH) approved the first introduction of a foreign 
gene into humans. The procedure is referred to as gene 
therapy. By the end of that month Rifkin had put the NIH 
Recombinant DNA Advisory Committee (RAC) on notice. He 
warned that he would file suit to assure that the "ethical 
and social implications of this work" were addressed.291 
LeRoy Walters, a Georgetown University ethicist and RAC 
member, responded to Rifkin's charges suggesting that 
"Gene therapy is the most extensively debated therapy in
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292history." Ignoring the issues of ethics and social 
implications raised by Rifkin, Halters' reiterated that 
gene therapy had been "extensively debated" implying that 
the issues that needed to be discussed had been covered. 
Walters' strategy relegated Rifkin's concerns to non­
issues .
Other scientists in those meetings joined the effort 
to minimize the novelty of genetic engineering and limit 
the scope of the discussion. Biologist Roger Beach of 
Washington University claimed, "Breeders have been 
altering the genetic pool of plants for centuries.
Genetic engineering is nothing but plant breeding done 
with exquisite precision."293 Beach attempts to engender 
a feeling of security when he uses the words "exquisite 
precision." This term implies that the scientist's 
approach to genetic engineering is calculated to produce 
predictable results with minimum risks. Plant scientists 
argue further that genetic engineering is not producing 
radically different species. Howard Schneiderman, senior 
vice president and chief scientist for Monsanto, explains 
that "To convert a corn plant into a weed would require 
hundreds of genetic changes because corn simply does not 
have a weedy personality." By minimizing plant 
alterations and comparing the newly created plants to 
those with which we are familiar, Schneiderman, too, 
appeals to our desire for security.
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Some scientists feel compelled to respond to Rifkin
by arguing that it is only through continued, perhaps
accelerated, scientific inquiry and research that the
needs of society and a growing population can be met. By
establishing science as the paradigm uniquely qualified to
fill this role, scientists elevate their world view to a
heroic social force. They suggest that only science can
respond to demands for more economically efficient food
and fiber production, improved medical treatments and
procedures, new energy alternatives, creative
environmental conservation approaches, and other
technologically oriented societal needs. For example,
William E. Marshall, president of the Microbial Genetics
Division of Pioneer Hi-Bred International, Inc., speaking
at the USDA Biotechnology Challenge Forum, predicted that,
We could become independent of petroleum-related 
inputs, our energy needs could be significantly 
reduced, new crops could be developed more 
quickly for new areas, food animals could be 
developed more readily for specific market 
targets, and our soil and water resources could 
be regenerated.
Still other scientists tout the benefits of 
genetically engineered products that will profit the 
consuming public, if not on the scale of miracle cures and 
the like. For example, DNA Plant Technologies Corporation 
boasts of celery without strings. The Wall street Journal 
reports that genetic engineering companies are 
"researching ways to identify specific types of DNA, to
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'map* or track them, and in many cases, to mix and match 
genes, in hopes of creating sweeter carrots, more-colorful
296flowers, longer-lasting tomatoes and leaner beef."
This strategy deflects the argument away from the dangers 
and ethical concerns of genetic engineering to a 
discussion of products; a discussion of ends rather than 
means. The implication of this strategy is that ends 
justify the means.
Regardless of the scientist-rhetor's choice of 
rhetorical strategies, the motivation to step beyond the 
laboratory and enter the debate on genetic engineering is 
to defend his or her research activities against 
biotechnology critics.
Social Consequences Bevond the Institution
Although Kurtz and Lessl examine the social 
consequences of a heretical insurrection on the 
institution in which it occurs, they do not address the 
effects of that heresy on other institutions. Rifkin's 
challenges have resulted in several social consequences in 
institutions beyond the scientific community that affect 
scientific activities.
It would be disingenuous to suggest that Rifkin is 
responsible for all of the regulations governing 
biotechnology, but it is likely he has influenced 
legislation more than any other individual outside 
government. The National Journal said of Rifkin in 1986
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that he was one of the 150 people in the United States
with the most influence in shaping federal policy.297
Rifkin directs his challenges toward influencing
regulations primarily in three agencies that regulate
agriculture: the USDA, the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA), and the Food and Drug Administration (FDA). USDA
approves the field trials of genetically engineered
plants, the EPA sets tolerance levels for chemical
pesticides, genetically engineered or otherwise, and FDA
evaluates genetically engineered plants destined for human 
208consumption. Rifkin also targets the National 
Institutes of Health (NIH) concerning its regulation of 
medical applications of genetic engineering in humans.299
Rifkin's most successful campaign and the effort that 
has created the most social consequences outside the 
scientific community is his opposition to B6H (bovine 
growth hormone. Although BGH has been in the FDA approval 
process for years, the Wall Street Journal reports, 
"Monsanto Co.'s efforts to gain Food and Drug 
Administration approval for its method of increasing milk 
production in cows...have stalled."300 Monsanto has felt 
the pressure of Rifkin's efforts. Monsanto spokesperson 
Deb DeGraff explains that Rifkin forced her company into 
the public debate about biotechnology: ''We've had to do a
lot more public relations work, we've had to justify our 
research. We've had to get information out much earlier
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than we ever had to do before, to be visual and vocal
about defending research.1,301
There are other BGH-related consequences for which
Rifkin is responsible. Rifkin took his campaign public,
arguing that milk produced by cows injected with BGH
transmits the hormone to those who drink it, posing
possible health problems. That suggestion was enough to
scare several companies handling milk products. As
Science magazine reported in 1989,
Fear of a consumer backlash was enough to 
frighten Kraft USA, Borden, Inc., Dannon, Inc., 
and other food processors to announce that they 
will not sell BGH milk products while the 
hormone is still under FDA review. And in 
August, four of the nation's largest grocery 
chains, including Safeway Stores, Inc., and 
Kroger Company, and a major 0$ilJc cooperative, adopted a similar position.3
Consumer reaction to BGH is an example of the social 
consequences produced outside the scientific community by 
Rifkin's campaign. Rifkin's goal is for these social 
consequences to produce effects within the scientific 
community that could eventually cause the abandonment of 
BGH. According to Rifkin, "This particular one [battle 
over genetic engineering] will be won; Monsanto, Eli 
Lilly, Upjohn and American Cyanamid will lose. And they 
will lose millions of dollars. They will be 
defeated. "303
As social consequences evolve in a heretical dispute, 
and the defenders of the orthodoxy begin debating the
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issues raised by the heretic, the orthodoxy undergoes 
still another change. Those who speak for the orthodoxy 
find themselves developing opinions and stances on issues 
never before considered to be doctrine. Kurtz contends 
that as these stands are taken, they eventually develop 
into orthodox doctrine.
Doctrinal Consequences Analysis 
Kurtz labels his fourth characteristic of heresy 
"doctrinal consequences." Kurtz does not suggest these 
doctrinal modifications result from the leaders of the 
orthodoxy establishing committees that hammer out a 
consensus to appease the heretics, but these changes are 
no less permanent modifications in operational procedures 
of the institution. According to Kurtz, "It is in the 
heat of escalating conflicts that orthodoxy is formulated, 
often through explicit disagreement with a position held
304by 'heretics...'" Lessl agrees with Kurtz and 
explains that "In the process of trying to keep deviance 
at bay, the advocates of orthodoxy are pressed to draw 
doctrinal lines which, by showing what is not correct,
305serve to clarify what is correct." Lessl posits that 
institutional assumptions exist that may have escaped 
deliberate scrutiny, but are drawn to the surface by 
heretics. In the process, they become more clearly 
defined and become part of the orthodoxy. Kurtz suggests 
that as people choose sides in a conflict, they find it
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"increasingly difficult to mix positions and beliefs that
have conflicting political implications."306 By
rejecting a particular heretical position, the orthodoxy
may find itself unintentionally endorsing a position that
was not previously doctrinal and may never have become
doctrinal otherwise.
One of the most prominent of Rifkin's arguments
against biotechnology is that scientists have too much
latitude in conducting their research:
Chief among the scientific assumptions now being 
contested is the right of total freedom of 
scientific inquiry uninhibited by any outside 
controls. Scientists like Edward Teller,
"father of the H-bomb," believe that a 
researcher should not deny himself a discovery 
for fear of the social consequences.30
The most important doctrinal consequence of Jeremy
Rifkin's heretical challenge to biotechnology is that
scientists in this field must yield as never before much
of the freedom with which they conduct their research.
This acquiescence manifests itself primarily in two areas.
First, biotechnology research is conducted within the
framework of increased government involvement and
regulations. Second, genetic engineering research is
subject to public scrutiny, often before experiments are
conducted.
Complying with Government Regulations
It is generally agreed that a meeting of molecular 
biologists in Asilomar, California, in February of 1975
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inadvertently led to the first federal regulations 
governing recombinant DNA research. Scientists attending 
that meeting approved several self-imposed safety 
practices regulating their experimentation. Their vote to 
regulate themselves was recognized by outsiders as an 
indication of continued research and a step toward tighter 
safety precautions. The scientists left the Asilomar 
meeting convinced that they could return to the seclusion 
of their laboratories to continue their research with 
little concern about outside interference. But, less than 
18 months later NIH issued the first federal guidelines 
regulating recombinant DNA, inspired in part by the
308Asilomar meeting. Alan Gross observes that the
scientific community offered little opposition to the
regulations at this stage of the controversy:
...the proponents of the research generally 
supported these guidelines as a shield for 
ongoing activities, while their opponents fought 
for legislation and court rulings further to 
restrict or to eliminate recombinant 
research.309
These fights for legislation and court rulings draw 
unsolicited and unwelcome attention to the scientific 
community in general and biotechnology in particular.
This scrutiny often translates into increased governmental 
involvement in research. Rifkin's role in involving 
government regulators in biotechnology research through 
legislation and court rulings has been considerable. For 
example, in a 1989 profile of Rifkin, Time magazine
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suggested that even though he loses more court battles 
than he wins, "he has forced the Government to establish 
regulatory pathways for some genetically engineered 
products and clarify practices for others.310
Ultimately, this governmental regulation assumes 
control of some of the decision making process for the 
scientific community's research activities. Though 
reluctant to relinquish research prerogatives, the 
scientific community is confronted with the mandatory 
participation of governmental and public bodies such as 
the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA), the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA), the U.S. Patent Office, and the 
National Institutes of Health (NIH).
At least three of these agencies have been involved 
in the Bovine Growth Hormone (BGH) controversy. No 
genetically engineered product to date has become more 
entangled in the federal bureaucracy than BGH and n o . 
product serves as a better example of how the scientific 
community yielded to government regulation. As early as 
the mid-1980s the FDA deemed BGH safe for human 
consumption, but as recently as February, 1992, the
311.product was still not available commercially. The FDA 
continues to evaluate the product to determine whether it 
is safe for animals that produce milk. Host of the BGH 
delays have resulted from Rifkin's lawsuits forcing
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government agencies to enforce technicalities they 
bypassed.
Since the original approval by the FDA, other 
agencies have become involved. On December 5-7, 1990, the 
NIH convened the Technology Assessment Conference on 
Bovine Somatotropin to review the data. The Journal of 
the American Medical Association reported on the 
conference, noting that the NIH findings essentially 
duplicated the FDA data.312 And, in May 1991, the United 
States Congress Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) 
issued a special report on BGH. The OTA found that "It 
[BST] is a technology that, based on today's research 
findings, poses no additional risk to consumers, one that 
does not produce adverse health effects to cows, and one 
that alone will not economically disadvantage the
313traditional farm operator." These conclusions were 
essentially the same as those of the FDA and the NIH. One 
might assume that the BGH situation is a unique 
bureaucratic quagmire, but it seems just as likely that 
Rifkin and the government set a precedent with BGH that 
may become the standard for the future. The message to 
scientists should be clear: anticipate complying with 
existing regulations and prepare to respond to lawsuits.
One of Rifkin's earliest efforts to have the 
government intercede in a genetic engineering experiment 
was the Ice-Minus controversy. That incident also
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prompted government agencies to begin developing rules 
under which genetically engineered products could be 
tested in fields. Although the NIH reviewed the 
University of California research, it failed to consider 
the experiment's environmental impact. Rifkin learned of 
the oversight and sued to stop the experiment. Time 
magazine reports that "testing was postponed for three 
years while NIH, the Department of Agriculture and the 
Environmental Protection Agency struggled to draw up rules 
under which genetically engineered products would move 
from the lab to the field."31*
The human gene therapy confrontation is another 
example of a long project review followed by a lawsuit 
claiming the process was short-circuited. On January 19, 
1989, the NIH approved what is termed gene therapy, the 
first introduction of a foreign gene into a human. At a 
January 30, 1989, meeting of the NIH Recombinant DNA 
Advisory Committee (RAC) Rifkin challenged the committee's 
review procedures and called for a moratorium on that 
experiment and all human gene therapy research. Rifkin 
accused the RAC of ignoring the social and ethical 
consequences of gene therapy and called for the 
establishment of a Human Eugenics Advisory Committee.315 
Robert M. Cook-Deegan, then acting executive director of a 
congressionally appointed Biomedical Ethics Advisory 
Committee, protested Rifkin's challenge: "I can't think of
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any other technology that's received so much public 
scrutiny." Cook-Deegan said gene therapy had been the 
subject of private and government reports, hearings, and 
public symposia, including five NIH committees since
3161983. Still, Rifkin sought postponement of the test 
until the committee he proposed could be established and 
could act on the proposed research.
Another genetic engineering case in which Rifkin 
seeks increased regulation surfaced in 1990. In late 1989 
about 5,000 cases of eosinophilia-mylgia syndrome (EMS) 
were reported among people taking a sleeping pill 
containing the amino acid L-tryptophan. The bacterium 
used to produce the amino acid was genetically engineered. 
Although the bacterium was not determined to be the 
contaminant, in October of 1990 Rifkin filed a petition 
with the FDA urging several measures to limit the use of 
such genetically engineered organisms. Science magazine 
reports that Rifkin's petition requested new rules for 
reviewing all products of recombinant DNA origins, that 
all those products be labeled as to their origins, and 
that studies be initiated to establish a "predictive 
science" for analyzing genetic engineering processes.317
On a biotechnology-related issue, Rifkin supported 
legislation that protects an individual's genetic 
information. The bill was proposed by Congressman John 
Conyers, Democrat from Michigan, and would regulate the
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"collection, maintenance, use, and dissemination of 
genetic information gathered from individuals by the 
federal government and its contractors and grantees."318 
Commenting on the bill, Rifkin exhibited his usual 
exuberance predicting that, "we will see in this decade a 
genetic rights movement as potent and as powerful as the 
civil rights movement of the 1960s."310
Yet, as the regulations become a reality for 
scientists, they, too, agree that some research needs 
oversight. For example, Rifkin filed suit in 1988 against 
two government agencies to effect regulatory involvement 
in two genetic engineering research projects. The suit, 
filed against NIH and the Department of Health and Human 
Services, sought immediate suspension of certain 
experiments involving oncogenes and the human 
immunodeficiency virus (HIV). Rifkin also sought an 
environmental impact study from NIH on all such research. 
Of particular concern was the work of Malcolm Martin, 
chief of the molecular biology and microbiology laboratory 
at the national Institute of Allergy and Infectious 
Disease. Martin had created a transgenic mouse by 
introducing the entire genetic code of HIV into a strain 
of lab mice. That meant that every cell of the mice 
carried the HIV genetic code and the virus could be 
transmitted to future generations.
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Science magazine points out that "Martin's research 
has raised eyebrows even within the scientific 
fraternity." Martin defended his colleagues' concern 
noting that "They were worried about putting the AIDS 
virus into the germline of mice" that could escape from
320the research facility. At the time, William Gartland, 
chief of the Office of Recombinant DNA Activities at NIH, 
said there were no rules for working with transgenic 
animals. Furthermore, there were no established protocols 
for working with transgenic mice with HIV.321
Government intervention and regulations have become 
part of the culture of biotechnology research. Scientists 
now approach biotechnology research projects with more 
than passive attention directed to the federal agencies 
that oversee genetic engineering experimentation. There 
is little doubt that Rifkin's lawsuits and lobbying 
efforts have introduced a broader scope of regulation into 
scientific research. Yielding a greater degree of the 
scientific research decision making process to these, 
agencies is now part of the institution of scientific 
inquiry.
Involving the Public
Rifkin argues that there have been two great 
scientific discoveries this century—nuclear fission and 
genetic engineering.322 He claims that one of those 
discoveries, nuclear fission, included too little public
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debate during its development resulting in a technology 
that is more harmful than beneficial. Rifkin argues that, 
like nuclear fission, the potential for genetic 
engineering is too great for the scientific community to 
exclude the public from discussions about its use. Rifkin 
maintains that the reason he spends so much time, energy 
and money trying to stop or delay genetic engineering 
experiments is to allow time for more public involvement. 
Gross contends in his analysis of the recombinant DNA 
controversy that even while the debate was young "...the 
opponents of recombinant research wrested the issue from 
the control of the scientific community and successfully 
brought their case into the relatively uncontrolled arena
323of public debate." Speaking to a national convention 
of agricultural communication specialists in 1988, Rifkin 
proclaimed, "We’re entering a new chapter in our 
relationship to technology, especially in agriculture.
Now, we're going to, as a society, debate the pros and
324cons of each new technology..." Rifkin argues that, 
"Scientists should show us how these new technologies 
work. Then society, not scientists, should decide if it
325wants to use them." Rifkin explains that his 1989 
gene therapy lawsuit against the NIH was a move to provoke 
broad public debate on the issue: "This is a transition 
point in human medicine that should be thoroughly 
discussed, debated, and assessed."326
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Rifkin's initiatives to involve the public are 
recognized by the scientific community, and in some cases 
have become sensitive issues. Jerry Caulder, president of 
Hycogen Corp. of San Diego, California, suggests that 
testing and marketing biotechnology products has become an 
expensive and time consuming process. He contends that 
"Previous industries had the luxury of developing 
relatively free from public scrutiny until their products 
had a significant impact on the economy and society."327
As genetic engineering research comes under increased 
public scrutiny, scientists find they must interact with 
the public to defend their work. The technical 
perspective scientists bring to the debate does little to 
achieve consensus on experimental procedures and 
oversight. Farrell and Goodnight observe that technical 
reasoning and discourse had a similar effect during the 
Three Mile Island nuclear incident. Their assessment of 
the discourse of the Three Mile Island nuclear power plant 
incident contends that technical reasoning usurped social 
reasoning long before that crisis occurred. They argue 
that the event "...marked the failure of technical 
reasoning and concomitant communication practices to 
master contemporary rhetorical demands."320 Farrell and 
Goodnight posit that technological reasoning disables 
consensual discourse because "...inference structures 
relating technical and social judgments remain
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329inaccessible..." According to Farrell and Goodnight, 
technical reasoning consists of the development of 
inferences in specialized forums. Moreover, the language 
of these inferences is coded for particular disciplines 
and evaluated by state-of-the art methods. Social 
reasoning, on the other hand, develops inferences arising 
from events in everyday life that affect a large 
population. The inferences are grounded in the notion 
that those affected are competent to make decisions about 
their circumstances.330
Consensual discourse appears as elusive in the 
recombinant DMA controversy as the discourse described by 
Farrell and Goodnight. In a manner similar to the Three 
Mile Island incident, technical reasoning concerning 
biotechnology excludes the public and usurps social 
reasoning. Scientists contend that the solutions to 
social problems are found in technological development.
As scientists argue that they alone are qualified to 
assess the problems and develop solutions, they assume the 
role of "judge, jury and executioner." While scientists 
are willing to publicly debate biotechnology, their 
strategy seems to be directed primarily toward 
rationalizing and justifying the need for continued, 
minimally regulated research, not the incorporation of 
social perspectives on the issues. Scientists attempt to 
discredit the scientific knowledge of non-scientists by
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undermining their credibility. Fred Davison of the
University of Georgia is a scientist who is clearly
frustrated by the constraint public involvement imposes.
He complains, "Our pipelines to that information
[biotechnology] are so clogged with so much ignorance,
regulations, and fear that we can't get it [leadership in
biotechnology] done." Davison deplores what he terms
"setting policy toward science in the voting booth."331
A Monsanto Company experience also exemplifies how
scientists are becoming more sensitive to the need to
inform the public of some of their work. Monsanto planned
a field test of a genetically engineered organism in a
town about 15 miles from it headquarters in Missouri.
Describing the planning procedure for the test to other
scientists, a Monsanto spokesperson explained,
We did not take the test community for granted.
As early as 1985, we began a briefing program 
for local officials. Favorable stories appeared 
in the local press, and briefings were conducted 
for county farmers. All in all, the community 
viewed the test positively.
Another scientist, Richard J. Patterson, speaking on 
that same program, suggested that "Biotechnology speakers, 
in trying to reach the public should talk about such 
things as screening the blood supply for antibodies to the 
AIDS virus, and avoid esoteric terminology..." Patterson 
is the president of the non-profit North Carolina 
Biotechnology Center at Triangle Park. He explained:
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"The Center's first 'in-house' program was Public 
Information and Education in Biotechnology.”333
By instructing scientists and administrators in the 
technical aspects of communication, the biotechnology 
industry appears to be responding to the rhetorical 
dilemma of public involvement and government regulations. 
Farrell and Goodnight, however, contend that the "problems 
of formulating a deliberative rhetoric..." are 
considerably more complex than teaching scientists the 
"how to" of public speaking and the techniques of 
effective media interviews. They argue that to achieve 
consensual discourse, "...the language, the modes of 
decision-making, and procedures for establishing consensus 
must be discovered for both experts and generalists 
alike."33*
Still another segment of the scientific community 
appears to have gained an appreciation for the public's 
growing influence on biotechnology. In the "Agricultural 
Biotechnology and the Public" regional conferences during 
the spring of 1988, more than 18 speakers addressed the 
issue of communicating biotechnology issues to the public. 
The published summary of those meetings declared, "It is 
generally agreed: The public is a full player in 
establishing the biotech success curve through influencing 
the flow of funds into research, the rules for testing and 
releasing biotech materials, and the acceptance of biotech
335products." Although these scientists recognize the 
need to communicate with the public about biotechnology 
research, they do not seem to appreciate the rhetorical 
challenge they face. The first sentence in the 
"Communicating with the Public" section of the USDA 
summary announces that, "With the new, wonderful world of 
biotechnology at work, would you believe that the big 
problem with agricultural biotechnology is public 
opinion...fear.. .that*s the main deterrent?"336 Although 
these scientists verbalize the need for the public to be 
involved, they perceive the necessity of dealing with the 
public as a problem. They view public opinion as a 
obstacle that restricts the freedom with which they 
conduct their research. The scientists assume that if they 
initiate a campaign to explain to the public what 
biotechnology is and how it works, the citizenry will 
support their research. The assumption underlying this 
strategy is that public reluctance to endorse 
biotechnology is based on a lack of understanding of 
genetic engineering. This assumption ignores the position 
that Rifkin advocates—that if even if people understand 
all the benefits biotechnology has to offer, they may 
choose not to support it. The scientists' perspective 
reflects Farrell and Goodnight's observation that 
technical reasoning is indifferent to the demands of 
social reasoning: "It seems that even as technical
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reasoning encompasses an increasing array of social
questions, its very logic precludes it practitioners from
full social responsibility."337
At least one speaker at that meeting seemed to
recognize the dilemma; he suggested to the scientists that
merely demonstrating the products of genetic engineering
may not be enough to gain public support. Orion
Samuelson, vice president and agricultural services
director of WGN Continental Broadcasting Company in
Chicago, suggested that the public is concerned about
safety. He advised that,
Ethical-moral questions about biotechnology are 
alive in the public; there's a feeling that 
biotechnology is dealing with creation...and 
emotional animal right concerns are there—and 
they need to be dealt with. Be truthful...don't 
be evasive...and don't get angry.
James Watson, director of the NIH Human Genome
Project, is aware of the public concern for the ethical,
social, and legal implications of genetic research and
plans to allocate from three to ten percent of his budget
to study these issues including the appointing of an
ethics committee.339
One of Rifkin's stated goals is to open to public
discussion the issues surrounding genetic engineering.
The evidence suggests that biotechnology, unlike any other
scientific effort, is fostering unprecedented public
debate. Public involvement in scientific research is a
relatively new notion for most scientists. Scientists are
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grappling with how they will invite public discussion 
while minimizing the effects of those discussions on their 
continuing research. The notion of non-scientists 
dictating what may or may not be investigated by 
scientists and the loss of freedom of inquiry it 
represents for the scientific community is a phenomenon 
with which scientists are having difficulty. Their 
initial response seems to be to invoke technical 
reasoning, to let the facts (data) speak for themselves. 
Even some members of the scientific community understand, 
though, that the debate extends beyond scientific 
experimentation and that ignoring societal concerns will 
not win the rhetorical battle.
The doctrinal consequences surrounding Rifkin*s 
heretical challenges exemplify Lessl's contention that 
institutional assumptions surface during these conflicts. 
The institutional assumptions that are the point of issue 
in this debate relate to the scientific community's 
freedom of inquiry. However, rather than affirming the 
assumption that scientists are free to conduct whatever 
experiments they choose and having that assumption become 
doctrine, the opposite is occurring. The heretical 
challenges focus attention on those assumptions causing 
government agencies and others to question the validity of 
unbridled scientific inquiry. Scientists, then, are 
forced to live by new doctrine that is contrary to one of
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their most fundamental assumptions. In the case of the 
Rifkin*s heresy, the new doctrine creates tension for the 
scientists that must be relieved.
With these tensions come anxieties about the 
intrusions of non-scientists into a once solely scientific 
domain. Scientists see the loss of latitude in their 
research as a result of unnecessary involvement by 
governmental agencies and the public. These intrusions 
are also viewed as obstacles to scientific progress. From 
the scientists' perspective, the time they spend defending 
their research could be better spent in the pursuit of 
advancing technology. A USDA report explains that, "The 
President's Commission on Industrial Competitiveness 
reported...our development and use of technology is 
lagging. Regulatory restraints are inhibiting innovation
340and commercialization." Scientists tout the 
capability of rapid changes in new plant and animal 
developments as one of the primary advantages of 
biotechnology; however, this increased efficiency has 
failed to proliferate new, genetically engineered 
products. Thus, the inability to live up to expectations 
becomes a source of mounting anxieties in the 
biotechnology community. The relief of tensions and 
anxieties lead to ritual and Kurtz' fifth characteristic 
of heresy—the heresy hunt ritual—and the person whom the 
scientists cite as the source of most of their problems.
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Heresy Hunt_Ritual Analysis 
Kurtz defines the heresy hunt ritual as "the process 
of defining and denouncing heresy and heretics.1,341 One 
of the roles of a ritual, he contends, is to relieve 
tensions and focus anxiety on that which is controllable. 
In the case of heresies, it is not clear if the ritual 
actually fulfills the role of relieving anxieties, but it 
serves as a form of action where action is required.
Lessl suggests the ritual may actually relieve some 
tensions that did not originate in the heresy. He argues 
that, regardless of the source of the anxieties, "the 
heretic is a convenient object onto which these anxieties
342can be focused."
According to Lessl, scientists involved in the 
creationist controversy found the actual problems of 
public and political ambivalence difficult, if not 
impossible, to solve directly. Their solution was to 
attack those close at hand, the "deviant insiders," with 
the most powerful weapons in their arsenal-scientific 
evidence and argument.343 Extending his argument, Lessl 
contends that "Scientists respond to general social and 
political problems growing out of the complex relationship 
between contemporary science and Western culture by 
focusing on a localized issue that can be remedied simply 
through scientific demonstrations."344
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It appears the biotechnology segment of the 
scientific community finds dealing with the larger issue 
of a challenge to its political prominence a frustration 
it cannot solve easily or directly. Regulatory oversight 
and growing public involvement are obstacles for which 
there are no quantifiable scientific solutions in a 
laboratory or experimentation field. So, rather than 
dealing with the larger, more complex issue, the 
scientific community focuses its anxieties on an object 
close at hand—the person it holds responsible for their 
problems-Jeremy Rifkin.
In his analysis of the anti-modernist movement in the 
Roman Catholic Church, Kurtz argues that the Church 
orthodoxy took a similar approach. Choosing not to 
address the larger issue of the challenge to the Church's 
authority, the orthodoxy focused on the heretics close at 
hand and their specific challenges. In the pursuit of 
these individuals, Kurtz points out that the Church 
hierarchy developed an arsenal of several weapons.345 The 
proponents of biotechnology, too, developed rhetorical 
weapons to defend its orthodoxy against heresy. The 
defense reflects what Andrew King describes as the 
"destruction of legitimacy." King contends that "Because 
government claims to act for the common good, exposure of 
hidden partisanship destroys its legitimacy."346 Rifkin 
claims to act on the public's behalf in his challenge of
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genetic engineering. Biotechnology proponents attempt to 
undermine Rifkin's legitimacy by revealing what they claim 
are his hidden agendas. The weapons of choice are the 
characterization of Rifkin as a "devil" and demonstrations 
of the integrity of decisions based on scientific data. 
Rifkin-the "devil"
Scientists and spokespersons for chemical companies 
and other allied industries openly criticize Rifkin for 
his stand on biotechnology. Whether it is a source of 
pride or frustration, Rifkin appears to accept the 
criticism as part of his stance. For example, in the 
preface to one of his books, Rifkin admits that,
I have been accused of being opposed to 
scientific inquiry, academic freedom and, worst 
of all, the march of progress. I have been 
castigated as an obstructionist, a spoiler, a 
man dedicated to slowing, retarding or halting 
the further advances of the human race.
Occasionally a scientist, corporate leader or 
policy maker will cast doubt on my temporal 
sanity, insisting that my real desire is to turn 
back the clock of time; how far back is often 
determined by the ire of the assailant. *
As Rifkin suggests, there is an extensive list of
people and agencies that not only disagree with him, but
publicly denigrate his motives, methods, and knowledge of
science. Biotechnology proponents cast Rifkin in a
devil's role by characterizing him as the antithesis of
good as portrayed by science. He earns that
characterization, in the eyes of scientists, for assailing
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the preeminence of science, the good it produces for 
society, and the promises it holds for the future.
Much of the strategy to characterize Rifkin as a 
devil centers around name calling, tout the names that are 
used suggest the effort extends beyond merely applying 
labels. For example, in a profile of Rifkin, Time 
magazine revealed that scientists view Rifkin as a 
"Luddite, whose opposition to DNA research is based on 
skewed science and misplaced mystical zeal." Time quoted 
Norton Zinder, a geneticist at Rockefeller University in 
New York City, who referred to Rifkin as a "fool" and a 
"demagogue."3*8 Forbes magazine, in an article titled 
"Ministry of Fear," labeled Rifkin a Luddite and 
fearmonger. The author of the article, Ronald Bailey, 
declared, "Jeremy Rifkin, a modern-day Luddite, wants to 
put biotechnology development on permanent hold. What's 
frightening is that he seems to be succeeding." The 
Forbes article predicted that "Unless the industry 
confronts fearmongers like Rifkin headon..." biotechnology 
will become overregulated like the nuclear industry.348 
The use of "Luddite" suggests that Rifkin is against any 
technological advancement; that he is not particularly 
interested in biotechnology, it just happens to be the 
area he chose to challenge. This argument suggests that 
Rifkin is an opportunist with little, if any, legitimate 
claim to challenging biotechnology. Labeling Rifkin a
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"demagogue" goes to the heart of his legitimacy. To label 
Rifkin a demagogue and make it stick is to brand him as 
insincere in his arguments and an advocate using 
questionable emotional appeals as means to purely personal 
ends.
In 1988 Rifkin was the subject of a feature article 
in the New York Times Magazine. That article suggests 
that scientists characterize Rifkin "essentially, as a 
nuisance, a rabble-rouser, a professional extremist, and, 
most simply, a nut bent on delaying the work of committed 
scientists and federal officials. 1,350 Labels such as 
"nuisance," "rabble-rouser," and "nut" do not inflict the 
same penetrating damage as do "Luddite" and "demagogue," 
but they help build a profile of Rifkin that reinforces 
the devil image. These terms attempt to minimize Rifkin's 
arguments and characterize them as "light-weight." The 
article also quoted from Harvard Professor Stephen Jay 
Gould's review of Rifkin's Algenv. Gould wrote that 
Alaenv was "a cleverly constructed tract of anti­
intellectual propaganda masquerading as scholarship...1 
don't think I have ever read a shoddier work."351 This 
allegation is more serious. Gould challenges Rifkin*s 
integrity and casts him as a charlatan who intentionally 
misleads his constituents.
Because of his highly visible role in the BGH 
controversy, Rifkin became the target of several
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proponents of the hormone. Clearly frustrated that BGH 
was not available commercially to farmers, Harry Schwartz, 
a guest columnist in a "face-off" with Rifkin in ysA 
Today. declared, "the pied piper of ignorant know- 
nothingism, Jeremy Rifkin, has panicked five supermarket 
chains...with his usual gall, Rifkin doesn't wait for 
tests to be completed but conjures up a frightening stew 
of imaginary illnesses he claims will result from use of
352the hormone." Employing the metaphor of a pied piper,
Schwartz suggests that people should ignore Rifkin*s 
comments because they have such an alluring appeal that 
they will have little choice but to follow his lead. 
Challenging Rifkin's credibility, Schwartz combines the 
pied piper metaphor with highly emotional and denigrating 
labels implying that Rifkin's arguments are devoid of fact 
and reason. Continuing his strategy to destroy Rifkin's 
credibility, Schwartz implies that test results will 
exonerate BGH of Rifkin's charges. Moreover, Schwartz 
argues that Rifkin's charges against BGH are "conjured up" 
for no other reason that to instill fear and manipulate 
the public into boycotting milk containing BGH.
In the summer of 1991, a dairy industry magazine 
featured Rifkin on its cover with an in-depth article on 
the BGH issue and Rifkin's role in the controversy. The 
magazine said of Rifkin, "...few [people] are at a loss 
for words to describe the man: a charismatic speaker, a
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zealot, an educator, a fear-monger, a champion of the 
people, a manipulator, and a man who doesn't hesitate to 
take on chemical companies in a war against
353biotechnology." Rifkin*s detractors' use of terms 
such as "fear-monger" and "manipulator" are further 
attempts to characterize him as an adversary of good. 
Suggesting that he is a "fear-monger,” or one who deals in 
fear, and a manipulator, Rifkin's opponents imply that his 
motives are other than his stated intentions of protecting 
the public and the environment.
An editorial in a Midwestern newspaper questioned 
Rifkin's motives in the BGH controversy. The writer of 
the editorial argued that, "With respect to the Foundation 
on Economic Trends [of which Rifkin is president], its 
real target is not BGH, per se. Instead, it's trying to 
thwart advances in biogenetic technology." In an apparent 
reference to Rifkin, the writer predicted that, "If 
Luddites persuade the United States to abandon development 
and implementation of biotechnology...there are plenty of 
other nations eager and able to take it up."35* Again, 
another detractor employs a strategy to destroy Rifkin's 
credibility by suggesting that his motives are less than 
honorable.
Members of the scientific orthodoxy often criticize 
Rifkin for his beliefs, his motives and his methods, but 
they rarely suggest that he is not effective. Although
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Karen Rogers of Monsanto begrudgingly credits Rifkin and 
others for taking advantage of a weakness in the 
biotechnology industry, she, too, challenges his 
credibility. She explains that biotechnology opponents 
generate unexpected public pressure because "...of the gap 
between technological literacy and technological advance. 
The opposition took the lead early on, and has several 
articulate, aggressive spokesmen who are influencing the 
debate with questionable tactics and even questionable 
information... "355 
Integrity of Scientific Data
Another rhetorical strategy scientists employ to 
negate Rifkin's legitimacy is to reinforce their own 
legitimacy through quantification of scientific data. By 
legitimizing decisions about genetic engineering on 
quantitative data, scientists hope to undermine the 
legitimacy of qualitative, value-based decisions advocated 
by Rifkin. King contends that quantitative decisions are 
easier to make than qualitative decision because "they are 
highly persuasive in a culture where bigger is usually 
better and constant growth is a national imperative."356
Schwartz, in his USA Today "face off" with Rifkin 
invoked the integrity of government testing procedures to 
support his claim that Rifkin's charges about BGH are 
unfounded and that BGH is a safe product. He recounted
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how the hormone was "carefully and cautiously tested under 
Food and Drug Administration auspices."357
Not only did another scientist use quantitative data 
to defend BGH in the Wisconsin legislative process, he 
argued that only scientists accurately interpret 
scientific data. Richard A. Spritz, an associate 
professor in Medical Genetics and Pediatrics at the 
University of Wisconsin-Madison, in 1989, provided 
testimony to Wisconsin Assembly committee members against 
a bill banning BGH. In that testimony Spritz enumerated 
seven points, substantiated with scientific data, that BGH 
was a safe product. Although he never mentioned Rifkin by 
name, Spritz referred to "political special interest 
groups" that raise objections to human-health issues.
These groups "...are misguided, based on insufficient or 
wrong understanding of the facts. At worst, appear to be 
attempts by individuals or groups...to influence public 
policy by misrepresentation and scaremongering."358
On another genetic engineering related topic, Science 
magazine questioned Rifkin's motives in his challenge of 
NIH rules dealing with gene therapy. After NIH approved 
the first-ever gene therapy experiment on a human, Rifkin 
filed a lawsuit to force NIH to halt the experiment until 
ethical concerns could be addressed. The rhetorical 
strategy of the response to Rifkin took two forms. First, 
even though NIH apparently overlooked a procedural step,
the scientists sought to redirect the responsibility for 
any delays from themselves to Rifkin. Then, despite the 
oversight, the scientists sought to justify proceeding 
with the test with explanations of the thoroughness of the 
process to that point. In a March 19, 1989, article. 
Science magazine suggested that "...he [Rifkin] seems to 
be trying to hang NIH on a technicality of the review 
process in order to force debate on the larger issue of 
human genetic engineering and its potential misuse." In 
that same article, Science labeled Rifkin a "perennial
q c gcritic of modern technology..." The magazine followed 
with comments by NIH committee members on the thoroughness 
of the review process. The Chronicle of Higher Education 
reported that the mood of the meeting was to reject 
Rifkin's petition and proceed with the experiment. 
According to The Chronicle. "Scientists proposing the 
experiment said that ample debate had already taken place, 
that the experiment was safe, and that it was time to try 
to put genetic engineering into practical medical use with 
patients." W. French Anderson, in an apparent reference 
to Rifkin, argued that "It's one thing to sit around a 
table and talk about what might happen way in the future, 
but I have to go back and talk to parents and kids who are 
suffering and dying now."360 Anderson's comment suggests 
that scientists are not above using emotion in their 
rhetorical appeals. Clearly, Anderson steps away from the
162
data as he appeals to the committee's sympathy for 
children.
Rifkin frequently raises the issue of the safety of
genetic engineering and what he calls the
"unpredictability" of some of the newly developed strains
of bacteria and viruses. Alan Goldhammer, director of
technical affairs for the Industrial Biotechnology
Association, argues that regulations are in place that
minimize risk. Goldhammer takes a page from Rifkin's
rhetorical strategy as he argues that biotechnology is
more in concert with the environment that the introduction
of exotic species. Making that argument Goldhammer cites
one of Rifkin's challenges to the proliferation of
genetically engineered products as inappropriate:
...making analogies to exotic species' 
introductions that have caused problems: Kudzu, 
gypsy moth, chestnut blight and the like. This 
is faulty comparison because those introductions 
involved organisms totally unrelated to the 
ecosystem. These new biotechnology products, on 
the other hand, will involve modification of 
organisms that are indigenous to the parent 
ecosystem.
Another industry representative attacks Rifkin's 
tactics, challenging his dramatization of the potential 
hazards of some genetically engineered products. Paul 
Bendix of the Talbott Group of Palo Alto, California, 
laments that "Biotechnology results...particularly bad 
results...are fantasized." People fear "that if you make 
something living in the laboratory it will get out of hand
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and become highly mobile and toxic and nothing will 
eradicate it except the National Guard.**362
As discussed in an earlier chapter, the conflict 
between the orthodoxy and the heretic is political, each 
side vying for the power to make decisions about certain 
doctrines. Fred Smith, president of the Competitive 
Enterprise Institute, recognizes Rifkin's attempts to move 
control of research decisions from scientists to the 
public. For Smith, "choices are best made by private 
individuals held fully accountable for their actions...A 
political approach to risk management is not only costly 
but risky to mankind's safety." Conceding that scientists 
have lost some of their decision making authority. Smith 
admits most people believe that we "must impose 'wise* 
political regulation over the biotech field."363
Ponglesion
Kurtz and Lessl contend that the socially constructed 
crisis created within an institution by heretics produces 
social consequences. One of these consequences is that 
the defenders of the orthodoxy can rally their supporters 
against the heretics. Another consequence is that 
scientists cloistered in their laboratories sometimes find 
themselves thrust to the forefront of the debate, 
developing arguments that support and justify their 
research. This chapter argued that members of the 
scientific community who engage in biotechnology convene
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forums and seminars to help coalesce their position among 
their peers from several states. It was argued here that 
rhetorical strategies surfaced in these meetings. The 
strategies include minimizing the novelty of genetic 
engineering, questioning the scientific competence of 
those who challenge genetic engineering, invoicing 
scientific dogma, and emphasizing the potential benefits 
of this research. Their rhetorical strategies serve to 
reinforce their beliefs about science and genetic 
engineering and propose arguments to respond to the 
challenges of their adversaries.
This chapter argued, too, that heresy produces 
doctrinal consequences. The most important doctrinal 
consequence to evolve as a result of Jeremy Rifkin's 
heretical challenge is the scientists' loss of a degree of 
freedom in the conduct of genetic engineering research.
The loss manifests itself in increased government 
oversight and regulation of the genetic engineering 
research and broader public discussion of the issues 
surrounding the technology. Neither Kurtz nor Lessl 
mentioned that institutional adoption of or adaptation to 
the doctrinal consequences of heresy is easy. The 
foregoing analysis shows that yielding any freedom for 
conducting research is a difficult experience for 
scientists and the scientific community as a whole. This 
analysis suggests, too, that involving scientists in
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public debate may present an entirely new set of problems 
for the scientific community. First, scientists must 
acquire communication skills appropriate for public 
debate, including public speaking skills, the ability to 
write for popular publications, and knowledge about 
broadcast media. Even if they acquire the communications 
skills but fail to address the more complex problem of 
consensual discourse, scientists will be little closer to 
resolving their rhetorical dilemma. Scientists should 
recognize that while they try to "educate" the public 
about biotechnology from the scientific perspective, they 
must be open and responsive to the nonscientific 
perspective that exists in the public. Furthermore, they 
most exercise some sensitivity to the different kinds of 
publics that exist. As they expect the public to have an 
appreciation for the necessity of scientific research, 
they must appreciate the public's concerns for safety, and 
moral and ethical dilemmas. Herein lies the rhetorical 
challenge for the orthodoxy.
Although scientists appear to be reluctantly adopting 
the new doctrine of presenting to the public the 
scientific perspective of genetic engineering, effectively 
adapting to consensual discourse will be a more formidable 
task. Ample evidence exists to suggest that Rifkin's 
heretical stance creates frustrations and anxieties in the 
genetic engineering scientific community. Evidence also
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suggests that Rifkin Is the object of a ritual to relieve 
those anxieties. The heresy hunt ritual the scientists 
engage in employs name calling and discrediting the issues 
Rifkin raises in his opposition to genetic engineering.
It is significant that a world view as pervasive and 
with as much momentum as science has finds itself 
struggling to extricate a segment of its endeavors from a 
vigorously active entanglement of bureaucratic regulations 
and public perceptions. The scientists and 
representatives of industry engaged in the struggle 
exhibit mounting frustration and exasperation as they 
endeavor to comply with regulations only to be confronted 
with additional lawsuits, petitions for moratoriums, and 
public boycotts of their products. Sensing increasing 
encroachment on their prerogative to determine the destiny 
of their research programs and realizing the slower-than- 
anticipated maturation of the biotechnology industry, 
genetic engineering scientists focus their anxieties on 
the person whom they hold responsible for their dilemma.
As they direct their attacks toward Rifkin, he 
accommodates their assaults by accepting responsibility 
for most of what they blame on him.
Much of the effort by the defenders of the 
biotechnology orthodoxy to expunge Rifkin the heretic 
centers on labeling him with the scientists' own brand of 
devil terms. Rifkin has earned for himself
characterizations such as "Luddite," "fearmonger," 
"scaremonger," "nut," "obstructionist," "fool," 
"demagogue," "pied piper of ignorant know-nothingism," 
"gadfly," "zealot," "manipulator," "crackpot," and other 
less concise descriptions. It is probably these exercises 
in name-calling that best fulfill the role of the heresy 
hunt ritual and relieve the anxieties of the orthodoxy.
The defenders of the orthodoxy transfer to Rifkin the 
responsibility for whatever genetic engineering has 
promised but failed to deliver, whether it is lower 
production costs for farmers, more productive varieties of 
plants or a safer, cleaner environment, on what they term 
the emotion-laden, scientifically unenlightened opposition 
fostered by Rifkin.
Not all of the heresy hunt relies on name calling.
As scientists defend genetic engineering, they turn to 
Rifkin's arguments as examples of issues lacking 
substance. The scientific community attempts to undermine 
Rifkin*s legitimacy by categorizing his charges as 
misrepresentation of the facts and overly dramatized scare 
tactics. They contend his dramatizations are unrealistic 
and his analogies inappropriate. Other scientists target 
Rifkin*s knowledge of science, suggesting his lack of 
scientific training compromises his credibility for 
questioning scientific procedures and goals. Still other 
scientists question his motives. Scientists frequently
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accuse Rifkin of initiating lawsuits on one issue with the 
ulterior motive of advancing another issue. For example, 
scientists argued that Rifkin's suit proposing that a 
committee address the moral and ethical concerns of gene 
therapy was, in reality, a delaying tactic to "buy time" 
for more debate on the broader issue of genetic 
engineering. Rifkin was accused of similar tactics when 
he promoted a public boycott of BGH for health and 
economic reasons. Scientists contend that Rifkin's 
motivation was based less in health and economics than in 
general opposition to genetic engineering.
So, scientists who participate in the biotechnology 
heresy hunt ritual focus their anxieties about the lack of 
progress in biotechnology on Rifkin through name calling 
and formulating their rhetorical strategies around 
discrediting the issues he raises.
I have one final thought about the rituals attendant 
to the genetic engineering genre of scientific discourse. 
Another ritual, while relieving a specific anxiety, does 
not seem to have Rifkin as its target. The ritual I offer 
for consideration is the compelling need for scientists to 
reiterate the necessity to communicate with the public. 
Opening the decision-making processes of scientific 
inquiry to public debate is one of Rifkin's stated 
objectives. It is not because of Rifkin's contention that 
public debate of scientific issues is a good idea that the
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scientific community feels compelled to enter the 
discussion. Rather, the act of saving they need to 
communicate with the public relieves scientists' anxieties 
resulting from their forced participation in events over 
which they have little, if any, control. Furthermore, 
scientists believe that greater involvement on their part 
in public discussions about biotechnology will minimize 
the tendency toward increased regulation and public 
rejection of its products. The ritual relieves scientists' 
anxiety about their participation in an activity with 
which they are neither familiar nor comfortable.
CHAPTER 6 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Descriptive/Analytical Summary 
This dissertation analyzed rhetorical artifacts 
resulting from Jeremy Rifkin1s involvement in the 
recombinant DNA research controversy. Examining these 
books, speeches, journal articles, interviews, and 
newspaper and magazine articles provided a unique 
perspective of the age-old debate between science and the 
more humanistic approach to the world. Although the 
conflict is well documented, this study contributes more 
evidence that the gulf between these two world views is 
wide, deep, and often treacherous for those who try to 
cross it. Rhetoric remains one of the most viable 
vehicles available to traverse this gulf, but it, too, has 
its shortcomings and they are brought into sharp focus in 
this study.
Rifkin's rhetorical challenges of biotechnology and 
science as a whole manifest themselves in an array of 
forms including legal battles, legislative lobbying, 
public debates, lectures, media campaigns, and 
demonstrations. Although Rifkin's approach is 
multifaceted, it maintains an underlying, philosophically 
heretical consistency. Rifkin takes an unapologetic, and 
often uncompromising, stance against what some scientists 
and philosophers argue is the most promising scientific
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discovery to date—biotechnology. Assuming this position, 
Rifkin, then, finds himself diametrically opposed to not 
only the scientific community, but a culture that affirms 
the scientific world view's orientation toward 
technological growth. Rifkin's opposition to the 
orthodoxy of science and a culture that embraces that 
world view earns for him the label of heretic. In his 
role as heretic, Rifkin's rhetorical strategies become a 
rhetoric of heresy. Just as enlightening as Rifkin's 
challenges are the scientific community's responses to his 
attacks. Rifkin's heretical actions compel rhetors within 
the scientific orthodoxy to enter the fray. The debate 
and the development of rhetorical strategies on both sides 
is fascinating.
Lester Kurtz' analysis of heresy in the early Roman 
Catholic Church provided the criteria against which 
Rifkin's activities were examined. Kurtz contends that 
heresy results, in part, from a phenomenon that he calls 
nearness and remoteness; that heresy is socially 
constructed; it produces social consequences; it results 
in doctrinal consequences; and it includes the heresy hunt 
ritual. Additionally, Thomas Lessl's application of 
Kurtz' heresy criteria in an analysis of the scientific 
creationism debate provided a rhetorical perspective of 
heresy. Rifkin's rhetorical strategies were examined in 
the light of these two pivotal works.
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Nearness and Remoteness
Kurtz* contends that his notion of the 
nearness/remoteness phenomenon positions the heretic 
inside an institution's orthodoxy as a bona fide, 
technical member, but outside the orthodoxy's belief 
system. The "deviant insider" who holds and advocates 
"errant beliefs" is a threat to the "faith and to the 
institution." Kurtz maintains that every heresy suggests 
a political stance and every heretic is the leader of an 
insurrection. As the heretic leads the opposition against 
the orthodoxy, he or she produces crisis within the 
institution.384
Rifkin the heretic is the agent leading the 
insurrection against biotechnology. His arguments focus 
on recombinant DNA and related genetic manipulation 
issues, but the threat he poses to science is more 
fundamental. The crisis he creates within the scientific 
establishment is a result of his challenging the validity 
of that world view. Rifkin condemns the scientific 
approach, accusing technological advancement of exploiting 
people and the environment. This condemnation leads to 
his suggestion that the scientific world view should be 
replaced with what he calls an "empathetic" approach to 
the world.
Rifkin's rhetorical strategy employs devil terms to 
characterize technological growth and a narrowing of his
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audiences' choices to one nonscientific alternative. 
Perhaps the most effective of these arguments is his 
comparison of genetic engineering to nuclear technology. 
Rifkin first develops a scenario in which he depicts 
nuclear fission as a technology with far more 
disadvantages than advantages. He argues that even with 
whatever advantages nuclear technology offers, because of 
its human species threatening uses, people would choose to 
eliminate it if they could. Rifkin contends that nuclear 
technology was never open to public debate and that if it 
had been its implementation may have been different or 
nonexistent. Arguing the necessity for public discussion 
on issues as important as nuclear fission and 
biotechnology, Rifkin contends that the scientific 
community is implementing biotechnology in increments 
intended to draw little attention. Using as examples 
nuclear technology and what he calls the human species- 
threatening danger that it has developed in small, 
incremental steps, Rifkin contends that biotechnology is 
being implemented in a similar manner. Rifkin argues, 
though, that biotechnology is less imposing than nuclear 
technology. He contends that nuclear weapons can destroy 
every living creature on earth in a matter of minutes, but 
the threat that recombinant DNA poses through the redesign 
of the genetic makeup of plants, animals and humans is 
more diabolical. Rifkin's "worst-case-scenarios" would
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suggest that nuclear annihilation might be a better 
alternative.
Although biotechnology is the focus of Rifkin's 
argument, the point of the comparison to nuclear 
technology is the depiction of both technologies in devil 
terms and characterization of them as destructive products 
of scientific inquiry.
Rifkin's attacks on science and his somewhat more 
passive challenges to that world view through direct 
attacks on nuclear technology and recombinant DNA have put 
the scientific community in the position of having to 
defend itself and justify its activities, goals, and 
methods. The questions raised by Rifkin and others 
represent a decidedly heretical perspective and create 
within the scientific community an unwelcome crisis of 
justification.
Social Construction of Heresy
Conflict is the focus of Kurtz' second characteristic 
of heresy, social construction. Rifkin's attempts to 
involve the public in recombinant DNA research issues is 
an overt attempt to assume some of the scientific 
community's decision-making prerogatives on how the 
research is conducted and applied. This is the point of 
conflict. Lessl contends that this kind of confrontation 
is a struggle over authority in the institution.365 
While the heretic attempts to undermine the authority of
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the orthodoxy, the defenders of the institution attempt to 
solidify their position by reinforcing authority, rallying 
its supporters, and denouncing the heretics. Again,
Rifkin not only attempts to establish control of the 
decision-making process, but he tries to overthrow the 
orthodoxy and replace it with one of his own design.
The analysis in chapter four revealed Rifkin's two- 
tier rhetorical approach. In what I term his "short-term" 
approach, Rifkin uses books, speeches, media events, 
legislative lobbying, and demonstrations to achieve 
visibility and support for his position in the 
controversy. His "long-term" strategy seeks to inspire in 
the populace a passive resistance to technological 
advancement toward a goal of exorcising the existing 
scientific world view.
One the most prominent of Rifkin's short-term 
strategies is delaying or blocking specific recombinant 
DNA research and distribution of genetically engineered 
products. Rifkin's activities include calling for 
moratoriums, imploring regulatory agencies to involve 
themselves in recombinant DNA research oversight, 
advocating risk-assessment studies, suing researchers who 
fail to comply with existing regulations, blocking the 
sale of biotechnology products, and organizing media 
campaigns to engender public resistance against products 
such as B6H.
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While arguing for more political clout in specific 
recombinant DNA cases, Rifkin*s long-term strategy appears 
to be to exercise the ultimate political prerogative-to 
replace what he sees as the dominant world view with his 
"empathetic" world view. Rifkin contends that the 
scientific community bases the legitimacy of its continued 
prominence on its unique role in preserving security. 
Rifkin argues that the equation for security, adopted by 
the scientific establishment, is: knowledge = power = 
control = security. However, he points to the nuclear 
arms race as evidence that power does not guarantee 
security.
From this rationale, Rifkin employs a rhetorical 
strategy intended to transcend physical issues, elevating 
the debate to a moral plane. Assuming moral superiority, 
Rifkin and his supporters become the moral elite in the 
controversy. Rifkin*s strategy also seeks to make a 
virtue of sacrifice. From this exalted moral position, he 
invokes names of renown humanitarians such as Jesus 
Christ, Martin Luther King, Mohandas Gandhi, and others as 
examples of people who chose the high road of morality, 
making tremendous sacrifices for the good of all. By 
invoking these names and the causes with which they were 
associated, Rifkin binds his opposition to recombinant DNA 
to some of the most remarkable crusades of human history
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and elevates his cause from mere opposition to science to 
a movement to save humanity.
Social Consequences of Heresy
Kurtz' first two characteristics of heresy, the 
nearness/remoteness phenomenon and social construction, 
focus the rhetorical critic's attention on the heretic's 
rhetorical strategies. Kurtz' final three 
characteristics- social consequences, doctrinal 
consequences, and the heresy hunt ritual-concentrate on 
the rhetorical responses and approaches of the orthodoxy. 
The most significant social consequence of Rifkin's 
rhetorical challenge is the increased exposure and 
visibility of scientists engaged in recombinant DNA 
research. As these scientists are drawn into the public 
aspects of the controversy to respond to Rifkin*s attacks, 
they leave the laboratory to develop arguments, publicly 
debate the issues, and recruit support for their cause.
As distasteful as heresy may be to the orthodoxy, 
Kurtz contends that it has a beneficial side, too. Kurtz 
points out that defenders of the orthodoxy readily 
recognize that heresy is disruptive to their institution, 
but what is not so apparent to them is that a heretical 
challenge benefits their cause by pulling their people 
together against a common enemy.
One example of how recombinant DNA opponents drew 
scientists together to address their challenges was the
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United States Department of Agriculture's (USDA) 
Biotechnology Challenge Forum in 1987. The agenda 
included defenders of genetic engineering that may never 
have become involved in public discussions except that 
their work was publicly challenged. The rhetorical 
strategies that surfaced in that meeting included 
minimizing the novelty of the technology, questioning the 
scientific competence of those who challenge genetic 
engineering, invoking scientific dogma, and emphasizing 
the potential benefits of the research.
Ostensibly, the meeting was called to examine some of 
the questions and issues surrounding the biotechnology 
controversy. An examination of the proceedings of that 
meeting, however, suggests that the speakers engaged less 
in critical evaluation of the issues than in developing 
rhetorical strategies to overcome the obstacles presented 
by the challenges. Much of the discourse was couched in 
scientific dogma reiterating the utility of technological 
developments and the necessity of continued, unrestrained 
scientific inquiry. Some speakers focused on 
personalities such as Rifkin. Others focused on the 
"irrationality" of the arguments and the "ill-informed" 
opinions of those opposing genetic engineering. Still 
another proposed a plan to increase the visibility of the 
scientific view of the controversy.
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Certainly, understanding the rhetorical approaches of 
those who spoke at this meeting and other similar 
gatherings is important. Understanding their rhetorical 
strategies reinforces Kurtz' notion that heresy pulls 
together the supporters of the orthodoxy. But, the fact 
that they met, apparently in response to the heretic's 
challenges, may be equally important. The act of calling 
the meeting reflects Kurtz notion that heretical 
challenges draw members of the orthodoxy out of their 
cloisters and into the public arena to engage in the 
debate.
Rifkin's heretical acts produce social consequences 
in institutions other than those of science. The effects 
of his attacks are particularly evident in the federal 
regulatory agencies such as the United States Department 
of Agriculture (USDA), the Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA), the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), and the 
National Institutes of Health (NIH). Due in part to 
Rifkin's efforts, these agencies have developed 
increasingly stringent regulatory guidelines to govern the 
conduct of recombinant DNA research. Also, Rifkin's 
monitoring of researchers involved in biotechnology 
produces stricter enforcement of the regulations by these 
federal agencies.
Rifkin's stance against BST produced other social 
consequences beyond the scientific laboratories. His
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public campaign against the growth hormone argues that 
milk produced by cows injected with BST transmits the 
hormone to those who drink it, posing possible health 
problems. These charges were enough to convince several 
national food companies to reject handling milk products 
containing BST.
These consequences cause defenders of the orthodoxy 
to begin debating the issues raised by the heretic, 
developing opinions and stances on issues never before 
considered to be doctrine. Kurtz contends that these 
positions sometimes develop into orthodox doctrine. 
Doctrinal Consequences of Heresy
Kurtz argues that defenders of the orthodoxy, through 
their explicit disagreement with a heretical challenge, 
find themselves formulating doctrine on issues that may 
not have been considered previously. Lessl suggests that 
institutional assumptions that may never have received 
thoughtful consideration are sometimes drawn to the 
surface in a heretical dispute. As these assumptions and 
issues are debated, they often evolve into orthodox 
doctrine.
Rifkin's heretical challenge draws into public view 
the scientific community's assumption that its freedom of 
inquiry is virtually unlimited. The public scrutiny of 
this assumption results in more government involvement and 
an erosion of the latitude with which scientists approach
their work. Scientists find they must yield unprecedented 
decision making authority to federal regulatory agencies. 
Submitting extensive research plans and complying with 
complex regulations play an increasingly important role in 
the formulation and conduct of recombinant DNA research. 
Still, the loss of freedom of inquiry does not end with 
mounting regulations. Some scientists who believe they 
have complied with all the necessary regulations find 
themselves engaged in legal battles with Rifkin over 
noncompliance with specific regulations and trying to 
jump-start their stalled projects. The effect of the 
regulations and the lawsuits is a slower, more complicated 
approach to scientific research. Stricter regulation and 
the resulting restricted freedom of inquiry is one of the 
doctrines that continues to evolve in the recombinant DNA 
debate.
Another doctrine that seems to be developing as a 
result of Rifkin's challenges is more exposure of 
scientific research to public scrutiny. Scientists find 
that as a result of Rifkin*s involvement in recombinant 
DNA, other members of the public are likely to want a 
voice in determining how recombinant DNA research is 
conducted. Moreover, they may want to be a part of 
determining whether it is conducted. As a result, 
scientists find themselves in the dilemma of grappling 
with how to invite public discussion while minimizing the
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effects of those discussions on their continuing research. 
As the heretical challenges focus attention on the 
assumptions of the scientific community, scientists are 
forced to live by new doctrines that are contrary to their 
most fundamental assumptions.
Heresy Hunt Ritual
The increasing involvement of government in 
recombinant DNA research and a failure to deliver quickly 
the promised cornucopia of biotechnology products creates 
tension and anxiety among those working with this 
research. To relieve these tensions and redirect these 
anxieties, scientists and corporate executives engage in a 
ritual called the heresy hunt. Kurtz defines the heresy 
hunt ritual as "the process of defining and denouncing 
heresy and heretics."36a Kurtz contends that one of the 
roles of a ritual is to relieve these tensions by focusing 
anxieties on that which is controllable.
The biotechnology segment of the scientific community 
apparently finds dealing with the larger issue of 
challenges to its political prominence frustrating and 
virtually without solution. So, rather than dealing with 
a problem that is difficult or impossible to resolve, 
scientists choose to direct their attention to Rifkin and 
other challengers of the technology. By focusing 
attention on Rifkin, the scientific community tries to 
deflect attention from itself and its weaknesses.
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Additionally, scientists can then blame Rifkin for their 
shortcomings.
Much of the heresy hunt ritual manifests itself in 
characterizing Rifkin as a "devil." The scientific 
orthodoxy employs devil terms rather liberally to 
undermine Rifkin's legitimacy. For example, their 
labelling Rifkin a "demagogue" brands him as insincere in 
his arguments and an advocate using questionable emotional 
appeals as means to purely personal ends. Other name- 
calling efforts attempt to build a profile of Rifkin as a 
"light-weight" and a person not to be taken seriously.
Another strategy scientists employ in the heresy hunt 
ritual is to negate Rifkin*s legitimacy by reinforcing 
their own through quantification of scientific data.
Bruno Latour observes that scientists obtain desired 
rhetorical results by "stacking so many tiers of black 
boxes that at one point the reader, obstinate enough to 
dissent, will be confronted with facts so old and so 
unanimously accepted that in order to go on doubting he or
367she will be left alone." Reiterating the testing 
procedures and the length of time a project has been under 
review, listing the agencies involved in the review, 
quoting statistical studies and similar arguments-all of 
these tactics are used by recombinant DNA scientists to 
legitimize their activities. By stacking the numbers 
higher, the scientific community hopes to prove that the
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data indicates the issue is beyond discussion. By 
legitimizing decisions about genetic engineering on 
quantitative data, scientists hope to undermine the 
legitimacy of qualitative, value-based decisions advocated 
by Rifkin.
While the name calling and number stacking relieves 
tension and anxiety, it also provides an alternative 
activity to addressing the issues that Rifkin raises. 
Scientists can engage in these rhetorical exercises and 
draw applause for their efforts from their peers because 
this approach gives the superficial appearance of 
responding to Rifkin. Even though these activities may 
serve to massage the orthodoxy's ego, the issues remain, 
and the conflict that evolves from the issues grows more 
intense. In the end, the heresy hunt ritual turns into a 
"chewing gum" approach—a lot of activity and not much to 
show for it.
Methodology Summary
Lester Kurtz may have never considered that his 
analysis of heresy in the Roman Catholic Church would 
become a methodological instrument for examining the 
rhetorical implications of deviance. Thomas Lessl not 
only considered using the analysis as a basis for 
investigation, but built a study of the scientific 
creationism debate around Kurtz1 five characteristics of 
heresy. Lessl, in his concluding remarks, suggests that
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the Kurtz' model "...provides an understanding of the ways 
in which rhetorical responses to deviance contribute to 
the construction and reconstruction of institutional
366reality." Lessl focuses on the changes that the 
institution and its defenders undergo as they respond to 
the heretical challenge. Lessl demonstrates that Kurtz' 
model is an effective tool for understanding how 
responding to deviance brings together fragmented elements 
of the orthodoxy to form a united front against a common 
enemy. Lessl notes that the Kurtz model illustrates how 
the heretic attacks the weakest part of the institution 
which points the orthodoxy to the areas that need 
improvement. Lessl suggests that, indirectly, the heretic 
"...causes the scientists to inspect, repair, and, 
occasionally, to build new walls in order to preserve 
institutional autonomy."389
Certainly, I would not argue that Lessl's findings 
are less than accurate. I would, however, suggest that 
the Kurtz model offers more than a means to understanding 
how an institution rejuvenates itself in the midst of a 
heretical challenge. The Kurtz model, in this study, 
highlights those aspects of the scientific community noted 
by Lessl. However, there is more. In the investigation 
of the Rifkin challenge, Kurtz' five characteristics of 
heresy employs deviance to more clearly delineate the 
lines of contention in a technical reasoning vs. social
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reasoning context. The effects of deviance on the 
institution of science are serious considerations, but so 
too is an understanding of the rhetorical barriers that 
develop in these disputes and ultimately prevent 
consensual discourse.
The first two of Kurtz* characteristics assist the 
critic in developing an understanding of the heretic's 
deviant position, the rhetorical strategies involved, and 
the philosophical perspective in which the challenge is 
grounded. The final three characteristics turn the 
critics attention to the rhetorical responses of the 
defenders of the institution. Again, Kurtz' model aids 
the critic in understanding the genesis of the orthodoxy's 
rhetorical strategies and responses and the philosophical 
grounding from which they grow. The Kurtz model provides 
an instrument to examine both sides of a controversy in 
which deviance plays a role. In the case of the Rifkin 
heresy, it brings into sharp focus the range of 
difficulties encountered by the two world views 
represented by technical reasoning and social reasoning.
Deviance is an ever-present phenomenon in 
contemporary society. Not all deviance is heresy, but 
Kurtz' model provides the critic with a means of 
distinguishing heretical stances from other forms of 
deviance. Heresy is an extreme form of deviance and an 
important phenomenon to examine. The rhetorical aspects
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of a heretical challenge provide insight into 
understanding an institution, its defenders, and those who 
rebel against the orthodoxy. Kurtz' model of heresy and 
Lessl's rhetorical perspective on that model provide a 




Those groups and individuals opposed to science and 
technological development have in Jeremy Rifkin an 
intelligent, aggressive, prolific, high profile, 
articulate, spokesman. Rifkin's efforts suggest that the 
rhetorical strategies of those opposed to the dominance of 
science have become highly sophisticated. This 
sophistication permeates not only the rhetoric itself, but 
also the media choices, legislative efforts, and other 
tactics such as legal battles and demonstrations.
Anti-science advocates, as with most good rhetors, 
look for the weakest part of the opposition's argument and 
attack it. Rifkin targets examples of technological 
development that he contends are ultimately destructive 
and what he labels the almost boundless freedom within 
which scientists work. Rifkin's rhetorical strategy of 
choice may be the use of scientific data, but I believe 
Rifkin has discovered the difficulty, if not the futility, 
of trying to "out data" the data suppliers—the scientists.
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One of the myths in which scientists have successfully 
shrouded themselves maintains that only scientists can 
reliably interpret scientific data. Interestingly, this 
myth survives despite scientists who contradict each 
other's interpretations of identical data. Nevertheless, 
because of the pervasiveness of this myth, Rifkin and 
other nonscientists are, in large part, confronted with 
the inaccessibility of scientific data as a basis of their 
anti-science rhetoric.
Lacking access to the tools necessary to debate 
scientists on scientific terms, opponents of science seek 
alternative rhetorical means. Although Rifkin employs 
several rhetorical devices, at the heart of his strategy 
is the depiction and characterization of science as the 
procreator of awesomely destructive technological evils.
One of the vehicles Rifkin uses to help build that 
characterization is the dichotomy between his empathetic 
world view and the scientific world view. Rifkin's 
depiction of science as a powerful, dominating, unfeeling, 
uncaring, elitist approach to the world does not serve the 
scientific community well. Particularly relevant to this 
effort is Rifkin's success at eliciting responses from the 
scientific community that confirm Rifkin*s contentions. 
Scientists' arguments that genetic engineering is not new, 
that the public is not knowledgeable enough about science 
to make decisions about biotechnology, and that only
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science holds the answers to society's ills plays into 
Ri£kin's hands. These responses make the scientists who 
deliver them sound elitist and dogmatic.
Rifkin demonstrates in other ways that anti-science 
rhetoric is successful when it turns science into a 
villain. Rifkin contends that scientists promoting 
nuclear fission promised more than they were able to 
deliver. He maintains that in the early stages of nuclear 
development the technology was hailed as a solution to 
several societal concerns. Instead, according to Rifkin, 
nuclear fission has evolved into a species-threatening 
phenomenon. Rifkin's perspective turns a highly visible 
scientific achievement into negative rhetorical baggage of 
which the scientific community cannot rid itself. Rifkin 
argues that the fear of a nuclear holocaust and the 
problems associated with the disposal of nuclear waste far 
outweigh any good that may be attendant to nuclear 
technology. Then, suggesting that the two great 
technological achievements of the 20th century are nuclear 
fission and biotechnology, Rifkin ties recombinant DNA to 
the evil nuclear technology. Continuing his argument that 
the two technologies are similar, Rifkin contends that 
scientists speak of biotechnology in its infancy in the 
same terms they spoke of nuclear technology in its early 
stages. By rhetorically linking biotechnology to nuclear 
technology, Rifkin transfers to genetic engineering the
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fear, guilt, and uncertainty that have evolved over the 
decades to become part of society's infrastructure. 
Biotechnology suddenly becomes a vehicle that instills a 
fear of annihilation, guilt for developing such an awesome 
capability and the uncertainty of where the technology 
will lead.
By challenging the scientific community's two 
greatest achievements, Rifkin attempts to shake the very 
foundation of science. But, attacking the products of 
science is only one aspect of his anti-science position. 
Another strategy is to challenge the scientists 
themselves.
Rifkin's characterization of scientists engaged in 
genetic engineering suggests that they are ambitious, 
amoral individuals who are blind to the ethical 
considerations of their research and see only the next 
experiment. He contends that scientists develop 
technology because it can be done, not because it needs to 
be done. This notion implies that scientists ignore the 
ethical and social ramifications of their research, in 
effect, ignoring the human consequences of the technology. 
Rifkin argues that because of this approach to science, 
these individuals are not worthy of the scientific freedom 
with which they work. He contends that left to their own 
devices, scientists will be driven to take recombinant DNA 
incrementally to its ultimate implementation—eugenics.
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Rifkin argues that scientists are Indifferent to the 
effects of their research on society. This argument makes 
the task of persuading those outside of science to limit 
the freedom of scientific inquiry considerably easier.
One other aspect of anti-science rhetoric is worthy 
of consideration here. Typically, scientists argue 
specific cases. They choose data for a given topic and 
point to a specific result. Their arguments focus on 
specifics. As often as not, scientists talk only to other 
scientists. All too often, scientists forfeit much of 
their credibility because of their inability or 
unwillingness to analyze their audiences and discuss those 
aspects of science important to those audiences in terms 
they understand. Opponents of science, on the other hand, 
argue in generalities and tune into what moves their 
audiences. Rifkin cites numerous specific examples of 
problems created by scientific inquiry, but then talks in 
only the broadest terms when describing alternatives. 
Unlike some opponents of science, Rifkin offers an 
alternative to the scientific world view. However, the 
alternative is his "empathetic" world view which is 
cloaked in a veil of rich, descriptive language, but is 
almost devoid of the "how to" required to achieve it. 
Finding fault is considerably easier than developing 
solutions. This appears to be one of the strategies
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employed by Rifkin andf perhaps, by other opponents of 
science.
Anti-science rhetoric has become more sophisticated 
and its rhetors have become more credible to much of the 
public. Rifkin grounds his challenges to science in a 
diverse knowledge of philosophy, history, economics, 
sociology, current events, and other areas. Resources for 
support of his position range from ancient philosophers to 
contemporary scientists. He is well-read, knowledgeable, 
and keenly sensitive to the mood of contemporary society. 
More important, Rifkin knows the system and how use it to 
his advantage. He knows how to get published, how to get 
time on television and radio, how to lobby legislatures, 
how to file suit against federal agencies, how to 
influence legislation, how to monitor research, and on and 
on. Anti-science advocates like Rifkin arm themselves 
with more than scientific data to debate the proponents of 
science. These opponents of science are not intimidated 
by the prominence of science and assume an offensive 
rhetorical posture.
The rhetorical sophistication of those opposed to 
recombinant DNA research is destined to become more 
evident as molecular biologists expand their gene 
manipulation research to humans. The Human Genome 
Project, jointly sponsored by the National Institutes of 
Health and the Department of Energy, is a massive effort
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to map the genetic code of human beings. Although the 
project can boast of significant support, it is already 
drawing severe criticism from those who fear a revival of 
eugenics and others who argue that personal and corporate 
financial gain is the motivation for much of the 
research.370 
Pro-science Rhetoric
The evidence developed by this study suggests that 
science as a whole has not formulated and organized a 
rhetorical strategy to defend itself against its heretics. 
Scientists, institutions, corporations, and other 
organizations, individually, have developed arguments in 
response to the heretical attacks. These arguments can be 
broadly categorized into three groups: challenging the 
legitimacy of the opponents of science; reiterating the 
necessity and desirability of technical advancement; and 
demonstrating the safety of biotechnology.
Rather than confronting the issues "up front," 
scientists first concentrate their efforts on undermining 
the credibility of their opponents. Legitimacy, or the 
lack thereof, lies at the center of the scientific 
community's defense against its challengers. On the rare 
occasions when scientists are willing to admit that 
societal concerns related to recombinant DNA should be 
considered, they still question the legitimacy of those 
who raise the issue. The scientists approach this
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rhetorical strategy from two perspectives. First, they 
employ name-calling that characterizes Rifkin and others 
as insincere, self-promoting charlatans. Using terms such 
as "demagogues," the scientists depict Rifkin as an 
individual who plays on the emotions of his audience to 
achieve his own personal goals which may or may not be in 
the best interest of his audience and supporters.
"Luddite" is another term frequently used by scientists to 
describe Rifkin. Luddites are infamous for their 
opposition to progress. So, scientists use these labels 
to suggest that while Rifkin is vociferously opposing 
biotechnology, he is only using recombinant DNA as a focal 
point for his opposition to science as a whole. Rifkin, 
scientists argue, is an unreliable source for scientific 
information and should not to be taken seriously. 
Therefore, his challenges are without merit.
Scientists contend that other non-scientists should 
not be taken seriously either, but for a different reason. 
For the most part, the scientists in this study regard the 
public as a group of science illiterates whose opinions on 
science are not to be considered. In an effort to 
undermine the credibility of those people outside the 
scientific community, scientists maintain that the public 
knows too little about the technology to be involved in 
the decision-making process regarding its development and 
application. Scientists contend that the public is too
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susceptible to fear appeals and scare tactics to make 
sound decisions about recombinant DNA research* The 
public's legitimacy for challenging biotechnology is 
clearly the target of the scientific community's 
arguments. By discrediting those outside their paradigm, 
scientists elevate themselves to the status of the 
informed elite—the ones who, because of their expertise 
and privileged insight, should determine the destiny of 
recombinant DNA research.
Interestingly, scientists themselves appeal to the 
public's fear or sense of insecurity as they argue for the 
necessity of technological advancement. Scientists cite 
biotechnology as one of the primary tools necessary to 
offset the decreasing number of farms and farmers and the 
increasing world population. Implying that food shortages 
may occur if genetic engineering progress is impeded, 
scientists argue that they must have the freedom to 
explore all aspects of plant and animal molecular biology. 
Scientists contend that refining plants and animals so 
that they produce food more efficiently is the key to 
human survival and that biotechnology hold the keys that 
unlock that potential.
The potential for disastrous consequences has been a 
primary argument of the opponents of biotechnology. 
Because, by definition, the products of biotechnology are 
new and unique, scientists have more difficulty refuting
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the opposition's argument that researchers cannot predict 
how these new plants and animals will respond when they 
are released into the environment. Knowing that 
predictions are based on what has happened in the past, 
and knowing that genetically engineered products 
technically have no past, scientists developed another 
argument.
In an effort to transform biotechnology into a 
predictive discipline, scientists attempt to redefine it. 
Chaim Perelman and Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca observe that it 
is through associations that one brings unity to otherwise
371separate entities. According to Perelman and
Olbrechts-Tyteca, the key to one type of association is
defining two elements as equivalent:
In order that a definition should not suggest to 
us that the terms which are being offered as 
equivalent are identical, it must insist on the 
distinction between the terms, as is the case 
with definitions by approximation or example, in 
which the reader is expressly asked to attempt 
to purify or generalize, thus enabling him to 
bridge the gap which separates what is being 
defined from the means used to define it.
Refuting the anti-science argument that biotechnology
exploits animals, plants, and the environment in general,
scientists maintain that recombinant DNA is nothing new,
merely an extension of classical breeding techniques. In
effect, scientists argue that recombinant DNA and
classical breeding techniques are equivalent. Scientists,
assuming the public believes that traditional breeding
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practices do not exploit and cause no harm to people, 
animals, or the environment, contend that genetic 
engineering is a refinement of existing technology. 
Minimizing the novelty of the technology through 
association and definition is an attempt to keep the issue 
within the realm of the familiar and to build a base from 
which predictions about genetic engineering can be made. 
Burke refers to this technique as shrinking the
373"circumference" of the debate. Reducing the 
"circumference" of the discussion is an attempt by 
scientists to minimize the opportunities for opponents of 
genetic engineering to challenge the predictability of the 
technology.
So, scientists defend their discipline by suggesting 
that their opponents should be ignored because they are 
arguing "hidden agendas" or they are ill-informed, or 
both. Scientists argue, too, that biotechnology is 
essential for the well-being of the human race. And, 
finally, scientists contend that there is nothing about 
biotechnology that people should fear. They argue that it 
is as safe as the breeding techniques that agriculturists 
have employed for centuries, assuming that everyone 
believes that those practices were safe and effective. 
Justifying Future Scientific Research
Without diminishing the effects of Rifkin's 
opposition to biotechnology, I contend that the scientific
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world view is a juggernaut. Its momentum is awesome, 
perhaps unstoppable. This is not to suggest that because 
of science's power and position in society that those who 
sustain it should assume absolute privilege. Although 
science is the dominant world view of today's society, 
proponents of alternative perspectives continue to voice 
their concerns for what they perceive are problems created 
by science. Competing paradigms will continue.
Although Rifkin's attack on biotechnology is a 
challenge to science in its approach and application, 
advocates on both sides of the issue claim to argue on 
behalf of the public. From that point of view, the 
recombinant DNA debate is reminiscent of the early 
Twentieth Century Hetch Hetchy controversy. Christine 
Oravec's analysis of the Hetch Hetchy debate illustrates 
the utility of understanding the intricacies of debating 
pragmatics for the public good versus aesthetics for the 
public good. Pragmatists in the San Francisco area argued 
for building a dam in the Yosemite National Park to 
provide water for the city. Preservations countered that 
building the dam in the park would ruin the aesthetics of 
that part of the park and that the national interest would 
be served by not building the dam.374 Oravec contends 
that "While preservationists strived to reconcile what 
seemed to be the contradiction between 'spiritual' values
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and public action, conservationists argued for the 
remediation of more immediate practical difficulties."37S
Rifkin's arguments and those of the scientific 
orthodoxy follow similar patterns as those in the Hetch 
Hetchy controversy. Rifkin's world view seeks a spiritual 
solution to the problems of advancing technology. He 
advocates the abandoning of scientific inquiry for the 
"resacralizing" of the human spirit with nature. Rifkin 
contends that this "empathetic" perspective is in the 
public interest because it is the only alternative for 
survival of the species. Science, on the other hand, 
argues from the pragmatic perspective. Seeking solutions 
to immediate problems, science maintains that advancing 
technology will solve many of the problems that plague 
society.
Oravec observes that the rhetorical notions of 
"public" are shaped "...not only by the immediate context 
of the debate, but also by the legitimizing force of 
predominant social and political presumptions."376 
Noting that the dam was eventually built, Oravec argues 
that the nation's prevailing mood of progressivism 
ultimately influenced the outcome of the controversy. 
Similarly, today's societal predisposition toward 
technological development can help scientists in their 
rhetorical struggles with heretics.
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As scientists prepare their rhetorical strategies 
they must first realize that some of their assumptions may 
no longer be valid. Scientists should consider the 
assumption that the public neither knows nor cares about 
their research a rhetorical time bomb ready to detonate. 
Equally as explosive is the assumption that the public 
trusts scientists "to do what is right," therefore they 
enjoy total freedom in their scientific pursuits. 
Scientists who view the abandonment of these assumptions 
as opportunities to advance the cause of science will set 
the example for the paradigm.
Rhetorical strategies that focus the public's 
attention on the practical applications of biotechnology 
will produce results similar to those in the Hetch Hetchy 
controversy. Scientists who describe stringless celery 
and more colorful tomatoes, for example, are more likely 
to enjoy success than those who defend the injection of 
growth hormones in cows or those who describe the benefits 
of bacteria to fix nitrogen in soybean plants.
Perhaps even more beneficial to the scientific 
community are the strategies that include discussions of 
medical advances. Opponents of biotechnology, in my 
judgment, have avoided aggressively debating the use of 
recombinant DNA research in medicine because of the 
difficulty of demonstrating that the disadvantages 
outweigh the benefits. When Rifkin describes his
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empathetic world of the future, a central theme is an
emphasis on life. Arguing against a product designed to
prolong life and relieve suffering— even if it is
genetically engineered— is infinitely more difficult than
arguing against an agricultural product with which the
general population may be only indirectly concerned.
Scientists will find that to argue effectively
against their opponents in the future they must focus more
on audiences outside the scientific community. While the
need to respond to the opposition necessarily requires a
certain amount of "preaching to the choir"—scientists
talking to scientists—eventually, the scientific
community's strategy must incorporate persuasive efforts
targeted for the larger numbers of people who influence
legislators and policy makers—the non-scientific public.
If scientists are to argue effectively against Rifkin
and other opponents of science, they must elevate their
rhetorical strategies above name calling, reiteration of
scientific dogma, and denigration of the public they are
trying to persuade. They must evaluate the opponents'
rhetoric and attack its weakest points. For example, one
of Rifkin's vulnerabilities is his use of what Perelman
and Olbrechts-Tyteca identify as argument of direction.
They explain,
The argument of direction implies...the 
existence of a series of stages toward a 
certain—usually dreaded—end and, with it, the 
difficulty, if not the impossibility, of crying
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halt once one has started on the road leading to 
that end.
The form of the argument of direction used by Rifkin 
is also commonly referred to as the "slippery slope 
fallacy." According to Vincent Barry and Douglas Soccio, 
"The fallacy of slippery slope is an argument that objects 
to a position on the erroneous belief that the position, 
if taken, will set off a chain of events that ultimately 
will lead to undesirable action."378 Rifkin claims that 
manipulation of genes in plants and animals will 
inevitably lead to genetically engineered humans. The 
fallacy of the argument is that there is no causal link 
between plant genetics, animal genetics, and human 
genetics. The process can be stopped at any point. Logic 
suggests that the genetic modification of a plant or 
animal does not necessarily lead to an unavoidable "slide” 
down the biotechnology slope to eugenics as Rifkin 
suggests. Rifkin's notion that biotechnology is 
unavoidably destined for eugenics and a genetically 
engineered environment is an excessively harsh indictment 
of science that taps into what Rushing and Frentz describe 
as "... an evolving dystopian shadow myth that expresses 
repressed fears the culture has about its relationship to 
technology." 379
Another of Rifkin's vulnerabilities is his lack of 
specificity in defining both his empathetic world and his 
audiences. As noted earlier, I contend that his lack of
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specificity is intentional. Restricting descriptions of 
his empathetic world to idealistic generalities denies 
Rifkin's opponents the opportunity to criticize the 
inevitable weaknesses in the plan. This strategy allows 
Rifkin to focus on the weakness of the scientific 
orthodoxy rather than responding to specific criticisms of 
his alternative world view.
Similarly, Rifkin never clearly defines his 
audiences. Although identifying a target audience is 
among the first priorities of most effective rhetors, in 
Rifkin's case it appears to have little, if any, priority. 
Defining audiences narrows Rifkin's rhetorical 
flexibility; it weakens his "us vs. them" strategy. 
Rifkin's rhetorical advantage rests in his ability to 
define "us" as anything that is not science. Dividing the 
whole "us" into smaller segments exposes vulnerabilities 
in Rifkin's strategy.
A Case for Rhetorical Heretics
Undoubtedly, there are individuals in the scientific 
community who believe that Rifkin and advocates like him 
not only create unnecessary complications for their 
research, but engage in behavior that is mostly 
destructive to science and society. I agree that not all 
of Rifkin's activities generate ultimately positive 
results. So far, however, whatever detrimental 
consequences that result from the activities of opponents
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of biotechnology do not outweigh the benefits of increased 
public enlightenment.
It is reasonable to assume that if Rifkin and other 
opponents of biotechnology had not involved themselves in 
the recombinant DNA controversy, many of the issues being 
debated today might still lay dormant in a shroud of 
scientific privilege. It is likely that many of the 
regulations governing recombinant DNA would not have been 
enacted. Other than an initial concern for public 
involvement expressed in the Asilomar letter in the early 
stages of recombinant DNA development, scientists for the 
most part have discussed biotechnology research only after 
considerable persuasion or coercion from their opponents.
Although Rifkin represents an extreme point of view, 
and some of his concerns may be beyond what some people 
consider reasonable, he raises issues that need to be 
discussed and questions that need to be answered, not only 
by scientists, but the public as well. Chapter 1 noted 
that much of Rifkin's advocacy reflects the ideas of at 
least one highly regarded contemporary philosopher, Jurgen 
Habermas. Habermas provides the philosophical grounding 
to the notion that the world's population is exceeding the 
earth's ability to sustain continued consumption. Rifkin, 
however, is responsible for presenting the issues in a 
manner that provokes debate. The issues may have never 
been raised nor the questions asked if Rifkin had not
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become involved. Increased oversight in recombinant DNA 
research by government agencies and corporate bans on food 
containing BGH seem to validate at least some of Rifkin's 
concerns.
The public needs to be aware of the approaching 
ethical dilemmas that are likely to evolve from genetic 
engineering. For example, should limits be placed on the 
development of transgenic animals? Or, should the 
boundaries of this research be limited only by the 
creativity or technical expertise of the scientists 
involved? Should the public have the opportunity to debate 
these limits? Are species sacred? More troubling, 
however, are Rifkin's questions of the ethics of eugenics. 
Without suggesting that scientists are conspiring to 
genetically engineer a superior race of human beings, 
other questions of ethics surface as recombinant DNA is 
discussed in terms of human applications. There seems to 
be little debate as to whether scientists should employ 
genetic engineering to develop a cure for cancer or the 
HIV virus. Even discussions of using biotechnology to 
remedy disorders such as Downs syndrome or epilepsy draw 
few critics. But, as recombinant DNA applications venture 
further from the confines of catastrophic diseases and 
debilitating genetic disorders, the term "disorder" comes 
under closer scrutiny.
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Rifkin asks questions that may seem extreme now, but 
are certain to become more difficult to answer as 
biotechnology advances. For example, Rifkin asks if left- 
handedness and color blindness may one day be defined as 
disorders. If genetic engineering is used to cure 
dwarfism, would it be unreasonable to use the technology 
to increase the "normal11 height of people for athletic 
purposes? Would parents choose to dictate hair color, 
height, intelligence, etc. of their offspring if the 
technology provided the means? Even more sobering is the 
question, "Who will make these decisions?” Will it be the 
scientists, government agencies, or the individuals 
involved? These kinds of questions regarding genetic 
engineering are certain to spark debates about the ethics 
of these procedures. The public needs to be aware that 
these issues are likely to be topics of controversy in the 
years ahead.
Rifkin advances the argument that genetic engineering 
is the ultimate technological tool. Given biotechnology's 
capability to change existing plants and animals and 
create new ones, he may be right. Rifkin's ability to 
argue the necessity for public involvement in decisions as 
crucial as these is essential to the well being of science 
as well as society.
Although the public is less directly affected by 
biotechnology now than it will be in the future, it has a
207
stake in the ultimate uses of recombinant DNA research. 
Whether the debate is about applications that increase 
food production, lead to medical cures, or develop novel, 
new transgenic animals for carnival side shows, the public 
should have a voice in whether these kinds of research 
activities are pursued.
It is the necessity for public involvement that 
validates Rifkin's activities. A democratic society needs 
deliberative discourse that gives voice to the minority 
position on issues such as recombinant DNA.
Unfortunately, sometimes the only way these voices can be 
heard in the presence of a dominating paradigm, such as 
science, is through strident, persistent, and often 
extreme discourse. Although this discourse serves the 
purpose of exposing a controversy to more public scrutiny, 
it may simultaneously damage the credibility of the people 
whom it represents and the cause it espouses.
Heretical Rhetoric-other Considerations
Kurtz and Lessl observe the irony of heresy—that 
although the phenomenon is an attack on the orthodoxy, it 
also produces beneficial consequences such as increased 
solidarity among the supporters of the orthodoxy. This 
study revealed a similar, but different, irony. The 
evidence suggests that Rifkin's heretical challenge slows 
the advancement of recombinant DNA research. Although the 
scientific community views Rifkin's opposition as
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detrimental, science may realize some unexpected benefits 
from a more gradual implementation of biotechnology. A 
more deliberate approach to research projects may result 
in better project conceptualization, planning and 
implementation. Conceivably, these improvements may 
result in more meaningful technology. A higher level of 
consensus building may be another benefit of a more 
gradual approach to biotechnology. Increased 
implementation periods for research projects potentially 
provide researchers and others an opportunity to engage in 
activities that build support for their projects. In 
fact, Lawrence Prelli suggests that the notion of 
gradualism is among the topoi that form the basis for the 
rhetoric of science.380
Another consideration is ethics. During the ensuing 
debates surrounding the recombinant DNA controversy, the 
inevitable questions of ethics arise. Are Rifkin's 
analogies, metaphors, interpretations of scientific data 
and appeals to fear ethical? Are his lobbying efforts and 
legal battles ethical? Perhaps one way to address these 
questions is by responding to another question: "Is the
scientific community's rhetorical response to Rifkin's 
challenges ethical?"
The examination of the scientific community's 
response to Rifkin in Chapter 5 suggests that scientists 
formulate their rhetorical strategy primarily around the
legitimacy and credibility of Rifkin and his arguments 
rather than the issue themselves. However, the 
scientists' rhetorical approach to questioning the 
validity of Rifkin's arguments seem to suggest a more 
fundamental challenge. Rifkin's heretical stance is an 
affront to the assumptions of the scientific establishment 
and because it is based in social values, his opposition 
is perceived by the scientific community as a threat to 
scientific rationality. Because of the seriousness of the 
perceived threat, I contend that the scientific 
community's rhetorical approach strives not only to 
curtail debate to gain a deliberative advantage, but also 
seeks to deny Rifkin and others a forum to voice their 
opposition. Walter Fisher contends that moral issues are 
often "...submerged by ideological and bureaucratic 
arguments that insist on rival moralities and technical 
arguments which denudes it of morality altogether, making 
the dispute one for 'experts' alone to consider."381 
Farrell and Goodnight argue that "...even as technical 
reasoning encompasses an increasing array of social 
questions, its very logic precludes its practitioners from 
full social responsibility."382 If the scientific 
community's intent is to deny dissent, then its rhetoric 
assumes a dimension of questionable ethics.
Value-based judgements that represent public 
attitudes must have a role in the implementation of
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scientific technologies that have the potential of 
increasing societal anxieties. Fisher observes that 
"Humans as rhetorical beings are as much valuing as they 
are reasoning animals. "3#3 The inclusion of value-based 
decisions occur only through public scrutiny and debate of 
these technologies and the issues that accompany them. 
Recombinant DNA may be characterized as what Bitzer terms 
a "global exigency." Bitzer contends that many of today's 
exigencies are global in nature and "...no less than a 
universal public is sufficient to authorize their 
modification. "38*
Farrell and Goodnight suggest that "If the public is 
to be revitalized, then the language, the modes of 
decision-making, and procedures for establishing consensus 
must be discovered for both experts and generalists
305alike." If, then, deliberative discourse is the most 
direct route to consensus, the question of ethics is more 
appropriately directed to those endeavoring to impede 
discussion than those attempting to broaden the debate. 
This does not suggest that Rifkin's rhetorical strategies 
should be elevated above ethical considerations, but the 
dilemma of how to confront successfully the questionably 
ethical strategies of the massive scientific establishment 
raises questions of rhetorical priorities. Does the 
context of the controversy place a higher priority on 
access to the debate than ethical considerations? The
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analysis in this study suggests that Rifkin employed 
strategies designed to make the public aware of the 
advances of recombinant DNA and to draw the scientific 
community into the public arena to discuss the technology. 
For the most part, Rifkin appears to have taken only those 
steps necessary to accomplish these goals. While the 
scientific community questions the ethics of Rifkin's use 
of fear and analogies, his application of these rhetorical 
tools appears to be within the bounds of ethical 
rhetorical invention, particularly when the goal is to 
open debate on the biotechnology issue.
Summary
Rifkin's rhetorical efforts reflect the criteria of 
Kurtz' characterization of heresy. As a rhetorical 
approach, heresy elevates the arguments of the "deviant 
insider" in an institution to a high level of visibility 
and draws the defenders of the orthodoxy out of their 
cloisters to respond to the challenge. Heresy draws to 
the surface of social concerns issues that may never be 
visible otherwise. In Chapter 1 it was suggested that 
heresy eventually becomes the victim of its own success. 
Rifkin's heretical challenges validate that observation.
As the heresy increases visibility and points to the 
weaknesses in the orthodoxy, the heretic draws 
increasingly concentrated rhetorical retribution from the 
orthodoxy, ultimately becoming the victim of his own
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success. The more prominent the heretical challenge, the 
more vigilant the orthodox response.
The heretic whose only goals are to overcome the 
establishment and to establish the heretical agenda as the 
new orthodoxy is likely to find himself engaged in an 
effort destined for failure. If, however, the heretic's 
goal is to modify the existing orthodox doctrines and open 
hierarchial decisions to broader discussion, then he may 
realize a measure of success.
Although Rifkin espouses the cause of a new world 
order that replaces the scientific world view with his 
"empathetic" world view, the immediate results of his 
heretical challenge may produce the most important 
implications for rhetoric. Rifkin demonstrates that 
heresy is an important rhetorical strategy for elevating 
the visibility of an issue and drawing the opposition into 
the debate. While heresy offers neither a resolution to 
the dichotomy between technical reasoning and value-based 
reasoning nor a bridge to consensual discourse, its value 
is in its ability to initiate dialogue on issues otherwise 
relegated to obscurity.
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